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G.E. Moore’s Proof of an External World: If we cannot prove it, can we know it?

3 Nov

I have previously discussed Wittgenstein’s book On Certainty that he wrote towards the end of his life, where he gets his frustration out mostly by correcting Moore’s essay Proof of an External World (and A Defense of Common Sense).  I am looking at Moore’s essay and looking at beginning propositions of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and thinking about their arguments.  What Moore’s essay ultimately boils down to is him saying that he can know things without proving them. He bases that upon his idea of rigorously proving things along with other things.

Moore begins by saying that he can prove the entire external world by saying “I have one hand here, and another here.” He says this and then says that what he said conforms to a rigorous proof. “I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, “Here is one hand”, and adding, as I make certain gesture with the left, “and here is another”. And if, by doing this, I have proved ipso facto  the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there  is no need to multiply examples” (Moore).  He then states that what he just said was a “rigorous proof” for the external existence of 2 hands. He proceeds even further to state what qualifications for a rigorous proof are: “Of, course it would not have been a proof unless three conditions were satisfied; namely (1) unless the premiss which I adduced as proof of the conclusion was different from the conclusion I adduced it to prove”, so in short, the conclusion is different from the discussed premise,”….; (2) unless the premiss with I adduced was something which I knew to be the case, and not merely something which I believed but which was by no means certain, or something which, though in fact true, I did not know to be so;” in short  you are certain about the premise, which certainty and knowing is the ultimate discussion about Moore’s paper, and I shall further discuss here later, “…and (3) unless the conclusion did really follow from the premiss” (Moore). So, to Moore, for a rigorous proof, the conclusion and premise must be different,  you are certain of the premise, and the conclusion follows from the premise. If, in ones argument, you can satisfy these three requirements, to Moore, you have proven what you have been trying to prove.

Going on in the essay Moore talks about why his proof is good, and how proving that something existed in the past external world helps him with his present proof. All of this leads up to the final paragraph of the essay where Wittgenstein and others get most of their food for argument. I will simply cite it and discuss it thereafter:

“But another reason why some people would feel dissatisfied with my proofs is, I think, not merely that they want a proof of something which I haven’t proved, but that they think that, if I cannot give such extra proofs, then the proofs that I have given are not conclusive proofs at all. And this, I think, is a definite mistake. They would say: ” If you cannot prove your premiss that here is one hand and here is another, then you do not know it. But you yourself have admitted that, if you did not know it, then your proof was not conclusive. Therefore, your proof was not, as you say it was, a conclusive proof.” This view that, if I cannot prove such things as these, I do not know them, is, I think, the view that Kant was expressing in the sentence which I quoted at the beginning of this lecture, when he implies that so long as we have no proof of the existence of external things, their existence must be accepted merely on faith. He means to say, I think, that if I cannot prove that there is a hand here, I must accept it merely as a matter of faith – I cannot know it. Such a view, thought it has been very common among philosophers, can, I think, be shown to be wrong – though shown only by the use of premisses which are not known to be true, unless we do know of the existence of external things. I can know things, which I cannot prove; and among things which I certainly did know, even if (as I think) I could not prove them, were the premises of my two proofs. I should say, therefore, that those, if any, who are dissatisfied with these proofs merely on the ground that I did not know their premisses, have no good reason for their dissatisfaction” (Moore).

The entirety of this ending section of the paper refers to what one says when saying “I know.” His opposition says that one only knows when it is proven, and when premises cannot be proven, the whole conclusion is proven. Responding to all of these oppositions to his proving qualifications and to how he gauges how he knows something, he ends up referring to Kant’s statement that when one cannot prove something, one does not know it, and must resort to having mere faith. Thinking back to Kant’s discussion of noumena, we cannot know of their existence and we must understand that there are ways of understanding things beyond empirical observation. Kant talks about faith when introducing noumena in that noumena cannot be really known. Moore talks about Kant when defending his argument (not necessarily the part in Kant’s work about noumena) by saying that if he has faith in his right hand being there, he can still know it.

Using again the phrase “what this boils down to”, what this boils down to is that what can be proven (proven rigorously beyond what Moore defines as rigorously proving in that the premises are proven in different ways to help prove even more the ending conclusion) is known, and what cannot be proven can be known in a way less strict sense (not with all the logical proofs) where we have faith in it, yet it is not really strictly Wittgensteinian defined ‘known’, yet Moore thinks with faith, one can ‘know’ in all forms of the word what cannot be rigorously logically proven.

Kant thought that faith did not lead to proving or knowing an external thing, Moore thought that faith led still to knowing external things, and Wittgenstein overwhelmingly trampled on Moore’s opinion here with his book On Certainty. I think that when looking at these few arguments about what it means to ‘know’ anything, the word ‘know’ should be thought of and use in the strictest sense especially when trying to understand the arguments and formulate individual opinions on them. Moore thinks of ‘knowing’ something as not having consistent proof (in my opinion) but having faith in things such as that there is a right hand here. Kant believes in faith being there for minimal understanding, but it doesn’t denote ‘knowing’. Finally, in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty he makes the word know, knowing, knowledge and any other words like it to be as strict as possible.

Here are only a few propositions in the book’s entire discussion about knowledge and certainty that stomps on Moore’s argument:

”  14.  That he does know takes some shewing.

15. It needs to be shewn that no mistake was possible. Giving the assurance “I know” doesn’t suffice. For it is after all only an assurance that I can’t be making a mistake, and it needs to be objectively established that I am not making a mistake about that.”

Wittgenstein goes on to cite Moore and say more things about his argument. One thing I want to make known about Wittgenstein’s argument is that he thinks that Moore’s use of know, knowing, and knowledge is redundant, repetitive, and does not help his overall argument. If you have a library near you, like a college library, it probably has a philosophy section and may have On Certainty by Wittgenstein, or if you have the means pick it up. To get Moore’s essay Proof of an External World go here:,%20external%20world.pdf I say that because there are many arguments that Wittgenstein specifically picks on from Moore’s essay, and there are many other things to think about and discuss besides the single point I am going to make from here on out, so if you want a more wholly picture of Moore’s opinion and Wittgenstein’s opinion, read the essay and read some of the book (since I do not think reading all of On Certainty is necessary and if you want to read a whole book of Wittgenstein read Tractatus Logic0-Philosophicus).

First of all, my opinion is that Moore’s proof of an external world and his qualifications for a proof that he used are faulty in actually making knowledge of external things. It all comes down to that Moore does not feel the need to prove his premises, and then he says that having faith is proof of external things, and it is knowing external things. I am a large holder of faith in things I have not empirically observed and proven, the only reason being that I have not found a way to prove their external existences beyond faith. Faith is similar but not equal to knowledge, and I think that when one says that faith equals knowledge, it is merely a cop out in that that person will not take further efforts to come up with logical proofs for what one has faith in.

Its hard to say how much proof there is in faith, and how much knowledge there can be had in any faith at its face value. This is because faith varies from what faith is had in, how the faith is had, and a plethora of other factors that go into faith in one thing. If I have faith in God, which I do, I feel like I have total knowledge about Him yet I do not have logical rigorous proofs for it. I feel like I have full knowledge because of my intimate and loving faith in Him, but I want to create a logical process for further proof of things others might not see but I still have faith in. Moore just says that faith equals knowing things external, but that leads to ridicule from logically sensible philosophers and people like Wittgenstein. This tells me that faith feels sufficient for knowledge to those who have faith in something external, but if we want to show others about this thing and prove it to others for the entire benefit for everyone and ourselves, we need a logical process to create a rigorous proof for things’ existences like God.

In the end,  I hate to say this, but faith is not sufficient for true knowledge in its strictest sense. Moore is copping out philosophically when he says that faith is equal to knowledge.  Wittgenstein isn’t really getting there either when he tramples on Moore’s argument rather than just removing a few things, polishing it, and building upon it.

I do not know what that logical process towards a rigorous proof of external things not empirically observed would be, but I think it should be something philosophers and logicians should progress toward. It would be nice to have logically rigorous proofs for noumena and God, or even monads and forms. Then metaphysics would be generally more accepted rather than rejected. This is a difficult thing to just say should happen, but I think it should have efforts put toward it rather than just saying that faith is knowledge.

To actually figure out how  to prove external things that are phenomena or noumena, it is my opinion that our sensations should be analyzed more than they ever have been. I say this to mean that we should analyze sensations beyond just the six senses. I like to think of it in the way that we should look at our impressions  (using Hume’s term in the Origin of Our Ideas). Impressions being things entering our perception with most violence and force. Impressions are what I take to be emotions, passions, feelings, and sensations. For example, I find an impression to be the event that one has a direct or indirect conversation with God. I have not had a direct one, but others I know have. An indirect one I have had is where I ask Him for something in particular to really help my horrible situation out. After not getting it for awhile and asking Him again, soon after, it immediately occurs and I immediately realize why He waited until now and why he put me in the problem initially. Along with this understanding, I would have amazing emotional feeling because  I can feel the things that have happened before me, and I know from who they come. This is one example of an impression that I think should be examined further to get from faith in noumenal external things to actual knowledge in the Wittgensteinian sense.

I just think that faith does not denote knowledge even if it gives us real pure understanding.

Thanks for the support, and my apologies if this was too long.


Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: The Specialized ‘I Know’

1 Sep

Wittgenstein’s proposition filled book On Certainty is a late work of his discussing many things, mostly discussing the many things about and against G.E. Moore’s Introduction of Sense Data/Proof of an External World. Moore discusses sense data among other things about the world ( I have 2 writings about Moore’s writings, in the G.E. Moore category to your right), and at the beginning of the book, as well as being the theme of the rest, Wittgenstein questions the claim to know something.

When Moore continuously began his statements with I know, Wittgenstein refutes not the exact propositions Moore has, but that he uses ‘I know’ with too much liberty. ” We just do not see how very specialized the use of ‘I know’ is” and “That [Moore] does know takes some [showing]” (Wittgenstein).  After reading this it is known that saying that one knows is quite a statement in that knowing something is a large feat to accomplish.

The feat of accomplishing the knowledge of any proposition is large and amazing because of how much doubt that one must go through to signify the knowledge of something. According to Descartes, one must take into consideration all possible doubts there are about something before declaring knowledge of truth or falsity about it. To go through the processes of coherence or correspondence about something to declare truth or falsity would be one thing that would eventually allow a person to use the specialized phrase I know. I think it must be established that if we claim to know something, and are asked to show how and why, that we should be able to produce evidence about why it is true. Wittgenstein states that if we know something, we should be able to maintain all evidence to show that it is evident. It is not my opinion, but according to Wittgenstein (and Descartes for that matter) and his solipsist values, one can know only one thing: that oneself exists.  With these solipsist values, Wittgenstein can easily be understood in the reason why he states that ‘i know’ should be reserved. With these solipsist values, the only thing he claims to know is that he exists and Moore throwing around I know for other propositions can only be leading to falsities unless it is for sure that something is true or false.

Wittgenstein in On Certainty goes further into further testing before saying ‘I know’ by stating that a hand outside him may or not be there based on sensory sight.  He goes on with the hand to discuss his feelings on the matter.For me, to know that my hand exists is to test how solid it is, find all its functions,  decide where it originates from, and where in the spatiotemporal continuum it exists.

So, it is my goal here to arrive at a conclusion as to whether this hand I have is true or false in its existence. I want to give evidence as to its existence, and then form a reductio to further prove the point. First, I want to note that this hand is a part of and not separate from me. Regardless as to whether the body, mind, self, and soul are existent in parts within me, the hand is something that is my own, and it is a part of me. One of the things that can be known in the universe to exist is oneself. I KNOW I exist (Wittgenstein and Descartes thought so too).  And if it is known that I exist, all parts of me exist too. My hand is a part of me, so given that I exist, and parts of me exist with I, including my hand, my hand has this evidence to exist. Secondly,  my hand performs functions that have little to some impact on the world around it. Right now, it types simultaneously with the other hand in a writing about philosophy that will be posted on a website for anyone to read at their leisure. Also, my hand does other functions like washing, eating, and performing a plethora of other functions. Regardless of the function that the hand performs, it puts an impact around the world around it and something changes to a degree. As I am about to say further down the road in this writing, things that do change and impact have hard evidence for existence. I could go further in looking for further evidence but these 2 things are enough for me to say I KNOW that my hand exists. Wittgenstein would not endorse my thought process and he would still think that my use of ‘i know’ would not be specialized enough and that it is to loose in use.

Another example of proving something to knowledgeable certainty is the proof of my friend Scott (he is imaginary, and may not even be a person if you humor me).  Scott is a part of the creatum, and was created by God (I have further things to know to exist later, including the creatum), and if this is so, he can be assured to exist almost to the point of I know. Also, Scott is a terrorist and  places bombs in buildings. Lets say Scott put a bomb in building Z in town X, and building Z explodes killing a quarter of the population of town X including those in large proximity to the exploding building. Scott affected the world with this bomb and killed a lot of people, and had an effect on the world. Between these two things, we can know that Scott exists.

The knowledge of existence of a thing is not what Wittgenstein limits full knowledge to. The justified and evident use of the specialized ‘I know’ can be applied to anything in question in progression to knowing it. I choose however to turn toward the somewhat knowledge and full knowledge of the existence of things because of how delicate the argument is.

After reading Wittgenstein’s thoughts on using ‘I know’ so limitlessly, I was sent into a storm of thought into the justification and evidence of the existence of the below 5 things. I apologize that this writing has gone from the proving with evidence on anything to just the existence of things. But this website is for unbounded thought about the cosmos regardless the setting.

1) Oneself We can know that oneself exists because we think, and we know we exist. We also can be aware of this because we are a thinking thing that are contemplating the issue in the first place. Second of all, oneself has an effect/affect on the world around it, and each person that defines oneself makes a difference. Third, God recognizes and embraces our existence.

2) God We can be sure that He exists because he causes 99.999% of the effects in the cosmos, and he has more impact than is conceivable. He created the cosmos, and each individual person. Because of His effects and creations, we can be sure that He exists.

3) Creatum God created the creatum with all of the living things and earth within it. All of the things inside the creatum cause things within the cosmos, and we can know it to exist. We are within it, so it exists.

4) Spiritual World God and His angels, nor Satan and his demons are here in full creatum form, therefore since we know of Satan’s deception and God’s love, they must exist somewhere.  These worlds have revealed themselves to us in other ways therefore these worlds can be known to exist.

5 Causing Things If something causes an effect, and creates a small to large domino effect, the causer can be known to exist. This overlaps upon all the other 4 things known to exist, and this is one of the justifications just as well as it is a fifth category.

Thanks for the support. The above 5 things were quickly justified and were not done in detail. My main aim was to discuss that saying that we know something is a bigger action than we think and we should not throw the phrase  around so much unless they overlap and reside within the 5 things known to exist, or unless you can come up with other justifications for existence.

The Non Being and therefore Un-Sayable

31 Aug

After reading passages from Parmenides and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, along with the opposite views of Heraclitus and Spinoza, I understand that for a long time a large argument is about what what the nonbeing is and what can be said about it. Parmenides responds to Heraclitus when Heraclitus said that “the road up and the road down are one and the same” and relative to the being/nonbeing argument it means that anything can be said or thought about the road towards being or non being. Parmenides comes back by saying that the nonbeing cannot be thought or said upon (he does so in a variety of ways other than just one quote stating his stance like Heraclitus’ roads, but he does say that “thinking and being are one and the same” stating his ultimate stance about why nonbeing cannot be thought or said).  My aim is not to discuss the arguments that both Heraclitus and Parmenides had in Greece, but it is to discuss Parmenidesian and Wittgensteinian opinion that what doesn’t exist cannot be thought or said. I take up the matter because it is evident and has been evident in all of time that people think and say about things that are in fact non existent. I involve Parmenides and Heraclitus in the matter because they are one of the first philosophies to come about, and both had good arguments upon the same matter Wittgenstein and other philosophers discussed. Finally, I choose to bring Wittgenstein into this same matter because in Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Wittgenstein says: “I cannot think what I cannot think. What I cannot think I cannot say either”.  When discussing what he cannot think is referring to those things that do not exist within the human perception. This was one of the propositions that led to his solipsism and neutral monism ( numerous writings about Wittgenstein’s neutral monism and solipsism on this webiste, look in the category Ludwig Wittgenstein and/or the archives to find them, theres like 6 I think) that I refute totally, but have respect for the propositions leading up to them. These arguments between Wittgenstein and Spinoza’s monism, and the other numerous arguments between Heraclitus and Parmenides along with other Presocratics are not the subject for discussion, the only subject for discussion is that the non being can be thought and said, so much so that the non being can be made into being by planning through discussion.

Nonbeing can consistently be thought of and reflected upon. When thought of as a being, nonbeing cannot be thought of leading to the notion that nonbeing cannot be thought of or said about. When contemplating upon any contradiction at all, no results will come forth because little can come of such thought (the being in nonbeing is what is thought here).  I say so because when people think about nonbeing, it is a common misconception to think of it as a being, which is totally fallacious and contradictory, therefore nonbeing cannot be thought or said at the outset.  But getting further in nonbeing, we have to get specific of what does not exist to think and say things about nonbeing itself.  For example, eons ago before the genesis, the only thing that existed was God and his angels in a spiritual world. The physical creatum was not in existence before God created it (note that God, angels and the heavens are not part of the general creatum), and yet He conceived the idea of this world, and he made it so. Because God can conceive the nonbeing, so can we to a lesser extent.  Like said before, nonbeing thought of in terms of its being in the world cannot be thought of and the notion is preposterous, but down to nonbeing’s specificities in terms of how it would be if it was can be conceived.

Hopefully I am getting to the point of how nonbeing can be thought of and said. Again, nonbeing can be both thought and said if it is thought of down to its specificities. If nonbeing is thought of in a broad perception little can be obtained from the notion, and yes it is lacking in thought and speech. But if we think of nonbeing specifically down to what certain thing does not exist, thought and speech can be made upon it, possibly even allowing us to turn this specific nonbeing into being.

If nonbeing is thought down to its specificities (examples), we can think and say things about it, and the best part of it (as evident in society) is that we can possibly make the nonbeing into being. If this were not true, then there would be no inventors of the products and services we use daily. Take Alexander Graham Bell for instance. In Bell’s time, there was no device that could enable 2 people 100 miles apart to talk to each other by voice (there was a telegraph, but it was not by voice). The telephone was a nonbeing object. Bell and his assistant worked together with this notion of this telephone device and turned nonbeing into being by inventing their notion into being. They invented the telephone.  Here, nonbeing was thought, and even said. This mere example of Bell’s achievements falsifies Parmenides’ and Wittgenstein’s opinion that the nonbeing cannot be thought or said.

Another example of nonbeing transitioning into being because of our thoughts and speech about the nonbeing, is the fairly recent idea of a liger.  A liger being a cross between a tiger and a lion. This was on the movie Napoleon Dynamite where Napoleon draws the liger, calls it his favorite animal and shows it amongst the people around him. If what Parmenides and Wittgenstein say is true (that what doesn’t exist cannot be thought or said), Napoleon would have no notion of a liger, and anyone thinking or talking about a liger would not be possible because of the fact that ligers are of the nonbeing. Even more recently, biologists tried to make a liger by breeding a tiger and a lion, and they were successful in producing it so the nonbeing notion of a liger did well because it led to an actual being state of the liger. It was born a very weak animal and may not do very well and could regress back into nonbeing.  If what Parmenides and Wittgenstein say is true, the telephone, many other inventions and the breeding production of the liger would never have been possible because we would never have the ability to think about the nonbeing.

My ending inference from my unorganized thought process is this: there is nothing we cannot think, and therefore there is nothing we cannot say. Nonbeing presents one of the many obstacles in thought and speech, but it can be easily hurdled. Wittgenstein’s statement that we cant think what we cant think and what we cant think we cant say is just a resolution to many philosophical problems of dualisms and what some may call ‘philosophical hell’, and the proposition is a great thought, but after searching philosophically, the proposition I refute rejects a lot of areas of thinking that are unexplored and deserve consideration and thought. Wittgenstein’s solipsist and neutrally monist principles when taken for truth would rule out about 1/2 of philosophical exploration that needs to be done in the future. I, personally, look forward to exploring these unexplored areas, and refute any proposition that make exploration of those areas redundant.  In philosophy, there cannot possibly be unthinkable or unsayable  just because there is some nonbeing within metaphysics. If there was, philosophy would not have come as far as it has because more than half of it would be redundant.

If you want more thinking in the nonbeing being said and thought read into Lawrence Sklar and his geometries relating to philosophy and epistemology because of how Euclidean geometry long passed into geometrical law are falsified immediately (i.e. making a triangle with 3 90 degree angles within a whole triangle, which is nonbeing until discussed specifically).

This was just an unorganized thought process coming from reading some ancient writings of Parmenides and Heraclitus and reflecting back on my studies of Wittgenstein.

Thanks for the support.

Against Wittgenstein’s Neutral Monism and Solipsism (trimmed version)

15 Jul

The full version of this paper has been put before the Prolegomena Undergraduate Journal for consideration. This version has been largely trimmed to not invalidate Prolegomena’s rule that the paper has not been published elsewhere. The previous smaller posts on Wittgenstein have been my preceding notes to this paper. Here it is below:


Perception is the root of Wittgensteinian arguments of neutral monism and solipsism. Perception is one’s interpretation, sight, and understanding of the people and world around us. Some philosophers rely on perception, while others righteously contemplate upon truth in things without necessary coherence with their own perceptions. Benedict de Spinoza, for one, relied little upon his perception to understand the world metaphysically. I bring up the topic of Spinozistic philosophy because he also, like Wittgenstein, had a monistic philosophy. Monism states that only one substance makes up the body and the world. Monism also states that because of the fact that only one substance makes up the body and the world, the human being consists only of one part (the soul). Following Rene Descartes and his dualist philosophy of there being a self and a body within the human being, philosophers predicted many difficulties and complexities in philosophy with this dualist idea. Descartes’ complex dualist philosophy caused a drive towards the proof and foundation of a monism, or of there being one substance of the body and the world, and one component of the human being. This drive towards monism did not allow every philosopher to agree with each other, and two different types of monism were created: neutral monism, and mental substance monism. Spinoza advocated the substance monism centered on God as the main substance of the world and human beings. This monism is often classified as mental because not all of what this monism states is perceived by the human that has faith in it. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, advocated neutral monism. This monism is neutral because objects within it are neutral without taking any precedent over each other and it states that the human is of one component and that that component creates the world he sees. For example, something only exists in neutral monism if the human sees it. Monism should not be rooted in perception, nor should anything else. However, Wittgenstein’s philosophies would not exist if he had not taken belief in perceptions.

Neutral monism and solipsism are included in Wittgenstein’s philosophies that are rooted in perception. Solipsism, being the more widely known idea between it and neutral monism, relates to the philosophy of neutral monism in a way that both can be explained and argued for or against together. Solipsism is easily understood when read about in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Each solipsistic proposition in the Tractatus works together to give the reader a full and accurate view of the solipsist’s ideas. Like neutral monism, solipsism states that because of one’s language and perception, the world and life together make the only possible world for you. Solipsism states that the only thing that can be confirmed to exist is of one’s own existence. The solipsist confirms his own existence because that is the only true knowledge available. The perceived world is believed by the solipsists to be in reflection of themselves because of the fact that it is a perception of their own mind. The perceived world is also believed to not be very well known because of the fact that their own existence is the only thing that can be confirmed. The perceived world cannot totally be confirmed to even exist because that which is perceived could be an illusion from perceptions that occur. The Latin word ‘sol’ means one, or alone and is used in the word ‘solipsism’ because the solipsist states that he only knows and recognizes his own existence. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus propositions reflect the solipsist view.

Wittgenstein’s propositions 5.6 and 5.61 in the Tractatus concern the link between language and logic and the limits within them. “5.6- The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” and “5.61- Logic pervades the world:  the limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in logic, ‘The world has this in it, and this, but not that.’ For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world…. We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either” (Wittgenstein). 5.6 is a well known proposition that concerns language of the solipsist. If someone has a certain language that governs what they say, it has limits just like all languages do. Wittgenstein states that because of the limits a language has, their world is also limited for that reason. 5.61 is basically warrant and backing for 5.6. 5.61 begins by relating 5.6 to another thing that is limited. He says that if language is limited, then my world is limited, and if my world is limited, logic that pervades the world is also limited. 5.61 goes on to say that you cannot say that there are possibilities that do not exist in the world because that would mean that the logical limits set by 5.6 and the beginning of 5.61 would be dismantled. 5.61 ends by stating that what cannot be thought cannot be said because of the limits of language and logic because of the world’s limits.

These two propositions relate to the overall definition of solipsism because of the water they want language to hold. Our thoughts are usually not able to be clearly said through our language, and this shows the limits language has. Wittgenstein states that language is how we explain logic and the world. If language has limits, the explanation of the world and the world itself are limited. Wittgenstein even goes far enough to say that because of the limits language obviously has, logic is also limited because of that. What this personal language does is it personalizes the way a person understands the world and logic. Each person’s language is different; therefore the limits are always different. Wittgenstein uses the connection between the language limits to the world and logic because of the fact that language can mislead you if you do not pursue knowledge correctly. By saying that logic and the world are limited, he feels he is correctly using language to explain the world and logic. This limited language and how it limits everything language conveys (logic and the world) is different for any person, and therefore causes a different perception for each person. These individual limits cause confusion and lead to the thought that the only thing that can be ensured is that the individual exists. Propositions 5.6 and 5.61 in the Tractatus directly show and lead to blatant solipsism.

The end of 5.61 “we cannot think what we cannot think; what we cannot think we cannot say either” (Wittgenstein) states in one sentence the argument of solipsism stemming from personal language. 5.62 is the proposition that explains that the previous two propositions cohere directly with solipsism. The proposition is ended with, “The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of my language (of that language which I alone understand) mean the limits of my world” (Wittgenstein). Because of the language that the individual has alone, limits are imposed on what the language exists for. Because the language is personal to one individual it limits the world. Wittgenstein takes from this that he can state that the world is his world because of the limits his language puts on it and how his mind perceives it. Stating that the world is your world is solipsistic because it relates to the fact that because of language limits and other limits on knowledge, you can only validate your own existence, and therefore making the world you perceive your own world.


Solipsism and neutral monism are coincidental and directly related because of the ground breaking propositions Wittgenstein stated in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. These propositions are ground breaking and interesting, yet they are wrong for the most part. These propositions being the root of neutral monism and solipsism make both schools of thought wrong. They have interesting inferences such as they think that perceptions do not denote reality at all, and other perceptory truths, but these inferences direct them to the wrong conclusions. Because of how solipsism helps explain the workings of neutral monism, I will explain why solipsism is wrong then go into the falsities of neutral monism.

Solipsism is easily understood by Wittgenstein’s proposition: “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (Wittgenstein). Language is only a means of communication between each other and explaining the world and people as best as possible. Language is all that we have to explain and communicate, but that does not mean that it limits the world we live in. By saying that language limits our world is settling for less than necessary in explaining the world. Language has faults and does not well explain the world, and saying that the faulty language we use limits the world is disallowing us to know the world to the best of our ability. There are many unknowns that we cannot possibly know, but language excludes more than those things. Rather than saying that the limits of language are the limits of the world, we can create more language to help more and more accurately explain the world around us. Language limits the world unless the philosopher or linguist does something about it. If no one had or does not do anything about the limits language has, then limits of language mean the limits of the world. Philosophers and linguists (like Derrida) have been doing something about the limits language has, so the limits of language are lesser as time goes by. Regardless of what language’s limits are, the world has an infinite amount of things for us to come to understand. Because solipsism is very rooted in “the limits of language mean the limits of my world”, solipsism is therefore faulty and false.

Because of how Wittgenstein thought that the limits of language meant the limits of the world, he grouped the world and life together as one entity: “The world and life are one” and “I am my world (the microcosm)” (Wittgenstein). The grouping of the world and life is wrong because the world is only a space for us to exist in for a certain period of time. If our life is to be grouped at all, it is to be grouped with God. God made us in His image, and created everything including the world as space for us to exist in. The solipsists group the life with the world because the world is all we can perceive by ourselves without concerning God’s presence. We cannot be united with a space because if we are united at all, we must be united with the one who created space and us. When Wittgenstein stated these propositions, he relied too much upon the perception and sensory impressions to guide his philosophy. The world and life are not one; the life is one with God. I cannot be ‘my world.’ God is my world. God causes everything to happen, and he creates everything we see, therefore, God is the only thing that my world can be. My statement against solipsism cannot be understood by using only perception, but one must have faith and understanding about the place of God to understand what the world really is. Because I am not my world, and the world and life are not one, solipsism in another aspect is therefore wrong.

Finally, a proposition by Wittgenstein that I feel is completely ridiculously solipsistic: “So, too at death, the world does not alter, but comes to an end” (Wittgenstein). Wittgenstein and the other solipsists believe this because of the fact that the person’s perceptions create the world, and when that person dies, and no more perceptions occur, the world comes to an end. In my opinion, this is completely ridiculous because of the many people that live in the world and have perceptions, and yet when one person dies and stops having perceptions, the world comes to an end. I understand that it is sort of meant that only one world is known to exist by each person, and that that world dies when that person dies, however it has to be inferred the possibilities of millions of other worlds that have not died. World cannot die if a person dies. Not only does the world not die if one person dies, but God still exists if one person (and one world) dies. God has to be taken into consideration. The world cannot come to an end if just one course of perception dies. The solipsists argue that that is all one can know to exist, and when the only thing one can for sure know dies, the world therefore dies. Everything besides your own perceptions has to be taken into consideration including the presence of God in the world and even within perceptions and sensory impressions. The world does not come to an end when a person dies in any sense of the proposition.

Solipsism basically defined is the philosophy that the only thing that can be ensured to exist is yourself and that things the perception catches may or may not exist. This main basic solipsist principle is false. More than oneself can be ensured to exist. The mind can cause perception to be misleading and foggy, but more than oneself can be ensured to exist. Nothing would be perceived to exist and there would be no being to perceive things if there was no supreme deity. A supreme deity can be confirmed to exist. If no supreme deity existed, the soul would not exist, and there would be no one to perceive and foolishly resort to solipsism. Also, if no supreme deity existed, there would be nothing to possibly perceive. God (supreme deity) created the beings and the world (the creatum) causing us to exist and perceive things to judge for ourselves what they are and how they exist. A creatum (plethora of space and beings created by a supreme deity) can be confirmed to exist if a supreme deity exists. A creatum denotes space, beings, and time that we all perceive. Many more things can be confirmed to exist if a supreme deity and a creatum exists, but my concentrated point is that more than just oneself can be confirmed to exist, therefore shattering the Wittgensteinian solipsist view.

Solipsism is what I would call selfish philosophy. Everything that happens and that is perceived is referred to in relevance to the thing that is confirmed to exist. The philosophy of solipsism does not leave room for the existence of anything else, even a God.  When first trying to understand solipsism, I was turned off to it immediately by the fact that it leaves out the possibility of existence of God (it does not directly leave this possibility out, but its only confirmation of existence in oneself quickly removes possibility of a supreme deity). I also feel that solipsism is hastily inferred from the fact that language is limited to a large extent in explaining the world. The limits of language eventually lead to solipsism and selfish philosophy. Finally, the only confirmation of existence being of a minor existence (oneself; this existence is minor in the fact that God is so much bigger than the world and its beings) makes solipsism difficult to advocate. Solipsism is ultimately false because of the fact that it ignores the existence of so many things around oneself which is why I oppose it and its propositions.

I include neutral monism in my argument against solipsism because of Wittgenstein’s proposition: “Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism…” (Wittgenstein). Again, pure realism is another name for neutral monism. After defining solipsism and neutral monism, and concluding the falsity of solipsism, I also conclude that neutral monism is also false. Like solipsism, neutral monism ensures the existence of the soul of oneself and little else. Neutral monism is unlike the Spinozistic mental substance monism in that only the soul is confirmed to exist and God is not stated in neutral monism to be the substance of the world, and also no substance is noted to exist in the world. Neutral monism is ultimately like solipsism in the fact that it states that the things we perceive (like matter and substance) do not for sure exist.


The solipsists believe in the lack of self in monism but made a few tweaks to neutralize it. By neutral, this form of monism tries to reduce complexities by making existences neutral as in that they may or may not exist. The Spinozistic mental Godly monism is not neutral because of the fact that it states the existence of God, multiple people, matter, personality and other things that are not neutral in existence in any way. The solipsists viewed the possible existences within perception as totally neutral and wanted to endorse monism, and did so by making some changes creating a whole new branch in monistic philosophy. Solipsism is neutral in its existence of beings as is this form of monism. In true reality, existence of things are just not neutral and cannot be made neutral through philosophical contemplation and inferences. Existences must be accepted for its characteristic non-neutrality. Neutral monism and its roots in solipsism are false because of its centrality in the sure existence of oneself.


If for some reason the paper does not get published by Prolegomena, I will post a full version (unless I put it before another journal), and if it does get published by Prolegomena (or anyone else), I will have to take this trimmed version down from this site, however I will post a link to it.

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: 5.621- 5.633 Notes

2 Jun

These 4 propositions in the fifth part of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus  are the ones that denote his solipsist views. I like this part of the Tractatus because it has so much room for argumentation because of how it leads to neutral monism and solipsism.

Lets start with the proposition 5.621: “The world and life are one” (Wittgenstein). This idea highly paves the way for solipsism. In todays world, it is obvious that the world and life are 2 different things to discuss in philosophy. The world is obviously this place we live in and exist about. As we perceive it, we exist upon this world and not a part of it. Life is the existence of ourselves. Life is obviously understood. Thinking about the world and life as 2 different things, do you think it is possible that the 2 are 1 together in themselves?

My opinion about 5.621 is that the world is just a place for us to exist for our short lives on earth. We exist to serve God and prove that we have committed to Him. After being on this earth we will go to either hell or heaven, but either way, the world is just a place for us to be in the short time we live physically. I do not feel that our life is connected to the world we live in. Our life is connected to God because He created us and will determine where we live in all points of our existence. The world we live in has no connection to our life. I disagree with Wittgenstein’s 5.621, because the world and life are not connected in any way and are in no way ‘one’. Because of this, I also disagree with solipsism and neutral monism (as you may have seen in other works on this site).

5.63- “I am my world” (Wittgenstein).

To go really far into solipsism, each person has their own perception creating their own world. I feel that this cannot be because, each person has their own thing and wouldn’t each person’s world intersect with each other? (this argument coming up in another work). This is a key solipsist proposition because it states that you are your world.  Each world is different based on the difference of the person. This states that ‘I’ am ‘my’ world because perception creates the world, directly relating perception to existence of the ‘my’ world. I feel that this is clearly wrong. I believe that there is no ‘my’ world because the world is a what is created by God and is perceived the same by each person. Each person is not the world. The person’s existence is totally separate from the world.

5.631- “There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas” (Wittgenstein).

By subject, Wittgenstein means a part of the person, life or world. This states that a part of a person that perceives things cannot think or entertain ideas like the whole can. 5.631 points out that the subject parts cannot function by themselves, and do not think by themselves. These subjects function as a whole together.

I think this is true to some extent. I think in most things, subjects do not function without being together as a whole, but the world has subjects that think and entertain ideas. In the self, many people are known to exist as subjects and those people do think and entertain ideas. I think  in this case, this is not true.

5.632- “The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world” (Wittgenstein).

I do understand why subject parts are understood as limits of the world.  Subjects may change the whole to modify it and end up limiting it. I also understand that subject parts cannot belong to the world. The world is a physically created thing for us to live on and it belongs to God. Nothing belongs to the world. The world is just another part of the creatum. I totally  agree with this proposition because I think that the subject does not belong to the world that cannot have anything belong to it, and I think that subject parts can modify the world and end up limiting it. This is one of the few things I agree with Wittgenstein on.

5.633- “Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?…..” (Wittgenstein).

Wittgenstein goes on in the proposition to compare this to the case of the eye where things are explained to be seen by a device of sight. I think this question should be answered by declaring that different modes of sight exist that look upon the world and see metaphysical subjects within it. In God, the world, people and spirits, metaphysical phenomena and subjects exist, but are not often seen or understood. Maybe Wittgenstein says this because the solipsist neutral monist self does not see metaphysical subjects because everything comes from the self to them.

I think that metaphysical subjects exist in the creatum and outside the creatum. Metaphysical subjects exist mostly in God (Wittgenstein would not have inferred this because of his lack of belief in God).

This has been mostly a few notes on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus solipsist propositions. I am planning and researching for a big paper on the rejection of neutral monism and solipsism and wanted to note the propositions 5.621 to 5.633. I meant this to be short, and for a reference for later works.

Neutral Monism in Wittgenstein

26 May

In the paper I posted on this site about Spinozistic substance monism, the case was argued that only one substance/material that makes up the universe exists. This one material makes up everything that exists everywhere. Spinoza did not however mention the mental and physical monism that exists. Wittgenstein does this in the Tractatus. In Spinoza’s monism, he still states that mental and physical parts exist within that substance and are represented as attributes of the substance. If you say that physical and mental monism exists you are saying that the physical world around us (the earth, the objects) are made of a variation of the substance and the mental thoughts and sensations are a different variation of the same substance. Wittgenstein and others in his same time period thought that this was not true. This includes that sensations/perceptions/thoughts and body versus mind are all of the same exact kind of substance, therefore there is no division between them. The fact that a mental and physical monism do not exist is neutral  monism. This type of monism states that all of the things around us are neutral things all made of the exact same kind of substance/material. Specific things are only differentiated from other things because of how they relate with other things; the differentiated things do not differ from each other any more or any less. Being in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, neutral monism supports solipsism because this form of monism does not state what this substance/material is, therefore it could be any self/soul that perceives the physical world. If monism has a mental form and a physical form, solipsism is much harder to prove. I disagree with neutral monism and endorse Spinoza’s form of monism. I will explain my opinions later.

Wittgenstein, Berkeley, and Hume provide justifications for eliminating certain things in this material/substance monism. First, justifications are made to allow matter to be eliminated from neutral monism because of its lack of neutrality. Berkeley mainly was he who justified this elimination but Mach’s view was a big justification

” the world consists only of our sensations”

Think about that. Are sensations coherent with today’s definition of matter? No (this view of Mach is a big contributor to solipsism). We perceive things around us, and the only perceivable living entity that we can for sure know about is ourselves and our perceptions. Therefore, Wittgenstein and others say that perceptions/sensations are the only components of the universe. This allows Berkeley to eliminate the presence of matter because of its lack of neutrality and because it is not for sure known to exist because our perceptions cannot confirm it.

Hume also helps confirm an elimination when he questioned the entity of the self. It is known that the soul is an entity because of our perceptions and those perceptions create the world around us (according to Mach and Wittgenstein, I disagree with this). The self is also an entity that lacks neutrality and poses problems in philosophy. Hume uses Mach’s propositions like Berkeley did for the elimination of matter. Mach states a big idea that helps cut to the chase to eliminate the self:

” The I is not an object”

If ‘I’ is not an object, then what is it? The ‘I’ is not an object because it exists in relation to the soul that perceives and senses. The ‘I’ is basically the self. If the self is not an object and not just a component of the soul, it is not neutral. In solipsism, only the soul exists and perceives/senses things, creating the only known world. In solipsism’s case, the soul is the only substance and its perceptions creates the known world. The soul is a large entity according to solipsism and governs everything we see and do. Where does the entity of the self come into place? It doesn’t. If it would be put into existence with the soul in the solipsist state, it would be a useless entity that would hold no water for proof of a reason for existence. It would also cause a lot of problems for philosophers. Therefore, Hume and Mach state that the self cannot exist because of how neutral this monism is.

Wittgenstein himself helps eliminate the presence of inner and outer worlds in neutral monism also using Mach’s statements.

“There is no rift between the psychical and physical, no inside and outside, no “sensation” to which an external “thing” different from sensation, corresponds…….”

When Wittgenstein talks about the distinction of inner and outer worlds, by inner he means sensations, perceptions, and thoughts. By outer worlds, he means the physical world we perceive and try to understand. In solipsism, the perceptions are the only world that can possibly exist. Solipsism is obviously governing Wittgenstein’s thoughts when he eliminates outer and inner worlds and when he advocates neutral monism. Matter is able to be eliminated because of how sensations/perceptions from the substance of the self are what make up the world around us. If there is a psychical and physical world in any sense, no distinction between both of them is possible or necessary because of how both worlds are of the same substance and in the same world. This prevents any possible distinction of inner and outer worlds.

Wittgenstein also helps eliminate the possibility of private objects. Private objects are objects/ sense-impressions that belong to a certain thing/being. A private object example might be if one person gets horrific hallucinations that he cant tell from reality. Because he is the only person who has this, this schizophrenia may be a private object because of how it belongs to him because he is the only one who has it.  Wittgenstein states that the existence of a private object is not possible because of solipsism and the neutrality of things in this form of monism. In solipsism, all things are from the same thing, perceived by one soul (that one knows of). If there is a possibility in the perceived world by the soul, it is possible in all relations of things perceived. If one relation of things or state of affairs has this object/sense-impression, the sense-impression does not belong to the relation of things/state of affairs because of how possible this sense=impression is upon the entire existence that is perceived. A private object in existence is not neutral and would cause philosophical problems to be solved. In a solipsist existence, a private object like this is impossible which gives Wittgenstein some of his justification for this elimination.

Wittgenstein does not eliminate the possible existence of other minds, but he does condone the fact that their presence cannot be known in neutral monism and solipsism.

Since Descartes, the distinction between mind and body existed and cause(s)(d) many philosophical problems. Mind and body are the two things that can possibly be differentiated between each other. Neutral monism defeats this problem because of how the soul is the only substance/material that makes up the universe. In this case, soul includes the relations/states of affairs of mind and body.

It is also stated in neutral monism that appearances of things in the world are the reality at that state of time. If appearances were different from the reality in any state of time, neutral monism could not be the case  and solipsism’s theories would fall apart on the spot.

Through all of the things that have been eliminated in the world to neutralize everything to make a better monism theory and to fit solipsism, hopefully you are able to get a mental picture of what this neutral monist solipsist world is thought to be. Go back to my paper on this website on Spinozistic substance monism where I explain Spinoza’s thoughts about substance, mode and attribute and compare that Godly substance monism with this solipsist neutral monism. In Spinoza’s monism, God is the only substance and it is more complicated because more than just your own perceptions matter to metaphysical existence. In this neutral monism mentioned above, all of the things above are eliminated by philosophers to fit solipsism and neutrality of things. This involves your own soul as the only substance, where only your perceptions are stated to cohere with reality. Nothing beyond your perceptions and sensations can be understood. Comment below which monism you think is correct

Which one is correct in your opinion?

A) Spinozistic Godly substance monism


B) Solipsist neutral monism.

I vote A.

I’d like to propose these things to disprove neutral monism because of what is beyond our own soul’s perceptions. I feel that saying that your own perceptions are all you can know and they are all that can be comprehended is a cop-out in logic and philosophy. Don’t we have logic and philosophy and its fields to explain the world around us beyond our perceptions? What good is philosophy if we cant understand anything beyond our own minds? Also, God is the substance that the universe is made up of and governed by. The soul is  a small tiny being that is a part of the creatum God made. Those who believe in neutral monism do themselves injustices because if we live here, we have the right to find out the realities beyond what we see and understand every day. I crave to understand things I don’t every day. If I was a neutral monist (and probably a solipsist), I would not care to know things outside my own perception unless they had a big relation to my own perceptions.

Post your thoughts below about whether you think monism is neutral like Wittgenstein’s or Godly like Spinoza’s

Go back up on this page to read over Wittgenstein’s justifications for neutral monism and what neutral monism is.

Go to to read about Spinoza’s substance monism. Please vote which monism you think is true.

Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logico Philosophicus 5.6 and 5.61

25 May

Still pondering the thoughts of Ludwig Wittgenstein in his  Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. And I want to eventually research the idea of solipsism for awhile and write a symposium (and shorter colloquium version) about Wittgensteinian solipsism and other forms of it. 5.6 and 5.61 are propositions that precede Wittgenstein’s solipsist propositions in the Tractatus. 5.62 and further is where he introduces the solipsist idealism. 5.6 and 5.61 are conditions that lead up to the inference that  the self is the only entity of existence and perception of the universe, hence solipsism.

For now, I feel that 5.6 and 5.61 are really important and should be argued.

5.6  The limits of my language, mean the limits of my world

5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.

So we cannot say in logic, “The world has this in it, and this, but not that.”

For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since           it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits             from the other side as well.

We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.


What do you think of when you hear “language”? We use it every day to speak to each other. It governs the manner that we think thoughts. If you are thinking about something, you are using words to think things and this is the use of language. Think about how language relates to the world around us.  Language governs how we understand and explain the things around us. But, Wittgenstein is stating that language limits the world around us because of its limits.

Lets first examine language in itself. The earliest inventors of language saw all of the physical things around us, the people around that could not be communicated with, and the feeling that there is a supreme being above. They proposed a symbol for each thing; the symbols had words invented for them to communicate with others, explain the world around us and explain some of the unexplainable.

When you think about it, there is a limited number of symbols that can transfer into words. Symbols express a lot of what reality is while when a symbol is converted into language, words to speak are created. When these words of language are created,  corners are cut in expressing reality. When symbols are converted into language realism and closeness to the way things really are decrease considerably. This poses the limits in language that Wittgenstein says there are in 5.6

In summary, reality that is perceived is all real. When one wants to express this reality, symbols are invented. The symbols express most of the reality of the way that item/phenomena really is. When one wants to speak these symbols, language is created. The creation of a language from symbols distorts the expression of reality and of the way things are. Language tries to express reality as well as symbols do, but it fails miserable because of how language cannot measure up on closeness to reality like symbols do. I say this because I feel that language does not by any means express the entire reality of the world around us. Wittgenstein however felt that language is the only means of perception and its limits are the worlds limits. Wittgenstein states in 5.6 that what language perceives is what the world’s reality is.

I disagree with 5.6. The limits of language only mirror the unseen, unexpressed, imperceivable part of reality that exists. God created this world and our minds and bodies are infinitesimally and exponentially smaller than the infinite gargantuan macrocosmic mind and spirit of God. Language is the only thing God allowed humanity to create because language can only perceive things that the small human mind can understand. The limits of language mean the limits of my world is an untrue statement. ‘My world’ includes God and his infinitely gargantuan spirit and mind. The limits of language do not apply to God and the wonders He does every day.

So, 5.6 is wrong.


5.6 says that language limits your own world. I  highly oppose that  thought because language is only a means for communication and expression of the world around us and ‘ my world’ is very complex beyond the possible perception of language.

5.61 on the other hand talks about logic. Logic is used in this world to explain proposition and thoughts that explain the world. Logic is linked to language because language is used to express logic. The first statement in 5.61 is that logic pervades the world and that the limits of logic are the limits of the world. ‘the world’ and ‘my world’ are 2 different things. ‘the world’ is the physical explainable world around us. ‘the world’ adheres to the limits of language and logic while ‘my world’ involves the complexity of God and does not adhere to any limits of logic or language (logic may be able to express things that language cannot  along with other unexplainable things. This may occur in the future when variables are assigned to imaginary and/or unexplainable things  —> limitless logic).

So when Wittgenstein says “logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits” he is right because logic  adheres to the limits that ‘the world’ has.

The next statement where Wittgenstein says that we cant say ” the world has this and this in it, but not that” is also correct. He states that this is true because if we were able to say this, we would be excluding possibilities of the world (again ‘the world’ being the physical world we live in and touch) in logic. If something can possibly exist in logical space, it does so somewhere in ‘the world’.

Wittgenstein ends 5.61 by saying “we cannot think what we cannot think; we cannot think what we cannot say either”. By ‘we’ he means all the humans with small minds in the world. In ‘the world’ of people like me and you,  thinking something that cannot possibly be thought is impossible. We cannot think what we cannot say either. The fact that we cant think what we cannot say brings us back to language and its limits.  A person that is a part of ‘we’ is a part of the pool of people that live here that all have tiny small brains that cannot comprehend the slightest bit of the things God can. Like I said before, we think in words of language, and in our small tiny minds we cant think what we cant say.

God on the other hand is not a part of ‘the world’ and he succeeds logic, language and their limits. He can think what we cant think. He can say what we cant think.

Heres an example of not being able to think/say something:

If you look at all the colors in existence on the wheel of colors that artists use, you think that there has to be another color not present on this wheel. You try to think of what it is, but every color you think of applies as a shade of a color on that wheel. You continue and continue to do this but you always come back to another original color on that wheel.

This thought process is redundant because a color not present on the color wheel that has all colors in existence is not possible in language, logic and our infinitely small minds. Its hard to even think of mentioning language in this situation because you have to have a thought established along with a symbol before you want to assign a word in language to it.

So in ‘the world’  5.61 is true. In ‘my world’ 5.61 is false because of Gods involvement and His complexity.

Comment below how you think language is different from initial symbol-less thoughts. Do you think language distorts our thoughts and perceptions? Why?

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