Archive | June, 2010

Paradox of the Liar

9 Jun

This is a well known paradox by Eubulides of semantic meaningless.  Eubulides presents the riddle by saying the following:

“The declaration that I lie will be either true or false. But if this declaration is true, then I lie, and my declaration will be false. But if that declaration is false, then what it says-namely that I lie- is not the case and I must be speaking the truth. Thus either way the truth status being assigned is inappropriate.”

When you read Eubulides’ riddle, how do you think the word ‘liar’ is defined? If a person is a liar, here he is defined as one who cannot tell the truth. When the liar says ‘ I am lying’ there is way too much complexity there to fully know for sure if that person is telling the truth.

Think about it. If a liar says, I’m lying, how can you be sure that he is telling the truth? All truth statements would be wrong in some way. Every form of logic that is formulated is immediately denied because the statement is self contradictory and largely false. Lets try a truth table on this while classifying the statement ‘I lie’ as A

A                          Truth Value of the Statement

T                                       F

Why? If a congenital liar says ‘I lie’, and it is true that he is lying (A), then the truth value of the statement is false. If he says ‘I lie’, and its true that he is lying, then the truth of ‘I lie’ is zero.

F                                     T

Why?  If it is false  as a statement ‘I lie’, then he is not lying making the truth value of the statement true.

I believe that this paradox causes immediate negation when the statement is analyzed for its truth. When Nicolas Rescher explains this paradox in his book Paradoxes, he explains Ruestow’s  4 possibilities of explanation of this paradox.

First, Ruestow states the possibility of  the use of a fallacy in the foundation of the lie statement. My thoughts are that fallacy is not committed when this paradox is laid out. If this were so, you could just go to the beginning of the argument and change some things allowing for the whole paradox to eliminate itself, and I think this paradox to be more complicated than that.

Second, Ruestow’s solutions considered that the argument self destructs due to self negation. I think this is a big possibility, because like mentioned above, when statement A is true, its truth value is false. This denotes some self negation to some extent. However, I do not think the argument self destructs due to this self negation.

Third, Ruestow stated that there is semantic meaningless in the argument because it fails to remain true or false. Also, fourth, that the argument has referential failure. I think that this lie argument has semantic meaningless because when there is meaning, it just goes back to where it started.

My opinion is that there is a mix of the second and third issues in the lie paradox. I think that there is semantic meaninglessness because of how one has to think so hard about the words and how they connect to meaning to even understand the paradox itself. I also think there is self negation, but the argument does not self destruct due to this self negation.

Rescher states in his book the possibility of having a U as a truth value in a truth table because of the semantic meaninglessness and the self negation for these kind of paradoxes. He states this because, it is not fully known if the liar is lying (in case he can possibly tell the truth at times). He also states that this undecided truth value accurately solves the liar paradox because it is often undecided whether or not this person is lying.

So lets recap about the truth values of the statement A (‘I lie’). If statement A is true, then the truth value is false because of the truth in the fact that he is lying. If statement A is false, then the truth value is true because, if it is false that the man is lying, then the truth value of the statement is true. If statement A is undecided, then the truth value is true because it is not stated that he is lying, therefore what he is saying is true.

I think this argument is understood and solved because of how it is known that the argument self negates itself and is semantically meaningless. The argument is never fully solved, but the use of a U truth value makes it easier to grasp. This paradox is well known because of its difficulty of understanding. I have been having a hard time understanding my argument as I explain its properties.

Info was found from Paradoxes by Nicolas Rescher.

Comment below how you think the ‘I lie’ statement is paradoxical and how it is possibly solved.

See you tomorrow at 8pm central time for another dose of philosophical thought.

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~F Logic: Frege’s Conceptual Notation

9 Jun

This is  also for my ~F Logic (negation of falsity) page. I have been setting up that page to be a logicians guide to philosophy to use throughout thought in philosophy. Gottlob Frege was a big influence in logic and mathematics especially when he came up with this conceptual notation for logic and its propositions. There is not really a way to type out this conceptual notation, and doing it in a Paint document looks terrible, so the best I can do in showing this conceptual notation is to write it on paper and take photos of it and upload them (regardless of how low quality of the photos are). Hopefully, the pics of the conceptual notation are enough to explain Frege’s notation.

I wanted to get my thumb out of there while doing this. I wish I could type it or do it somehow on the computer so that these low quality photos of pieces of paper would not be necessary,  but for now and these purposes, it suffices.

Look at the middle figure, the one with the line and the A. This is the simplest of Frege’s conceptual notation. It identifies the essence of ideas and existences of A. No real judgment is made, so no certain proposition is declared. Now look at the top one, the lines with the A, B and C. This denotes an actual judgment so an actual proposition is made. A is the main thing discussed. The top figure translates to: If A exists, then a B exists. If B exists, then a C exists. The vertical bar at the beginning of the figure denotes that a judgment or certainty is made, unlike the line with the A where only vague essences are stated to exist. Considering the middle figure, most of Frege’s notation looks like this. Something will branch off of the top component or existence. It often becomes extensive and complicated where it is often split into two parts and worked out to find an actual meaning. I will post some of those complicated extensive notation examples in the future, but for now my aim is to show Frege’s conceptual notation and the things it can cooperate about each existence.

Look at the bottom figure. It looks kind of like the top figure. It denotes that if A, then B, except for the vertical bar in the area after A branches off to B. This lonely vertical bar denotes negation. So this translates: If not A, then B. Just because the negation bar is on the A side, it does not mean that the negation for sure sits with A. It could translate: If A, then not B. If the negation bar was before the branch of A to B, it would definitely negate A without possibility of negation of B. If there was a negation bar on each side of the B branch, A ‘s negation would cancel and no negation would exist. Hopefully the figures above and my explanation give the gist of what Frege’s notation is supposed to explain in each branch and bar. This gets more complicated.

Usually, notation in Frege does not  just deal with single variables denoting one existence, component or essence. A function of these existences is usually denoted by certain symbols in this type of notation. The top figure I could have just typed out. This is one example of a function. These functions in Frege’s notation usually  denote relations between variables or properties of functions in variables. The top figure F(A) denotes A has a property F function. The  function of the Greek letter phi and A and B denotes that A and B relate to each other by phi (Refer back to the Pics for thought page to see the relation sequence of Wittgenstein because A and B relate to each other in the same way as Wittgenstein shows it with existential quantifiers).  The bottom figure shows a judgment of phi’s property in B as a function. Notice one difference in this  notation than the other ones explained in the first photo. This notation has a concave part in the middle with lowercase b in the concave space. This can also be expressed by italicizing the B in the phi(B) function judgment, but I like the concave line better with the lowercase letter. This represents a generality. The third figure above reads: For some b, phi is a property of B as a function. I like to think of this generality as an existential quantifier in predicate based logic because it denotes the word “some”.  Without this concavity or italics, the universal quantifier could be used with the judgment.

The above is one figure, one judgment, one relationship. It is quite a big relationship, but you can see in the middle a 3 lined symbol in the middle. This denotes that both expressions above and below are equal to each other. The beginning of the notation here is 2 vertical bars, where normally only one judgment bar sits, but here there are 2 because 2 expressions are noted. The 2 expressions noted here: first is the regular notation I have discussed here, and the second notation is an abbreviated notation Frege used to shorten conceptual notations.  The abbreviated versions involve Greek letters in place of English letters. The English letters are used in the actual notation and one is supposed to make the transition when reading the abbreviated notation and translating it to conceptual notation. Lets analyze the regular conceptual notation first. The first note is if some a, then a phi property of a exists as a function. If the previous exists, a and b relate to each other by the f function. Also, if some a, and a property phi exists in a, then some b exists in a phi property of b as a function (note how f(a,b) does not relate to phi function of b). This notation is quite a simple judgment. Frege uses the second  expression to abbreviate the long conceptual notation.  Here Frege uses the delta sign (δ) to show b, and the alpha letter (α) to show a.  The delta and alpha are first shown in the abbreviated notation by a long vertical bar going from the delta to the alpha (different variables used intermittently). A big long ‘(‘ parentheses is used next to the long delta alpha bar to show 2 extreme functions explained by the conceptual notation.  Here, F(alpha) and f(alpha,delta) is shown to note that A and B and A/B together are shown in functions as judged in the notation. Generalities are shown in any function of a and b unless it is known that they are universal. Later in the future, I will show a few conceptual notations and the abbreviated forms and set them up for practice to be converted from one form to another and I’ll give the answers. This abbreviated notation is a smaller form of the abbreviated kind.

Again, this is a doubly judged equation, where one expression equals another. This is the same thing as the first equation of notation, but the abbreviated expression is different. First lets analyze the conceptual notation. For some F, there is properties of F in y as a function and if this is true then, for some a, F exists as a property in a, and if this is true, then x and a relate to each other by f as a function.  Also, for some F, you see that abbreviated notation set by itself and it has the same properties and connections as the first kind of notation like this explained. We would then have to translate this into another conceptual notation and this would be a huge conceptual notation to analyze. The abbreviated expression here shows a lambda and a beta letter one on top of the other separate by a negation ~ sign followed by the function f and x sub lambda and y sub beta.  The lambda and beta separated by ~ means that y follows x. The fact that y follows x is shown by lambda and beta separated by ~ and how x has a subscript of lambda and y has a subscript of beta. The use of lambda and beta at the start of the expression and as subscripts of x and y just show that y follows x in function f. By y following x, Frege means that the conceptual notation starts at the top with functions of y. I also want to post problems on this ~F page where you are given the conceptual notation and are supposed to convert it to abbreviated notations and vice versa.

Delta and epsilon are separated by an I  followed by the function of delta and epsilon. This translates to  the function of delta’s relation to epsilon is the many one. The many-one means that each variable comes with a generality (a,b,e) . This many-one also denotes that the epsilon variable and the main variable a are equal to each other. Lets analyze the conceptual notation expression: for some a, b, and e,  a is equal to e. and if this is true, b and a relate to each other by terms of f as a function. For some e and b, b and e relate to each other by f as a function. The many-one creates another variable besides the one presented in the abbreviated notation. This is just another kind of the small abbreviated notation like the one first discussed. There is one more abbreviation of conceptual notation to discuss.

Look at the gamma and beta organization in the abbreviated expression. There is one thing added besides the ~. A horizontal bar is added above the ~ which makes this abbreviation of notation different. This modified following notation denotes that y belongs to f starting with x. This causes an equality to be needed before the notations are presented. Generally, this would start with a y being equal to x and then it would conclude with a conditional statement with negation of that same abbreviated following notation but without the horizontal bar above the ~ putting things back to normal and leaving that following notation to be translated.

This is not for anything interesting to be argued about, but I think it is necessary to learn about to understand some later philosophers explanations.

Time’s Relation to Space in Nature: In Reference to Whitehead

8 Jun

This is not meant to be in direct relation to Whitehead’s work, but in his book Process and Reality he states his theory of nature, with time and space as its components. It  is the relation between time and space that I want to argue against Whitehead. In his work, Whitehead said the following things causing me to want to argue about it. Thats usually my tendency:

” It is hardly more than a pardonable exaggeration to say that the determination of the meaning of nature reduces itself principally to a discussion of the character of time  and the character of space.”

By saying this, Whitehead says that time and space are only components of nature and not anything else.

and also:

“There can be no time apart from space, and no space apart from time.”

This second proposition is what startles my arguing arsenal more. First, I do not feel that time is only involved in nature. Space however, is because it is a part of the creatum. I want my argument to be in this work that time can exist without relation to space and without being a part of nature. Also, that space does not/will not/ has not always exist(ed). Hopefully I achieve my goal.

Spinoza often denotes God as natura naturans and the creatum as natura naturata, denoting that both are a part of nature, but I do not think that God is nature. God created nature and manages nature, but is not nature Himself. Nature is a part of the earth and exists on the earth. Nature takes up space. Nature is of the creatum most importantly. Pagans worshiped nature and the earth, and did not worship God. Nature is different from God. God created nature and the two are not equal.

I think that Whitehead is right when he says that nature is divided into time and space, but when he says there can be not time without space and no space without time, he is partly wrong. There can be time without space. There cannot be space without time. Time always exists regardless of the world it measures time of. Time is always there whether there is space or not.

Before going into why there can be time without space, lets clarify why there cannot be space without time. First, time always exists regardless of anything else as stated above. Second, if there was some possibility where time would not exist, space could not possibly exist because if there is a tangible existence, there must be time to measure its length in the continuum.  So, if there is a tangible existence, time must always exist. By tangible I mean not holy, spiritual, or thought bound. Tangible meaning things that are physical like bodies, earth and other systems. If any of these things exist, time comes along with it.

∀xTx(Ex ⊃ TIx)

In other words, in all tangible things, if there is an existence, there is time.

This is something I want to keep in the back of ones head about the existence of the world. Do not forget that this only occurs in tangible things, or Tx. Space is by the way a tangible existence in all its possible forms.

Lets think about the big thing I want to argue today. Why does Whitehead think that time cannot exist without space? Why does time exist/has existed/may exist without space?

Whitehead may have thought that time cannot exist without space because he does not think that there can be existences without space.  Im sure he knew that time always exists regardless of whatever else is going on but he did not consider the possibility and for suredness that there are existences that do not take up space. This is something he may have overlooked due to his religious beliefs or other things.

Like I said before, space, nature and bodies are tangible existences that are a part of the creatum. God created the creatum for us to live in. All of the creatum and infinite space around it is space that is still tangible regardless of its infinity. So where is God, heaven and hell in this picture? Whitehead said that time and space do not exist without each other because he did not consider the fact that there are existences that are not tangible. God, angels, demons, Satan, heaven, and hell are not tangible existences like the creatum and its infinity.

I believe that the spiritual world (God, heaven, hell, angels, spirits, demons, and Satan) is not a tangible world and is not equal in components. This spiritual world does not take up space like the creatum does. For example, ghosts that are lost on this earth appear to the living tangible world here, and we can walk through them and vice versa and feel their presence, but how can this world be tangible if certain people can walk through others? This world is a place for us to go after we die (heaven or hell). This place is not the same as the world we live in now and is not a part of the creatum. This world is not a part of the creatum because it was made before the tangible existences were made. This world is not the creatum even though God created all of it. This spiritual intangible world has existed forever in the past, exists now, and will forever exist in the future. Think about this world being in existence before the creatum we live in today. There was no space (because the spiritual world did/does/will not occupy spaces).

Keeping all of this in mind, if there is ever an existence in the continuum tangible or intangible, a time sub-continuum exists. So, in the past and the very late future, when there is no creatum and just the spiritual world of intangible existences, there will still be time even though there is no space. Point made.

So time and space are a part of nature but time being a part of nature does not imply that time only exists in nature, because time exists and has existed as long as any existence tangible or intangible exists.

So, to sum up, in my opinion,  there is no space without time, but there is time even though there is no space. I would want to argue with Whitehead about this. I think I could present a positive case.

Thanks for support see you tomorrow at 8 pm central time.

Comment below your thoughts plz.

Bentham’s Principles of Morals and Legislation: Sovereign Masters and Utility

7 Jun

Jeremy Bentham begins his book Principles of Morals and Legislation by talking about pain and pleasure and specifying into stating the Principle of Utility. I think his beginning philosophy is enough to spark a lot of philosophical thought and argument,so I decided to put up this argument even though I have only read the first 2  pages of the PML.  I do not know if this will turn out to be a short (like my recent Zizek notes, or my Wittgenstein  late 5 notes) or a regular work.

Bentham begins his book by saying: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters: pain and pleasure” (Bentham). What he says after that up until the Utility principle does not matter to what I want to argue  here. He says that there are 2 things nature governs mankind under: pain and pleasure. This states that our emotions, physical feelings and thoughts are either painful or pleasurable. By calling pain and pleasure sovereign masters, Bentham is inferring that these 2 things are prevalent in mankind and occur a lot in a man’s life, governing how he does things and how things come out, and therefore his entire life, therefore, pain and pleasure are sovereign masters.

For example: If a guy has been working at  a HVAC company for 19 years and has had better reviews from the company’s customers than any other customer. He is happy right? So pleasure is governing his thoughts and feelings now. This happiness causes him to feel that he thinks he can have his own HVAC business that he can be his own boss in. If the business goes down and gets little business because of the economy, he sells his company and gets hired by another corporate HVAC company because of how painful and sad that experience was owning his own business.

See how pain and pleasure governed each action he did. Sovereign masters pain and pleasure are.
The fact that pain and pleasure are sovereign masters is not the matter I want to argue here however. Are pain and pleasure the only sovereign masters that govern mankind? Bentham states so and continues in his principles and says nothing more on the matter, but I think either position can be argued through rhetoric and its tactics.

The arguments are that the only sovereign masters are pain and pleasure (calling this argument X), and the other argument is that other masters govern mankind (calling this argument W). Like I said before, I think either one can be argued, but in each argument below I am stating justifications for thinking each argument

W

Pain and pleasure are not the only masters governing mankind. Things such as half neutral/half mad   and half neutral/half happy along with neutral exist. These things are midways between the two extremes of pain and pleasure. One cannot always feel one way or the other, there has to be midways between 2 extremes. Confused is another master that governs mankind because not only should a man be able to be in between 2 extremes, but he should be able to be not sure of his emotions, opinions or what he should do.

Sovereign Masters

1) Pain

2) Pleasure

3) Half Neutral/Half pained

4) Half Neutral/ Half pleasured

5) Neutral

6) Confusion

Items 3 through 6 cannot be brought into either 1 or 2.

X

Every possible situation fits either into pain or pleasure. It is not possible for someone to be neutral on a subject or confused without having some bias. Even a tiny amount of bias or opinion will cause a person to be overcome by one of the 2 sovereign masters. Or, this tiny bit of bias/opinion will cause the person to go the opposite way to the other sovereign master. Either way, the man ends up being governed by one of the two sovereign masters.

Between arguments X and W, what do you think? Do you have your own hypothesis?

I think this can be correlated with another work here on my site about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus proposition 4.023 because it deals with is there a gray area between black and white propositions.

I disagree with Bentham’s thought that there is only pain and pleasure. I think there are 3 sovereign masters that govern mankind. There is the pain and pleasure of course. I also think there is the master of confusion because a man is not always governed by pain or pleasure, because when a man is governed by one of the two things, he is sure of his feelings, thoughts and opinions (If he agrees with a proposition he is pleasures, if not, pained). If we knew and were sure about every thing we dealt with and experienced, philosophy, science and other arts would never be necessary and in the practice of these things, a master of confusion must be possible to get somewhere in research and philosophizing.

One may argue that there can be sub states that make their own master out of the first 2 (in my case 3) masters. Why is a half neutral/pleasured state not its own master? Because it is half pleasured, it is not confused and pained, therefore it goes into the pleasure master and is a part of it. If it had pained with it instead of half neutral, it would be the confused master. Anything half neutral and half pained or pleasured, is not its own category because it goes into the half category it represents.

Also, why is a full neutral master not possible? We all get to know something by being in the confusion state for awhile until we understand something enough to develop an opinion or argument about it, once that opinion or argument is formulated, it moves from the confusion state immediately to either the pained master of the pleasured state. An opinion or thought, maybe even an argument emerges immediately when something is understood. There is no time or possibility for a neutrality. One might say he or she is neutral because he knows something will happen if he says he agrees or disagrees, but no one is ever neutral on any subject ever while he or she understands it. It may be able to be said that one can be neutral on a subject while in the master of confusion, but I do not think so because that would be not giving an argument a chance to allow you to understand it before you make a choice.

You always have an opinion or argument about a thing immediately when  you understand it. No exceptions.

Principle of Utility

This is the main thing Bentham states in the first part of the book but I feel it needs less argument. The principle states that in each object, a property exists that good, pleasure, happiness or good knowledge emanates from and is found in. This is like that old saying that ‘there is good in everybody’ but in this case everything too!  What do you think? Do you think there is good in each and every existence? I think not. There would not be a hell and a Satan if this was true. There is good in most things of the universe except for one being that is the same being as hell itself: Satan. Satan does not have good in any property in him. All of him is evil and all of hell is evil.

Satan and hell is the only thing to concern with when talking about utility in everything (utility is the good property in everything).  Other than Satan and hell, everything and every being has utility. Every soul and every part of the creatum (except for Satan and hell) has utility in it because it is made in God’s image and is made for people to serve God. The only exception in its entirety is Satan and Hell.

Utility is not as big of a thing to argue as the sovereign masters of mankind, but it is important to understand that utility does exist for the most part.

What do you think? Is utility a part of the entire world? Is pain and pleasure the only sovereign masters?

Comment below your opinions if you’d like and I’ll respond.

Henri Bergson’s The Two Sources: Against Nature’s Static Religion

3 Jun

Henri Bergson’s work The Two Sources of Morality and Religion concern just those things. Bergson sections off an area in the work for Static Religion. The big topic concerns the division between man and other animals and their difference. Man and animal have differences in intelligence that everyone knows about. We would not have the problems and dilemmas we have everyday unless we were intelligent (more so than inferior animals). Bergson relates this intelligence of ours to the religion we believe and the deity(ies) we worship. Think about the connection between intelligence and having religion before reading on. Then go on.

Like in the other statement of Bergson I last addressed in my last Bergson opinionated work, a paragraph in Bergson’s text begins and explains things (most likely premises) and an end italicized inference (conclusion). The preceding material in the paragraph is necessary what Bergson means down to the word to understand the whole proposition. Bergson begins the paragraph about static religion, talking about how the actions of man are often uncertain because of our superior intelligence. Bergson states that for an animal, instinct and habit provides their daily routine and solves all of their momentary problems. A man having superior intelligence has the ability to imagine all scenarios and apparently, man will expect the worst scenario, this causes the man’s future to be uncertain because he knows about how possible it is that his life could go awry. The paragraph preceding the inference explains this thought about intelligence and man’s state. Bergson uses these facts to define static religion:

It is a defensive reaction of nature against what might be depressing for the individual, and dissolvent for society, in the exercise of intelligence” (Bergson).

By it, Bergson means static religion, or just religion to make things as simple as possible. This quote states that nature reacts in a defensive way because of the things in this world. In life, things might get depressing because, in short, life sucks (sometimes, not all the time, as it is shown here). What is depressing to the individual? We can probably name about a billion things: bills, foreclosure, divorce, bankruptcy, death, illness….. Lets define dissolvency. If something is solvent, it dissolves throughout everything, and the thing it dissolves in is okay with it being there and it will cooperate with it. If something is dissolvent, it does not cooperate with the things around it. What is dissolvent for society? Drugs, gambling, alcoholism, crime etc…. These things only occur according to Bergson because man and men in society are intelligent and they try to perceive everything, and in this process, depressing things and dissolvent things come about just because they are known to exist. Because of these intelligences, Bergson says that nature creates a defense against these depressive things and dissolvencies.  This defensive tactic that nature creates, involves itself in the lives of men and society making it feel better and secure about the bad things that can/will occur to them in their lifetime. If intelligence were not here, this would not even be needed, but men are intelligent and see all scenarios of their possible existence, and it scares them. Bergson says that nature uses religion or static religion as this defense mechanism to make man feel secure about the bad possibilities of existence.

Bergson saying that nature creates this defense in religion, creates a lot of room for argument. With this proposition, he states the following:

  • God does not exist, but rather nature controls the equilibrium of the universe and its life.
  • None of the current religions are truthful.
  • Bad bad things will happen to people on this earth and beyond.
  • There is no known purpose for the universe.
  • There is no known creator of the creatum.

The fact that nature is the entity/deity (maybe?) casting any defense to stabilize something, states that God does not exist. If God exists, nature is not a real living thing itself, just the living things God created. If nature is the thing casting any form of defense, the current religions it casts as defense  are all false. Also, people are doomed to bad bad results according to this statement. Nature, the possible deity that controls things, would be misleading its living things, because, the intelligence of the man causes him to rightly concern himself with the worst case scenarios that will likely happen to them. Nature using religion to disguise these truths is not something I can fathom. If these things are so, there is no purpose for existence of the man and living things. If there is a misleading, natura god that pretty much directs you to perish, there is no purpose for the life of the man. Because of there being no purpose, there cannot have been a creator either, and if there is not creator, there is no existence, unless that existence is a supreme deity, which in this case there is none. So there is no purpose, therefore no creator, therefore there cannot be any possibility for anything to exist in this small statement by Bergson. Bergson is wrong in this proposition.

I want to explain the way things really are before blatantly rejecting Bergson’ s statement here. One thing I love about Henri Bergson’s philosophy is that his ideas are outside of the box and I have to over explain myself to even understand why I do not agree with a certain statement of his. The world today, in real life, is created, run, loved, and caused by God. God does everything.  I reject this proposition because each stipulation that goes with this statement of Bergson’s goes against the possibilities of the way things are. We live here and serve a purpose to serve, love, and converse with God. We live here for Him. We will soon go to either heaven or hell based on our commitment to God. I use the word creatum a lot in my work because it represents all of the things created. I feel it works well because, the creatum and the creator are different entities and should be explained differently. I explain more about this in my work about Spinoza and Godly substance monism. I take the word creatum from use of it while arguing Spinoza’s position. If this statement of Bergson were true, only the creatum would exist, and this would be like Spinoza’s attribute existing without the existence of a substance: not possible. Nature is a part of the creatum. In reality, God created nature and nature does not control anything itself. Nature is just a largely categorized group of living things. Therefore, nature could not have done anything (could not have casted any defense).

Before I felt the need to explain the conditions Bergson states to exist in this proposition, before I wanted to explain what was suspectedly occurring. Placing aside the fact that nature could not cast any kind of defense because it is creatum and placing aside the fact that this defense would lead the man to doom, what is this religion that nature is supposedly passing?

Lets define religion (again aside from all of the previous things that disqualify Bergson’s statement from truth): The state of a religious commitment, or the devotion to a religious faith or observance. Nature is here using a falsity as a defense. This falsity is false because, it is not possible that this religion is true (like the reality one). The religion created as a defense to depression and dissolvency is a false truth that will lead the man to doom. This religion, regardless of its truth, causes a man to confide in it and trust it with his life. The man will practice it and adhere to it in his life as much as he can because he feels that it is the only way he can prevent himself from having bad things happen to him. When the man dies and suffers eternally, his trust is violated just because nature wanted to stabilize things for awhile. In Bergson’s statement, man would be continuously violated in his trust because of a false deity. Thank God, our god is not a part of the creatum and protects our lives.

Rejecting Bergson’s statement here, makes me thank God more and more that he will not violate our trust, let us have eternal hardships, or let us suffer eternally. Our God stays with us all the time making sure we are okay and are helped from our necessary hardships.

I feel that I want to again present Bergson’s proposition here logically. I want to show how Bergson is wrong in a few logical sentences of contradiction.

∀x(Nx –> ~Px)

In all existence, nature is not controlling.

∀x(Rx –> Tx)

In all existence, religion causes full trust.

∀xGx

In all existence, God exists and is all powerful.

∀x(Ix–>Fx)

In all existence, intelligence causes fear.

∀xRx(Fx –> ~Ex)

In all religion, fake ones do not cause equilibrium in nature and universe.

When religion is created and employed upon a certain number of people, it may have a certain power that causes people to believe in it and trust its deities.  Religion has an overpowering power of trust that could kill an elephant if it was poison. Religion should only be used for comfort, conversation with God, inspiration, spiritual involvement and other things when a true God is behind it. Without this true God, the religion is an empty shell that will have everlasting horrible effects on those that exit the religion. Because of this, Bergson is so wrong, because nothing (no existence) could just throw religion around to fit a situation for awhile just to stabilize some things. Once the religion blew over, it would have everlasting detrimental effects to the living men there and equilibrium and stability would no longer be a problem because of how bad things would be imbalanced.  Religion and its power should not be messed with.  Religion messes men up every day where they die after worshiping the wrong deity and practicing the wrong religion their whole lives and ending up in hell for eternity. That is the best example of the power of religion and its everlasting detrimental results, regardless of who uses religion loosely, it is wrong that it can be used so in any fashion.

As I explained before, it is also not possible that nature did the religion throwing and how it would stabilize things at all (it may stabilize the world for awhile, but once men find out the religion is an empty shell, there will be a forever imbalance in the world).

Bergson was right about one thing: intelligence causes men to know every possible scenario causing them to expect the worse scenario causing paranoidal depression and dissolvency. But the religion that is not empty, but has a true large and powerful deity is the religion that is not used as a defense tactic, but it is used as a device to save and comfort those who want the safety and comfort. This religion will save you from all worst case scenarios and it will help you get through the hard times here on earth. No member of the religion will find out that the religion is an empty case and end up in demise.

I think Bergson was inferring that religion is always an empty box and no deity ever shows up in this statement, but I immediately shoot down this opinion and show why the empty religious fake is so detrimental.

Bergson’s statement here, is just one thing that says that intelligence causes fear that something will have to cover, but in it, it packs so much inferences and conclusions that need to be addressed. It packs the thought that intelligence causes fear, that nature uses religion whenever it wants, it shows that God does not exist to sit behind religious environments, it shows that society and man needs to be balanced, it shows that no God exists, it shows that nature is the smallest possible controlling thing that exists, and on………… I believe I addressed all of them in different ways.

Comment below if you would like  on what you think about Bergson’s statement on static religion in the Two Sources. Comment below and I will respond in address to your thoughts.

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: 5.621- 5.633 Notes

2 Jun

These 4 propositions in the fifth part of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus  are the ones that denote his solipsist views. I like this part of the Tractatus because it has so much room for argumentation because of how it leads to neutral monism and solipsism.

Lets start with the proposition 5.621: “The world and life are one” (Wittgenstein). This idea highly paves the way for solipsism. In todays world, it is obvious that the world and life are 2 different things to discuss in philosophy. The world is obviously this place we live in and exist about. As we perceive it, we exist upon this world and not a part of it. Life is the existence of ourselves. Life is obviously understood. Thinking about the world and life as 2 different things, do you think it is possible that the 2 are 1 together in themselves?

My opinion about 5.621 is that the world is just a place for us to exist for our short lives on earth. We exist to serve God and prove that we have committed to Him. After being on this earth we will go to either hell or heaven, but either way, the world is just a place for us to be in the short time we live physically. I do not feel that our life is connected to the world we live in. Our life is connected to God because He created us and will determine where we live in all points of our existence. The world we live in has no connection to our life. I disagree with Wittgenstein’s 5.621, because the world and life are not connected in any way and are in no way ‘one’. Because of this, I also disagree with solipsism and neutral monism (as you may have seen in other works on this site).

5.63- “I am my world” (Wittgenstein).

To go really far into solipsism, each person has their own perception creating their own world. I feel that this cannot be because, each person has their own thing and wouldn’t each person’s world intersect with each other? (this argument coming up in another work). This is a key solipsist proposition because it states that you are your world.  Each world is different based on the difference of the person. This states that ‘I’ am ‘my’ world because perception creates the world, directly relating perception to existence of the ‘my’ world. I feel that this is clearly wrong. I believe that there is no ‘my’ world because the world is a what is created by God and is perceived the same by each person. Each person is not the world. The person’s existence is totally separate from the world.

5.631- “There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas” (Wittgenstein).

By subject, Wittgenstein means a part of the person, life or world. This states that a part of a person that perceives things cannot think or entertain ideas like the whole can. 5.631 points out that the subject parts cannot function by themselves, and do not think by themselves. These subjects function as a whole together.

I think this is true to some extent. I think in most things, subjects do not function without being together as a whole, but the world has subjects that think and entertain ideas. In the self, many people are known to exist as subjects and those people do think and entertain ideas. I think  in this case, this is not true.

5.632- “The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world” (Wittgenstein).

I do understand why subject parts are understood as limits of the world.  Subjects may change the whole to modify it and end up limiting it. I also understand that subject parts cannot belong to the world. The world is a physically created thing for us to live on and it belongs to God. Nothing belongs to the world. The world is just another part of the creatum. I totally  agree with this proposition because I think that the subject does not belong to the world that cannot have anything belong to it, and I think that subject parts can modify the world and end up limiting it. This is one of the few things I agree with Wittgenstein on.

5.633- “Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?…..” (Wittgenstein).

Wittgenstein goes on in the proposition to compare this to the case of the eye where things are explained to be seen by a device of sight. I think this question should be answered by declaring that different modes of sight exist that look upon the world and see metaphysical subjects within it. In God, the world, people and spirits, metaphysical phenomena and subjects exist, but are not often seen or understood. Maybe Wittgenstein says this because the solipsist neutral monist self does not see metaphysical subjects because everything comes from the self to them.

I think that metaphysical subjects exist in the creatum and outside the creatum. Metaphysical subjects exist mostly in God (Wittgenstein would not have inferred this because of his lack of belief in God).

This has been mostly a few notes on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus solipsist propositions. I am planning and researching for a big paper on the rejection of neutral monism and solipsism and wanted to note the propositions 5.621 to 5.633. I meant this to be short, and for a reference for later works.

Henri Bergson’s Matter and Memory: Law of Masters

2 Jun

I call this law the law of masters because it says that one thing is the master of another. I do not think that this is universally called the Law of Masters, but in the essay, there is little else it is identified as. If there is something that this law is universally called (will state it below) please say so in the comments and I will change the title of this post. I just read this part of Bergson’s essay of Matter and Memory and saw this italicized proclamation.

“Perception is master of space in the exact measure in which action is master of time.” (Bergson)

I feel that declaring that perception is master of space is the main proclamation but I think the fact that action is master of time is also introduced when it is compared with perception mastering space. 2 philosophical things are to be argued from this law in Matter and Memory. As I do in most of my work I like to thoroughly explain what each statement means and argue for or against each statement.

There is a paragraph that Bergson writes that leads up to this law. I would like to explain his pre-statements to fully understand his justification for the law.

First, the beginning sentence states that “the degree of independence of which a living being is master allows then of an a priori estimate of the number and the distance of the things with which it is in relation” (Bergson). I took out an alternate definition Bergson uses:  “the zone of indetermination which surrounds its activity” (Bergson). I took this out because I feel it confuses the reader. 2 explanations to think about and relate to the condition he explains I feel is too much to do for my purposes right now. Now lets analyze this first sentence. If something is independent to a certain degree of the thing it masters, the amount of independence allows an ‘a priori’ estimate of the number and distance of the relation of the master and the mastered.  A things independence of the thing it masters creates an ‘a priori’ estimation of number and distance of the master and the mastered. So if a master has independence of what it masters an a priori estimation of the number and distance between the master and the mastered. I just stated those things because I wanted to break down into understandable terms the first sentence. What is a priori? A priori in Kant and others is knowledge and/or perception of things before the fact/ before something comes into existence/before something happens. So, if a master has independence, it has pre-existential/pre-occurence knowledge about the number and distance between the master and the mastered. This shows that the master has a lot more knowledge and power over what is mastered.

“Whatever this relation may be, we can affirm that its amplitude gives the exact measure of the indetermination of the act which is to follow” (Bergson). The first part of the sentence states that there is a relation between the master and the mastered (as shown in the first sentence). Lets define amplitude in this case. I find 4 definitions of the word amplitude but I feel this one matches our situation the best: the extent or range of a quality, property, process, or phenomenon. Amplitude is the range of phenomenon I think in this case.  The relation between the master and the mastered, has the condition where its range of phenomenon gives the measure of indetermination of the act that follows. This just states that the relation between the master and the mastered allows one to know a lot about the act that will follow in the relation between the master and mastered.

Bergson states that the above 2 statements allows us to follow that: perception is master of space in the extent measure in which action is master of time (Bergson). Perception is the master of space just like action is the master of time. I would like to relate each of the masteries to the above 2 statements that allowed Bergson to infer the law of masters (as I call it). The degree of independence of perception from space allows perception to have an a priori estimate of the number and distance between itself (perception) and its mastered item space. Because Bergson inferred this law from the first 2 sentences, he declares that perception is independent, consistent of a priori knowledge, and masterful. Also, perception relating to space is able to affirm that the range of phenomenon in perception and space gives the exact measure of indetermination of the actions to follow in the perception (also space, but this need not be said because perception’s actions correlates with space’s actions). Because of these things, it is for sure by Bergson that perception is the master of time.

Action’s independence of time allows action to have an a priori knowledge of the estimate of the number and distance between action and time. The relation between action and time allows us to affirm that the range of phenomenon gives the exact measure of the indetermination of the act that follows in action (also in time, but again, the actions in action correlate directly with the actions in time due to their relation).

Because of these things, it is inferred by Bergson that perception is the master of space just like action is the master of time. Action/time is used as a comparison with perception and space. Perception and space might be the main thing Bergson states in this law, but I think in the comparison, he states that action is the master of time and it is just as important as perception and space.

Think about what it means for something to master another. If mastery is not familiar, it should be looked up because the mastery of one thing over another is the heart of Bergson’s law/argument. If one thing masters another, it governs its actions. If one thing masters another, it can represent the mastered all by itself without the need of the mastered. If something masters another, the master is independent of the mastered.  The mastered is dependent on the thing it is mastered by. Mastered in this situation can be thought of as subjugated, outsmarted, held hostage, conquered, learned totally,  supervised, defeated,….etc. Could go on and on. If the idea of something mastering another is not clear, please say so. I want everything to be clear and understandable before positions on Bergson’s law are argued.

I want to have the correct tactics in explaining a philosopher’s justifications for a proposition and arguing why one would think either argument, along with clearly explaining my position in this cosmos. I wanted to go beyond my usual topics lately to test my tactics at explanation and argumentation. If you have suggestions and criticisms, say so in comments below. Please by frank and critical.

Going on with Bergson’s mastery law. Lets deal with the first part of his law: perception is master of space. What is perception? What we perceive is our world. Perception is what we see, how we interpret the world around us, and our placement of opinions about the world. What is space? Space is the physical world with or without things in it. It can be concluded that Bergson thought that perception governs how we see space, therefore perception masters space. I think that this law can be related to neutral monism and solipsism because according to Bergson, our own perceptions created by the self/soul govern the nature of space (the things and spaces around us). Neutral monism states that the world is created from the self and the material of the world comes from the self/soul because the self perceives the world. To neutral monism, the only thing that matters is the self’s perception of the world. The perception that the self creates is our only way of knowing anything. We cannot know anything about the physical space without our own perceptions according to Bergson and neutral monists (solipsists too). Because perception governs how we see everything around us, space cannot be understood or seen without perception, therefore according to Bergson, perception masters space (Bergson’s/neutral monists/solipsists position only, not mine).

Action masters time. Time might be thought of as a governing item, but what happens in time masters it according to Bergson. Because action happens so frequently, time shows relation in occurrences.  Actions occur so frequently and are more important than the relations between when they happen. Because, according to Bergson, action has more importance, involvedness, and relevance than time does, therefore action masters time.

Based on explanations of perception mastering space, and action mastering time, if you want, comment below on one or both things and if you think Bergson is right or wrong.

On Bergson’s statement that perception masters space, I strongly disagree with Bergson. A little bit back in this work, where I correlated this thought with neutral monism and solipsism, I still feel this thought is close to those things. Neutral monism and solipsism think that the self is the only means for perception and creation of the world (space). I disagree with neutral monism and solipsism whole heartedly, and this first part of Bergson’s mastery law correlates directly with these things, therefore I strongly disagree with the fact that perception masters space. I do not think perception masters anything. Perception is only our sight, interpretation and slim understanding of the world around us. Perception is the only small possible way we can understand anything. Many many things lie outside our possibility of perception. Perception cannot possibly perceive all that exists and goes on in the cosmos, therefore perception is not worth much. There are many things we cannot understand and perception is our only means of understanding the world. If perception is not worth much and cannot allow us to understand all that exists, perception masters nothing. God is infinitely enormous in his size, power, thought and creation powers. Compared to God, our minds are infinitely small and useless. We cannot go beyond regular perception to understand the world unless we have gone to heaven. Philosophy only correlates to things on this world, therefore perception is all we have. Perception cannot perceive the works, love and existence (knowledge too) of God, therefore perception cannot master anything and sure does not master space.

If perception does not master space, what then masters space? God masters space. God created space and all in it. I believe in Godly Spinozistic substance monism where God is the only substance of creation in the universe. God created space not the self.

On the statement by Bergson that action masters time, I agree with Bergson. I have some apprehensions to whole heartedly agreeing with this thought, but for my understanding at this moment, I believe that action masters time. I want to first talk about what I think time is in this world. Time to God is basically nothing. Time that is long to us, is infinitely small to God. Time is only a device for referring to when things happen. Everything exists, and time is not a necessary thing to explain everything and its existences. Time is just a device for understand the phenomenon of when. If nothing ever happened, time would not be necessary. For example, the Precambrian time as referred to in geology is a time where everything began to evolve from cyanobacteria and very very little happened in this time. The Precambrian time covers a long long long time in history with little divisions in it. This time is so long because very little happened in it. If a lot happened in evolution and geology, it would be divided down to the epoch just like the Phanerozoic era. Because nothing really happened in the Precambrian time, time was not really necessary to divide much up. If nothing happens, time is not necessary to define when each action happens. If tons of things happen in one small time period, time is infinitely necessary to explain the occurrence of events and divide up each time in between big occurrences. I believe then, action masters time. Action happens in this world and a when is necessary to fully explain the action (why,where, how it happened). If an action did not happen, a when would not be necessary to explain anything because nothing would need to be explained. Because of all this, I feel that action fully masters time because time would not be necessary unless action of some kind existed.

I feel that the big part of Bergson’s argument here is wrong, but his comparison to his big argument is the thing that is correct. For more information or if you have questions, comment below, direct message on twitter, or email me at cosmosuniversez@yahoo.com