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Self Deception as a Good Thing?

30 Nov

Sorry for my lack of activity on this website. I have just had a Thanksgiving break, and now have 3 weeks of the semester left and school is getting more and more stressful, so the writing may be sparse from here on out.

In an ethics class the other day, the issue of self deception came up and made we want to talk more about it. Self deception is something that is looked at psychologically and epistemologically. This is an issue that defies logic and reason. When one comes upon a situation and that person deceives him/herself, the deception involved may defy logic and reason. This utter temporary rejection of reason and logic makes me want to think about it more. When I talk about it here I am thinking mostly about the dire situations people have in life only.

If you want to look into it beyond my ramblings about it you can go to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article about it here:

Also, there is a 20 question questionnaire to find out if you deceive yourself. I could not find the entire questionnaire, but a blog contains a few of them and discusses them. I found this blog helpful in understanding self deception:           

Self deception is something that a mind does when one wants to believe something that they know is not true. Thinking of it in an example, have you ever had any hatred for either of your parents? If you say no, you are deceiving yourself. I would think there is an issue deeper below your answer of no. There are many other questions like this where if you answer no you are/have been deceiving yourself (another one, to any attractive girl do you think of them as hot/sexy/very attractive?). My thoughts on this entire matter is that people deceive themselves because they want to believe something as truth (I’m sure most see it as this in one way or another).

Go to this link to see a key example of self deception: This is a South Park episode where Jimmy comes up with the joke “Do you like fishsticks? Yes. Do you like to put fishsticks in your mouth? Yes. What are you a gay fish?”. Cartman just happened to be present when Jimmy comes up with the joke. Cartman ends up rationalizing with self deception (as he does with everything else) that he himself came up with the joke and Jimmy had little part in it, when really Jimmy came up with the whole thing. Just watch the episode, not only will you see some examples of self deception but you will get a great laugh. Many South Park episodes involve Cartman who do these ‘mental gymnastics’ as Kyle puts it.

Self deception can go one of two ways. It can go the way where one goes about believing something untrue that they just want to believe (Cartman believing he came up with the fishsticks joke to get all the fame and to be awesome), or it can go the way that one believes something they would never really want to be true ( a man believing his wife cheats on him because of mere suppositions with little evidence of her doing this). I think also that self deception can be done subconsciously or intentionally.

First I think we should look at the truth when viewing one’s own life. Life itself is a hard thing to take, and truths of it are hard to maintain. Because of this it is my thought that self deception can be a good thing rather than bad. It can be a bad thing most of the time (especially the other way self deception goes, or twisted self deception), because logic and reason are set aside in self deception. It can be immediately understood, and it as well should be, that self deception is a bad thing because the truth should be always what is sought after. For the most part truth is what we all try to find. When looking at other things besides aspects of science, history, philosophy and other disciplines, such as one’s life and the problems it has, truth might not be the best thing for a person.

Truth of one’s life is a hard thing to keep depending on the situation. Keeping one’s sanity may be at stake when looking at the truth. The truth is painful and can often do more harm than good in certain specific situations. It is because of this that I think that regular and regulated (rather I have no idea how) self deception is not a bad thing.

Self deception pushing the truth away I think should only be temporary. One’s truth needs to be confronted and accepted at some point because in the end I think truth is the most important thing one keeps, even if it is held off for short or long periods of time.

I keep talking about one pushing the truth away, and that one should confront and accept the truth at a certain point. This is more difficult than immediately said.  I have heard this in more places than in just my thoughts. To even be thinking about self deception of oneself, that person must ask him/herself “Have I been deceiving myself? and if so where?” If this is answered by the person honestly, one’s self deceptions can be unpacked and evaluated for the real truth about one’s life to come out.

I have done this once all of problems and issues in life have receded, and it is really a good thing to view the truths one has denied.

This was just a simple bunch of thoughts I had on the subject of self deception, and my apologies if it was too random and mis concentrated.

I like to think of self deception (not the twisted self deception) as white lies we tell ourselves for the good of ours and others’ lives.

If you feel differently please say so on Twitter, email, or comment below.

Thanks for the support.


Russell’s Logic as the Essence of Philosophy

14 Sep

Logic as Essence  of Philosophy is a lecture/essay by Bertrand Russell  that breaks all of the principles down to their bare minimums.  Russell does a lot for epistemology when he brings everything down to philosophy only mattering to logic and sense data. In this lecture he makes logic the bare essence of philosophy.

Logic is our rules for making judgments and thoughts and without it, we would not be able to get anything out of what we philosophize. We have observations, and we have a desire to make something out of them. Logicians like Frege establish formally these rules for philosophizing and the boundaries to maintain. Things we do not know about, we aim to define (I will get to what defining is later).

Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that aims to help us understand the being around us, and what all this actually is. As I have said,  epistemologists and skeptic philosophers discredit and often eliminate metaphysics from existence. This is so for many reasons like we cannot perceive what metaphysics says, or we cannot test for what metaphysics says, or like here, reducing metaphysics to its logical components reduces the logical sentence to mere gibberish.

Russell calls logic the essence of philosophy, because whether it is metaphysics or not, any philosophical relation can be reduced to pure logical sentences. Metaphysics is just discredited among them because before it is reduced, it means even less than the other philosophies.  If I said ‘Socrates is a sycophant’  , I would be saying the same thing logically if I said  ‘ rooter is a beezer’. This is basically what Russell talks about in this essay of his, because anything can mean the same thing logically when it is stripped of all its meaning.

I bring Russell’s essay up for discussion just to lay some foundation in what metaphysics and epistemology do in fact have in common. My aim in my progressing writings is  to shoot down empiricism and positivism in their elimination of metaphysics, and defend metaphysics to its stronghold. Metaphysics and epistemology have this quality in common. A rooter could be either metaphysical or epistemological, but regardless of what a rooter or a beezer means, the logical sentence works. I feel little further need to explain this relation, in that I feel that my readers have a strong understanding and feel for logic without my need to explain it.  I just wanted to state that in regardless of what the sentence talks about,  if it confirms logically, both are the same regardless of what the words’ meanings are.

If theres pink shoes , then theres  fogoters. There are pink shoes, so there must be fogoters. This is a perfectly logical statement, yet we cannot know for sure if this true because we cannot know what fogoters are.  I push this concept so hard because I want to clarify that empiricists and positivists do not discredit metaphysics because of its logic, but because of its definitions. If the definitions known or not work well in the relation with one or more other things, it works great, but a metaphysician could assign a property with the name fogoter and have just created a frivolous philosphy, according to empiricists, Noumena is one thing that works well with logic, but the empiricists and positivists thought noumena was the worst metaphysical concept and means nothing even though it works well when related to other things with logic. I used Russell’s lecture to base my discussion off of, and to lay some foundation for some writings that will be here in the future.

This thought brings me to address the actual defining of  A, B, C, D, fogoters, rooters, and beezers.  It is not until here where metaphysics begins to be discredited and eliminated by the positivists and empiricists.  We can assign a letter like A to the first spot to mean anything, but when we define it, metaphysicians use relations with these undefineds and make properties out of them. For example, Kant defined a principle  X as noumena giving it its proper definition (which if you do not know it, it doesn’t matter for the moment) and noumena defines other things, and the things defined refer to other things as well. Heidegger uses Dasein to define his undefined, with the same thing happening too X as soon as it is defined.  It all works out agreeably until the variables are assigned definitions, and at that point, disputes are had and philosophy divides itself.

One of the bigger problems of metaphysics is that a newly defined term is often needed to be set forth to say what a metaphysician means. Empiricists and positivists dislike this action. After stating what i have said before this point, I want to portray metaphysics as a plethora of definitions that are scattered about, and then I want to further organize that beyond this writing to arrange all of the conflicting metaphysics together like Carnap began to organize the analytic and synthetic definitions.  I want to arrange metaphysics this way because of what a definition of any term causes.

The taking upon the action of defining a term is something that puts you in an infinite  regress of referrals. Lets define the word ‘braggadocio’ to help understand how defining something puts us in an infinite regression. Braggadocio:  empty boasting; bragging. If someone does not know what  bragging means we must define bragging. Bragging: to use boastful language. Now that we know that boasting and bragging are somewhat the same, what is language? Language: a body of words and the systems for their use common to apeople who are of the same community or nation, the same  geographical area, or the same cultural tradition. Okay, so what if we don’t know what words or common means. Then we would define those, and so on, and so forth.

I state that defining things puts us in an infinite regression because this sets the stage for a metaphysical buildup to have a stronghold instead of speculative things based on faith. I want to create a metaphysical buildup just like Carnap did so in an epistemological way. Faith is a great thing to have, but when people ask you your reasoning and you tell them faith, you will be laughed at. I want to find another way of reasoning metaphysical properties. Just like Kant said concerning noumena: “….for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition….”

This was only a preconcerning discussion about my intentions and thoughts. I did however want to root some things in this essay by Russell (even if most of this writing goes beyond what the his lecture actually adresses).

Thanks for the support, and do not get mad if more than half of this lecture was not actually about Bertrand Russell’s philosophy.

Progressing Advocation of Metaphysics

14 Sep

Some of my previous writings on this site have come about from my thoughts on some topics my classes have gone over, and these topics in philosophy have made me have a large desire to advocate and defend metaphysics from empiricism like Kant and in a more modern way that skilled metaphysicians do today. I am not the first one to want to defend metaphysics from empiricism , and I am not claiming to be the first one.

I do however claim to have a few theories that could progress to defend metaphysics logically and even empirically, but I do not wish to present those until further research and verification. I want to make this an introduction to my further writings here because most of the continuing writings will address something about defending metaphysics and addressing those who cause metaphysical decay.

My aspirations to defend metaphysics began when I read the part in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason about the noumena (there is a post all about noumena in the Immanuel Kant category to your right). Noumena is all things we cannot experience yet know still to exist. This is a primary principle of metaphysics that I intend to defend.

I do not mean for this to be a full writing, however, I want to define what my writings will be about in the future. I want to discuss any philosopher that addresses metaphysics, and that is what I am determined to do. First, I have not discussed Aristotle at all in my writings here, and I want to read his metaphysical material and address those. Second, I want to address the metaphysical and theological thinkers that advocate things like noumena, God and other things. Third, I want to address those who discredit metaphysics like empiricists and positivists. These include Russell, all members of the Vienna Circle including Wittgenstein again, Schlick, Carnap, Neurath, Hahn, and more. Also, empiricists like Hume.  These groups of philosophy are great yet they often anger me in their discredit of anything other than the experience. Fourth, and finally, I want to present ideas metaphysicians today present that I may apply to advocating the existence of things we do not experience. I will not do this instantaneously but in a very gradual fashion, addressing small topics bit by bit. I want this site not only from here on out to be a philosophical guide to all philosophers, but also to be an advocation of metaphysics (and theology for that matter).

I took a little break from writing here just to reevaluate my direction and decide what is next, because in my previous trains of thought I came to a standstill and needed to figure out what my goals were. My previous goals were to further familiarize myself with the ideas of many philosophers, and having done that somewhat, I feel like I can begin further and further evaluating them and presenting my own ideas.

This is not a formal writing for this site, just an introduction to what the writings hereafter will be considering.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: The Specialized ‘I Know’

1 Sep

Wittgenstein’s proposition filled book On Certainty is a late work of his discussing many things, mostly discussing the many things about and against G.E. Moore’s Introduction of Sense Data/Proof of an External World. Moore discusses sense data among other things about the world ( I have 2 writings about Moore’s writings, in the G.E. Moore category to your right), and at the beginning of the book, as well as being the theme of the rest, Wittgenstein questions the claim to know something.

When Moore continuously began his statements with I know, Wittgenstein refutes not the exact propositions Moore has, but that he uses ‘I know’ with too much liberty. ” We just do not see how very specialized the use of ‘I know’ is” and “That [Moore] does know takes some [showing]” (Wittgenstein).  After reading this it is known that saying that one knows is quite a statement in that knowing something is a large feat to accomplish.

The feat of accomplishing the knowledge of any proposition is large and amazing because of how much doubt that one must go through to signify the knowledge of something. According to Descartes, one must take into consideration all possible doubts there are about something before declaring knowledge of truth or falsity about it. To go through the processes of coherence or correspondence about something to declare truth or falsity would be one thing that would eventually allow a person to use the specialized phrase I know. I think it must be established that if we claim to know something, and are asked to show how and why, that we should be able to produce evidence about why it is true. Wittgenstein states that if we know something, we should be able to maintain all evidence to show that it is evident. It is not my opinion, but according to Wittgenstein (and Descartes for that matter) and his solipsist values, one can know only one thing: that oneself exists.  With these solipsist values, Wittgenstein can easily be understood in the reason why he states that ‘i know’ should be reserved. With these solipsist values, the only thing he claims to know is that he exists and Moore throwing around I know for other propositions can only be leading to falsities unless it is for sure that something is true or false.

Wittgenstein in On Certainty goes further into further testing before saying ‘I know’ by stating that a hand outside him may or not be there based on sensory sight.  He goes on with the hand to discuss his feelings on the matter.For me, to know that my hand exists is to test how solid it is, find all its functions,  decide where it originates from, and where in the spatiotemporal continuum it exists.

So, it is my goal here to arrive at a conclusion as to whether this hand I have is true or false in its existence. I want to give evidence as to its existence, and then form a reductio to further prove the point. First, I want to note that this hand is a part of and not separate from me. Regardless as to whether the body, mind, self, and soul are existent in parts within me, the hand is something that is my own, and it is a part of me. One of the things that can be known in the universe to exist is oneself. I KNOW I exist (Wittgenstein and Descartes thought so too).  And if it is known that I exist, all parts of me exist too. My hand is a part of me, so given that I exist, and parts of me exist with I, including my hand, my hand has this evidence to exist. Secondly,  my hand performs functions that have little to some impact on the world around it. Right now, it types simultaneously with the other hand in a writing about philosophy that will be posted on a website for anyone to read at their leisure. Also, my hand does other functions like washing, eating, and performing a plethora of other functions. Regardless of the function that the hand performs, it puts an impact around the world around it and something changes to a degree. As I am about to say further down the road in this writing, things that do change and impact have hard evidence for existence. I could go further in looking for further evidence but these 2 things are enough for me to say I KNOW that my hand exists. Wittgenstein would not endorse my thought process and he would still think that my use of ‘i know’ would not be specialized enough and that it is to loose in use.

Another example of proving something to knowledgeable certainty is the proof of my friend Scott (he is imaginary, and may not even be a person if you humor me).  Scott is a part of the creatum, and was created by God (I have further things to know to exist later, including the creatum), and if this is so, he can be assured to exist almost to the point of I know. Also, Scott is a terrorist and  places bombs in buildings. Lets say Scott put a bomb in building Z in town X, and building Z explodes killing a quarter of the population of town X including those in large proximity to the exploding building. Scott affected the world with this bomb and killed a lot of people, and had an effect on the world. Between these two things, we can know that Scott exists.

The knowledge of existence of a thing is not what Wittgenstein limits full knowledge to. The justified and evident use of the specialized ‘I know’ can be applied to anything in question in progression to knowing it. I choose however to turn toward the somewhat knowledge and full knowledge of the existence of things because of how delicate the argument is.

After reading Wittgenstein’s thoughts on using ‘I know’ so limitlessly, I was sent into a storm of thought into the justification and evidence of the existence of the below 5 things. I apologize that this writing has gone from the proving with evidence on anything to just the existence of things. But this website is for unbounded thought about the cosmos regardless the setting.

1) Oneself We can know that oneself exists because we think, and we know we exist. We also can be aware of this because we are a thinking thing that are contemplating the issue in the first place. Second of all, oneself has an effect/affect on the world around it, and each person that defines oneself makes a difference. Third, God recognizes and embraces our existence.

2) God We can be sure that He exists because he causes 99.999% of the effects in the cosmos, and he has more impact than is conceivable. He created the cosmos, and each individual person. Because of His effects and creations, we can be sure that He exists.

3) Creatum God created the creatum with all of the living things and earth within it. All of the things inside the creatum cause things within the cosmos, and we can know it to exist. We are within it, so it exists.

4) Spiritual World God and His angels, nor Satan and his demons are here in full creatum form, therefore since we know of Satan’s deception and God’s love, they must exist somewhere.  These worlds have revealed themselves to us in other ways therefore these worlds can be known to exist.

5 Causing Things If something causes an effect, and creates a small to large domino effect, the causer can be known to exist. This overlaps upon all the other 4 things known to exist, and this is one of the justifications just as well as it is a fifth category.

Thanks for the support. The above 5 things were quickly justified and were not done in detail. My main aim was to discuss that saying that we know something is a bigger action than we think and we should not throw the phrase  around so much unless they overlap and reside within the 5 things known to exist, or unless you can come up with other justifications for existence.

The Non Being and therefore Un-Sayable

31 Aug

After reading passages from Parmenides and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, along with the opposite views of Heraclitus and Spinoza, I understand that for a long time a large argument is about what what the nonbeing is and what can be said about it. Parmenides responds to Heraclitus when Heraclitus said that “the road up and the road down are one and the same” and relative to the being/nonbeing argument it means that anything can be said or thought about the road towards being or non being. Parmenides comes back by saying that the nonbeing cannot be thought or said upon (he does so in a variety of ways other than just one quote stating his stance like Heraclitus’ roads, but he does say that “thinking and being are one and the same” stating his ultimate stance about why nonbeing cannot be thought or said).  My aim is not to discuss the arguments that both Heraclitus and Parmenides had in Greece, but it is to discuss Parmenidesian and Wittgensteinian opinion that what doesn’t exist cannot be thought or said. I take up the matter because it is evident and has been evident in all of time that people think and say about things that are in fact non existent. I involve Parmenides and Heraclitus in the matter because they are one of the first philosophies to come about, and both had good arguments upon the same matter Wittgenstein and other philosophers discussed. Finally, I choose to bring Wittgenstein into this same matter because in Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Wittgenstein says: “I cannot think what I cannot think. What I cannot think I cannot say either”.  When discussing what he cannot think is referring to those things that do not exist within the human perception. This was one of the propositions that led to his solipsism and neutral monism ( numerous writings about Wittgenstein’s neutral monism and solipsism on this webiste, look in the category Ludwig Wittgenstein and/or the archives to find them, theres like 6 I think) that I refute totally, but have respect for the propositions leading up to them. These arguments between Wittgenstein and Spinoza’s monism, and the other numerous arguments between Heraclitus and Parmenides along with other Presocratics are not the subject for discussion, the only subject for discussion is that the non being can be thought and said, so much so that the non being can be made into being by planning through discussion.

Nonbeing can consistently be thought of and reflected upon. When thought of as a being, nonbeing cannot be thought of leading to the notion that nonbeing cannot be thought of or said about. When contemplating upon any contradiction at all, no results will come forth because little can come of such thought (the being in nonbeing is what is thought here).  I say so because when people think about nonbeing, it is a common misconception to think of it as a being, which is totally fallacious and contradictory, therefore nonbeing cannot be thought or said at the outset.  But getting further in nonbeing, we have to get specific of what does not exist to think and say things about nonbeing itself.  For example, eons ago before the genesis, the only thing that existed was God and his angels in a spiritual world. The physical creatum was not in existence before God created it (note that God, angels and the heavens are not part of the general creatum), and yet He conceived the idea of this world, and he made it so. Because God can conceive the nonbeing, so can we to a lesser extent.  Like said before, nonbeing thought of in terms of its being in the world cannot be thought of and the notion is preposterous, but down to nonbeing’s specificities in terms of how it would be if it was can be conceived.

Hopefully I am getting to the point of how nonbeing can be thought of and said. Again, nonbeing can be both thought and said if it is thought of down to its specificities. If nonbeing is thought of in a broad perception little can be obtained from the notion, and yes it is lacking in thought and speech. But if we think of nonbeing specifically down to what certain thing does not exist, thought and speech can be made upon it, possibly even allowing us to turn this specific nonbeing into being.

If nonbeing is thought down to its specificities (examples), we can think and say things about it, and the best part of it (as evident in society) is that we can possibly make the nonbeing into being. If this were not true, then there would be no inventors of the products and services we use daily. Take Alexander Graham Bell for instance. In Bell’s time, there was no device that could enable 2 people 100 miles apart to talk to each other by voice (there was a telegraph, but it was not by voice). The telephone was a nonbeing object. Bell and his assistant worked together with this notion of this telephone device and turned nonbeing into being by inventing their notion into being. They invented the telephone.  Here, nonbeing was thought, and even said. This mere example of Bell’s achievements falsifies Parmenides’ and Wittgenstein’s opinion that the nonbeing cannot be thought or said.

Another example of nonbeing transitioning into being because of our thoughts and speech about the nonbeing, is the fairly recent idea of a liger.  A liger being a cross between a tiger and a lion. This was on the movie Napoleon Dynamite where Napoleon draws the liger, calls it his favorite animal and shows it amongst the people around him. If what Parmenides and Wittgenstein say is true (that what doesn’t exist cannot be thought or said), Napoleon would have no notion of a liger, and anyone thinking or talking about a liger would not be possible because of the fact that ligers are of the nonbeing. Even more recently, biologists tried to make a liger by breeding a tiger and a lion, and they were successful in producing it so the nonbeing notion of a liger did well because it led to an actual being state of the liger. It was born a very weak animal and may not do very well and could regress back into nonbeing.  If what Parmenides and Wittgenstein say is true, the telephone, many other inventions and the breeding production of the liger would never have been possible because we would never have the ability to think about the nonbeing.

My ending inference from my unorganized thought process is this: there is nothing we cannot think, and therefore there is nothing we cannot say. Nonbeing presents one of the many obstacles in thought and speech, but it can be easily hurdled. Wittgenstein’s statement that we cant think what we cant think and what we cant think we cant say is just a resolution to many philosophical problems of dualisms and what some may call ‘philosophical hell’, and the proposition is a great thought, but after searching philosophically, the proposition I refute rejects a lot of areas of thinking that are unexplored and deserve consideration and thought. Wittgenstein’s solipsist and neutrally monist principles when taken for truth would rule out about 1/2 of philosophical exploration that needs to be done in the future. I, personally, look forward to exploring these unexplored areas, and refute any proposition that make exploration of those areas redundant.  In philosophy, there cannot possibly be unthinkable or unsayable  just because there is some nonbeing within metaphysics. If there was, philosophy would not have come as far as it has because more than half of it would be redundant.

If you want more thinking in the nonbeing being said and thought read into Lawrence Sklar and his geometries relating to philosophy and epistemology because of how Euclidean geometry long passed into geometrical law are falsified immediately (i.e. making a triangle with 3 90 degree angles within a whole triangle, which is nonbeing until discussed specifically).

This was just an unorganized thought process coming from reading some ancient writings of Parmenides and Heraclitus and reflecting back on my studies of Wittgenstein.

Thanks for the support.

G.E. Moore’s Sense Data and of the Hallucinative Forms

30 Aug

After explaining sense data in the previous writing on Moore’s sense data, I feel it is necessary to address the forms of sense data that do not usually come about, and even may not even be connected to an object.

This is just a brief discussion about sense data’s objects that it comes from. When Moore introduced the sense datum he exemplified and explained most about the actual sense data, and little of where it comes from. Epistemology from Moore to Russell and on can lead to and often involve rejection of metaphysics and theology (like the Vienna Circle), making the relation between sense data and its material object not something searched for. I am concerned with both epistemology and metaphysics and where the sense data comes from concerns me more than the sense data itself mostly because the sense data itself is easy to understand, but its source is something difficult and ambiguous.

Moore even stated that sense data comes from a variety of sources that either may or may not have an object. After understanding Moore, the sources of sense data I state to exist are similar and almost equal. Sense data generates from one of these things: 1) material objects 2)redistribution of color without object 3) the mind’s images. I mainly am concerned with the third category in this brief discussion because I discussed sense data of material objects and redistribution of color in my previous writing about Moore’s sense data. My reason for having concern with the third category is because the first two categories exist because they reside with an outlining object. A tulip resides in category 1 because there is an outline to it that is the flower and the color within it (yellows and greens) are the sense data that is represented to our minds.  The mind’s images do not work the same way and are wholly ambiguous in nature.

The mind is a complex entity and does many complex processes causing confusion within us by many ways of doing so. A mirage known to come before one thirsty and tired in a desert can create any image the mind chooses and we will believe the image to be a true object when really it is only imaginary. After not sleeping for days the same thing will happen. After taking certain harmful narcotics the same thing (in a more extravagant way) will happen. One with schizophrenia will have the same thing happen to him but in a more scary and different way. All of these things appear to us in the same form as sense data in that a tulip actually existing will look just as clear in color and shape as a miraged bottle off water. These pseudo-sense data being unusual are ambiguous and I know not what to think of them because of the fact that I know not where their sense data originates from.

I choose to equate a material object’s sense data with a hallucination or schizophrenic image because in both states of mind both look exactly the same in color and clarity. The only inference I can possibly make is that for hallucinations of all forms no sense data is present. After going through logic and epistemological contemplation, (I actually did go through a lot of thinking metaphysically even about it), I do not see any possibility that true sense data exists unless an object lies beneath.

No sense data can be perceived unless an object lies beneath.

I say this boldly and confidently because all hallucinations being compared to true object originated sense data are faulty and inconsistent. Sense data obviously exists when objects push the data strongly through consistency and clarity. Even though all hallucinations are always as clear and visible as object sense data, the hallucinations appear less frequently for the object it portrays and is very inconsistent. The hallucination can be clearly discerned from the object sense data. If we can see the clear distinction between real sense data and sense data of the hallucinative form, we can decide which is truthful and which is false. My philosophical statement is that the hallucinative form of sense data has no object behind it and therefore is false in nature and origin. The mind, however, is complex enough to deceive us with these sense data of the hallucinative form, and making this distinction is a must.

For this, it was necessary to speak only to sense data of the hallucinative form while a person is awake because when one is asleep it is easy to understand the state one is in because of clarity and usualness of the data being perceived. I felt the need to discuss the hallucinative sense data and to discern it from the true sense data Moore states to exist. We all have stayed up to late and seen something unreal, and some of us may have even taken a hallucinogen narcotic, and some of us may be (not myself) schizophrenics, so I felt it necessary to understand what is true amidst all our perceptions.

Thanks for the support. Longer writings on Deleuze, Berkeley, Locke, Heidegger and more to come in the near to more distant future.

Philosophy of the Philosopher (A Metaphilosophy #1)

20 Jul

I had just started reading Friedrich Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, and after the second proposition, I have been sent into thought. I do not want to talk about Nietzsche’s preliminary prefatory propositions in his text, but the fact that he was talking about what the common philosopher looks for, is what makes me think.

After much thought, I am writing because I want to think about while writing: 1) what the philosopher seeks, and 2)what the philosopher’s psychological characteristics are to make him think in such a way.

First, what does a person have to be like, and what must his/her personality be to be a philosopher? A regular person that does regular activities has the ability to think logically. Most people have common sense and are able to think logically. Logic is not what makes the philosopher unique. I hate to use this cliche, but philosophers “Think outside the box.” By the box, I mean the means of thought that everyone else uses to find truth and the answers to problems. The box includes mostly logic and common sense that everyone else uses (logic is used even when people do not know it). The box also is the group of things that the regular person thinks of every day (sex, food, money, controlled substances, entertainment etc.).  The box varies from person to person, but excluding philosophers, this box is the regular, run of the mill, almost cliched things that everyone else thinks about on a daily basis.

The philosopher’s brain is occupied with epistemological, metaphysical, advanced logical, cosmological etc. things that most people do not think about daily. Usually the person either has the answer to “why are we here?”, or they could care less. Regular life on earth causes a seclusion of our lives here, where outside matters are often overlooked. Philosophers do not overlook the slightest matter that is outside of this regular human life seclusion. If the philosopher overlooks anything, he overlooks what goes on between humans inside this human seclusion of a world. Kant would have never written Critique of Pure Reason if he did not think outside the box, Plato would not have written the Republic if he did not think outside Athenian life in the polis, as well as Zizek would have never written Plague of Fantasies if he did not think differently from the advances of everyone else. One has to think outside the box to even care about anything besides interhuman matters. People cannot understand why philosophers think about the things philosophers think about, just as philosophers cannot understand how everyone else can overlook such things. So, in essence, philosophers think about things totally different from what everyone else thinks about. This leads me to the long heard saying: “Everyone has a philosophy, but not everyone is a philosopher.” I state this as my points being driven home because everyone has an opinion that can be considered a philosophy, but all of these ‘philosophies’ are not the philosophies that famous published philosophers have. Philosophers’ philosophies are different from the ‘philosophies’ of everyone else because of what the philosopher seeks.

The philosopher looks for the unanswered. They do not necessarily look for truth, or falsity, but they look for what is desired to be answered by at least a small group of people. Philosophers find data, and prepare an opinion on that data just like any scientist or politician, but philosophers look for things that no scientist or politician would find. Philosophers look to prove truth, falsity, or indeterminacy.  Politicians or scientists do not look for indeterminacy, usually for truth or falsity. Philosophers gather information and data to get from one point to another, even if the end result might be indeterminacy. Philosophers look for indeterminacy because they are willing to accept it and find other data supporting it, and other data telling more about the indeterminate. I find this intriguing to think of philosophers this way. Many philosophers are not willing to admit to have found indeterminacy, but I am confident to say that philosophers would rather accept indeterminacy about something that is thought to be true, than falsity. Finally, I think that philosophers are unique and great in that respect because of the fact that any analogy, example, or story can be used as an example to a philosophy. Philosophy does this using the ancient skill of rhetoric, making many things a difficulty to disprove, or find truth in, or rule indeterminate.

I was just thinking about the nature of philosophers. If you think I am wrong in anything above, please @reply me on twitter (go to the About CosmosZ page on this site) with what you think, or comment below, or email me at