Tag Archives: Being

Charles Iroegbu’s Neo Classification of Beings

18 Nov

I feel like I should make aware to my readers the communication I have had with Charles Iroegbu. Charles contacted me after reading my Classification of Beings writing that I posted here awhile back. He wrote an article on the same subject of his own. He asked me to look at it and I did. He also wanted me to put it on Google Docs for him, and I did so as well. The document can be found on Google at this link:  https://docs.google.com/document/d/1jdkmWX-BYBgOyss0OzYHiR7AUKVNCi3HTUDE97zq3CU/edit?hl=en&pli=1#

I want to discuss my feelings about it, but do not continue reading until you have taken a look at the link where Charles’  article is. He goes to the University of Nigeria by the way.

Charles classified beings closely similar to the way I did. He distinguished a God being, a Death being, a Human being, an animo-plant being, and a lifeless being. He calls things differently than I do, but his view metaphysically parallels mine. The God being is of course the unmoved mover and the God that I constantly refer to. The death being is the spirits that have left the human being state. The human being is obviously the state of life that we as humans are all in where our bodies are not separated from our souls. The animo-plant being is what I would describe as the beings with non-nous souls. The lifeless being is the beings that of course have no life such as the desk my computer sits on.

What I really like about Charles’ understanding of the classification of the world metaphysically, is that he goes against Aristotelian thought that the body is too personalized to be separated from the soul.  Near death experiences that some have had where they experience the leaving of their body towards a somewhat spiritual world would not be explainable if the body were together forever with the soul.

Charles discusses being really only in terms of ontological existence. When I wrote my classification of beings, I classified things in three ways, by  location in the cosmos, matter making up the being, and spirit. Charles mostly discusses beings based on their spiritual status. The God being is an all powerful omnipotent spirit. The Death being is spirit after physical life after death. The human being is spirit before death. The animo-plant being is spirit without intelligence. The lifeless being is what confused me as to his mode of classification.  The lifeless being is of no spirit at all, so I am understanding that Charles is classifying things based on their mere ontological status.

I should not have a problem here really because it is my opinion that whatever is experienced or observed is ontologically existent at one time or another. Maybe my classification of beings was more complex than necessary because of how I broke things up into three modes of classification. Charles simplifies things because of how he reduces classification down to level of ontological existence.

And they are all real at one time or another because they whatever is seen is actualized existence. The metaphysical classification of being by Charles is basically a reduction of metaphysics to a level of ontology.

Thanks for the support, and thanks to Charles Iroegbu for contacting me.


W.V. Quine: On What There Is

22 Oct

My apologies again for not writing for a long period of time. It has not really been that long, like a week, but for me, and this site, that is a long time. Last week I had school duties to take care of, so did I this week (with a midterm test), and still so I do next week as well, as I have another midterm test. I will try again to post more, but this month is just crazy, with the tests and papers, and I do not suspect November to be the same, and I will resume having 4 to 5 posts per week as usual.

Having not gotten into too much ontology here, I have been reading a lot of W.V. Quine’s essays. I would like to discuss today his essay On What There Is. One thing that Quine takes upon himself to do is to make it known to all philosophers that there is no meaning in the world, and all of it is reduced to grammar and semantics. He does this not only by starting with the riddle of Plato’s beard in On What There Is, but also starting with analytic/synthetic and reductionism in Two Dogmas of Empiricism.  In both essays he comes to the conclusion that all this striving towards finding meaning in everything is useless in that there is no meaning anyway. I will discuss Two Dogmas of Empiricism in a near future writing. Before even going into On What There Is I want to think about ontology’s distinction (or indistinction) from metaphysics. Ontology is understood as the metaphysical study of the nature of being and existence (Princeton). Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that examines the nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, substance and attribute, fact and value (answers.com). Metaphysics is also taking up the understanding and proving of things not able to be understood or proven by science (all fields).  In lieu of these definitions, I would like to understand ontology as the core division of metaphysics, especially since ontology goes into what being and existence are.

My focus of Quine’s essay On What There Is is not the conclusion he comes to (that there is no meaning at all). My focus is thinking about the riddle of Plato’s beard of nonbeing, and what being and existence are as Quine questions them. This simply means that my opinion is different from Quine’s in that I see meaning in things discussed like Pegasus, the author of Waverley, or the round cupola on top of Berkeley (these are things ontologically defined in On What There Is).

Quine begins his essay discussing Plato’s beard. The riddle of Plato’s beard comes from Plato’s discussion of nonbeing. This refers to Plato’s beard back in Ancient Greece because of how tangled his beard was. The argument and discussion of nonbeing as to finding a meaning in it, and to ontologically define it is a tangled argument, much like Plato’s beard. What makes nonbeing such a tangled argument is that nonbeing is being in one way or another. Quine puts it perfectly: ” This is the old Platonic riddle of nonbeing. Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not?” (Quine). Simply, if we say “Pegasus is not” how the hell did we say and understand Pegasus if it does not exist somehow? Plato’s beard kind of relates to Wittgenstein’s statement in the Tractatus saying that what cannot be thought cannot be said either. If we can think of Pegasus, it can be said also, and since we are saying it, how can we deny its being? This back and forth rambling is Plato’s beard. Quine confronts 2 arguments allowing nonbeing to still work.

The first argument allowing cohesiveness of nonbeing is the thought that nonbeings can be ideas of the mind. I can have an image of a flying horse with wings in my mind and think Pegasus. This argument allows a nonbeing (Pegasus) to still be just in a different manner. Quine refutes this by talking about the Parthenon itself (thing in itself) and the idea of the Parthenon. These, says Quine, are 2 different things and ideas of things being not the same as the thing in itself. This makes the nonbeing not able to be beings in that ideas of things are not ( when I say is, or is not  or are or are not, I refer to being or not being, just to clarify if you get confused in ontological discussion as I sometimes do). The second argument for nonbeing being something, is that nonbeings are beings unactualized with potentiality in space-time. Quine refutes this belief by saying that nothing can be understood or learned about unactualized beings in space-time, while also noting that logically contradictory things can’t be ruled out in this  belief, like a round square (specifically a copula). These two arguments are refuted by Quine simply because they are not being, and with other arguments he eventually concludes by saying that there is no meaning in anything. The meaning discussion is beside the point (my point anyway).

To understand nonbeing and what it represents, being and even existence need to be defined alone first. Quine viewed being as potential unactualized beings or actualized beings, and existence as purely actualized beings. Quine does this to state that the possible potential unactualized beings that are nonbeing in a sense  are not possible because of those logical contradictions and because we cannot find anything out about these possible unactualized beings or nonbeings. Using Russell’s theory of description he not only reduces everything to grammar and no meaning in anything at all, but he proceeds further. He also declares fallacious the ontological commitments to certain things besides something , nothing and other sure things. He finds fallacious the commitment to things such as the existence of Pegasus, blocks of cheese on Jupiter’s moons, God(s),  souls, or other specific things. Again, these things are beside what I want to discuss, as I keep saying that. I want to think about and know what is being (and existence) and therefore what is nonbeing (Plato’s beard)?

Existing, I will agree with Quine’s definition for his argument, is being actualized and having actuality. I think existing is something used to define things tangible in regards to the universe. Tangible is of course physical things, but also living souls with or without nous. In writing Classification of Beings, I only discussed existing things, and nothing on that discussion included nonexistent things. Looking back on nonbeing and how this is Plato’s beard, I do not think nonexistence creates real problems like nonbeing does. All philosophers should create their own understandings of being and existence but the definitions Quine has presented in lieu of his present argument have little room for argument. Being can be looked at to be the same as existence, but I really do not think this is so. If nonexistence would be called into question, there could not be possible unactualized existences or mental existences because of the contradictions that would take place. Nonexistence is not existence simply, and refers to things potential.

A quick aside, all of this discussion of one meaning to the next makes me feel silly. I think as of now that there is meaning in everything, but know what Quine thinks about meaning, and while exchanging meaning for meaning, word for word, I feel this all becomes meaningless. I do not say that I think being and existence are meaningless words, but I just feel dumb throwing these words and meanings around, so hopefully I do not sound dumb, but I think the meaninglessness presented in Two Dogmas of Empiricism and On What There Is might be getting a hold of me. This was just a disclaimer in case I sound stupid or ignorant.

What was I talking about, oh, being. My understanding of being is everything. Quine would probably not have gone this far especially because he states that since we cannot determine anything really, being has a vague definition (not that vague definitions are bad since my and probably others’ definition of being includes everything, and I shall specify as I progress). Quine signified being as things actual and potential (unactualized things). Things in themselves in the world are actual (existent) or unactual/potential (possible potential things that could or may exist at one point or another). Things actual or potential include most of the beings of the world. There are certain things that are not potential or actual that are in different ways. Quine discussed in On What There Is the possibility of nonbeing being in the sense that there are ideas of the mind. Some of these ideas are potential (never actual because our ideas are different from actual existences) but some are not. Pegasus is an idea of the mind, but not potential because a horse being able to fly with large white wings is not a possibility. Our dreams, being so messed up and weird sometimes, are ideas of the mind but not potential. So, in being is included actualities (existences specifically), potentialities (possibilities of existence), and non-potentialities (ideas of the mind not possible to be or exist). These categories of ‘being’ (not really classifications) make up the definition of being, and mostly includes everything. There are things still that are not actual, potential, or non-potential, and this is what I would call nonbeing.

As I finally return to the nonbeing riddle of Plato’s beard, the riddle states that nonbeing can in a sense be being: 1) by being an idea of the mind, 0r 2) by being a potentiality. I believe to have given a solution (that some probably have given already, not really sure) to the riddle of Plato’s beard (at least to two common arguments for it). The ideas of the mind and potentialities are beings and should not ever have been included in nonbeing anyway. What I think nonbeing is is things that actually are not. Quine used as an example for logical contradictions (in a previous argument) when he introduced the example of a round square. A round square (impossible as it is) can never be actual, potential, or non-potential. This is an example of nonbeing.  An example I came up with, think about the colors: blue, black, red, green, yellow, orange, purple, pink, brown, white, gray and various variations between each color. (Aside from each variation between each color like burgundy, turquoise, hot pink, violet, indigo, frog green, forest green, cobalt blue et cetera) Try to think about a different color besides the colors on the color wheel. Can you do it? No you cannot. A new color besides the said colors cannot be perceived of and cannot be. This is another nonbeing. Or can you think of a black Caucasian person (Caucasian meaning white)? No you cannot. This is another nonbeing. These things not actual, potential, or non-potential are nonbeings. If you want to discuss nonbeings more please says so, you know how.

Is this a disentanglement of Plato’s beard? Who knows, yet… probably not….since someone probably already did this, so I am just a follower……probably.

I love ontology, I should talk about it more.

Thanks for the support.

If you don’t have a Twitter you need one, heres mine: http://www.twitter.com/cosmosz

I have 2 Youtube channels, but on my second one: http://www.youtube.com/bluespectacles I started a Youtube orbit where I make a video every day for a year, and as of now I am trying to keep each day philosophical, but I do not know how well that is going.

Russell’s Solution to the Problem of Infinity and Why It Matters

16 Sep

Infinity and the philosophy of time is something that, in my opinion, matters directly to metaphysics, which is the main reason why I address Russell’s essay ‘Problem of Infinity Considered Historically.’ Russell talks about the long time theories of infinity including Zeno, Hegel, and Kant. In my discussion here on the matter, my aim is to discuss how certain things are infinite, and how this discussion is a preamble of what I want to talk about metaphysically.

First, philosophers think infinity is a false thought for varieties of reasons. A few that are popular arise from mathematics, and were discussed by Russell. The infinite series that are discussed in trigonometry and calculus, are often finite, which when mixed with the other series that are in fact finite, it causes confusion. Metaphysically, people die, and a person is thought to cease to exist, and this for some ceases the possibility of infinity.  Also, it is Kant’s and many other’s belief that everything has a beginning, and that that discredits all infinity in the past. Infinity is also thought not to exist because we are contained within a began and ended part of time, and that there is no way to prove whether anything is infinite because we cannot exist before our coming to be, and that some believes that we cannot exist after our coming out of existence (when really everyone does, because we always go somewhere after death).  All of these things together require a need to justify that things can be infinite both ways. And by both ways I mean infinite in past existence, and infinite in future existence.

I have a structure to understand the temporial, spatial, and existential statuses of individual things ( like X for example). I have not written this structure for the classification of beings yet, but that is to come in the near to distant future as I clarify my structure and classifications.  I should not even have these theories anyway, as I have not  actually graduated with any philosophy, so I am in no hurry to publish anything.

Russell’s justification in ‘The Problem of Infinity Considered Historically’ is simply by how people count:  1,2,3,4,5,6…….. Counting is one of the ways we can justify infinity. I think that counting just from 1 to 2 to 3 and one to 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 and on. I use such a high number to say how high we can count is because that large number I stated is not the end of our count. We could start from that large number and start counting again. I  could count forever if I wanted to. If I could really count forever, this proves infinity to exist in the future tense. I was thinking about this and thought, how we use the word ‘million’ to describe 1,000,000. I was thinking that every word in every language said by anyone in the past present and future could be postulated by a number.  The word ‘stimfuggerinpod’ is in fact a number. The word ‘ computer’ is a number. The word ‘fagilabottlekoop’ is also a number. This is only true because there is infinity in this future tense.

Another way to prove infinity this way is to think about the number 1.  If I have o.8 and I want to round up to 1 and get as close as possible to it as I can, it cannot happen because as I try to round up, the distance between o.8 and 1 will get so much smaller and smaller, and I will never get to the smallest amount before 1. For example, if I went from 0.8 to get to 1 and I got to 0.99999, if I kept adding more and more to it to get closer and closer to one, I would never do it.  0.999999, 0.999999999,  0.999999999999999, 0.99999999999999999999999999, 0.999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 99999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 99999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 99999

And so on. I could keep doing this until I reach 100 years old, and I would still not be as close as possible to 1 without being 1. Get the picture?  Do you now believe that things can be infinite? If you do not, let me know and I will meet with you and discuss it out, or I could do to you what Richard did to Tommy on Tommy Boy while on the freeway in front of Prehistoric Forest (Richard hit Tommy with a 2×4).

Finally, people discredit the past infinity. As in the fact that God has always existed into past infinity, is what people discredit. This past infinity of any being denotes that this being never came into being. Now  thats a contradiction. This is one of the metaphysical principles (of time especially) that I aim  to defend. I want to do so because I have FAITH and BELIEF that God has this past infinity and never came into being, but was always a being.

The specifics of infinity aside, infinity and proving its existence matters to metaphysics.  In Russell’s other essay about infinity ‘The Positive Theory of Infinity’ ,  he states that infinity is proven when put into classes.  I aim to further this incentive because in my forthcoming paper of the classification of beings, I want to put beings into classes to state their temporal status. I personally believe that stating the temporal status of a being helps prove their status of existence. By temporal status I mean whether they are infinite, and if so how infinite and in which ways. If we can figure out the temporal status of certain beings.   Hey look to your diagonal left there is the words ‘temporal status’ three times in a column! ^ ^^^

Finally, I want it to be known before I even postulate more on the classification of beings, that all things in the universe are infinite. In one way or another they are infinite. If a body dies, the soul is recycled into one of the spatial regions. The material body is decayed and remains in the biospheric creatum somehow.  A carrot that is eaten does not disappear from existence, but it is infinite. The carrot is released from the body, goes to the soil and still remains in the biospheric creatum somehow.

More on this later in my classification of beings, thanks for the support.

Rene Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy: Second Meditation

1 Sep

This is the second writing about the meditations on my site, the writing on the first meditation is in the Rene Descartes category to your right (as well as a paper I wrote 2 years ago about all 6 dialogues together). The second meditation by Descartes is about the nature of the human mind. The theme that Descartes drives towards in the whole meditation is that the thing we can be sure to exist is ourself.  Many smaller arguments are mildly taken up by Descartes within the mediation, but all lead up to his justification for the existence of the thinking thing.

Descartes stated towards the beginning of the meditation that ” .. I cannot perceive without the body.” Descartes states this after discussion of the deceiving God, and about the self, mind, and body in general. I choose to take up this statement because it is paramount in discussing the deceiving or nondeceiving characteristic of God (I discuss the deception further in the discussion on the first meditation). This argument does  360 degree turn back into the argument about how God deceives us, and leading up to, I think, I am. Going on to the quote above’s argument, I think that Descartes statement about  perception without a body is somewhat false, and somewhat true. Lets clarify that the body, in all the cosmos, is just a material limitation that we are destined to reside in during our occupation of earth. God (not Descartes’ deceiving god) made the body a temple for us to respect and reside in. Lets also clarify that the soul, or our individual spirit that either becomes a tortured spirit or an angel after death, is a person’s immaterial spirit that is of no substrata, and has all abilities of perception when not limited by God. The material body is a limit that is put on the soul (and as I have said multiple times on this website, we are only here to serve God and pass the test to find salvation amongst all the evil we are presented) because of how God places the soul within this body. To fulfill God’s purpose for us living on this earth for a short time (here to either find God’s salvation or go to hell for eternity after life on earth), He must limit the soul’s perceptions. I am quite sure that the soul without a body is able to perceive things  because of the things angels have done in biblical times and beyond. This understanding of the bodiless soul having all possible perception falsifies Descartes claim that there must be a body to perceive. There is, however, a difference between the perceptions the naked soul has, and perceptions the body limited soul has in the creatum. Contrasting with the bodiless soul, the body limited soul has perceptions because of the sense organs God created for the body. These sense organs are created by God to purposefully distort the images we see. God distorts our sense organs in the body limited soul because we are to go against the ‘seeing is believing’ standard, and put faith in God regardless of what we see. So, without a body we cannot have normal perceptions. I use this term to state what most beings in the cosmos have:  perceptions with sense organs within a body that are distorted purposefully by God to test the soul to find Him.  To correct Descartes, normal perceptions cannot be had without a body, but his original statement is wrong, because perceptions of infinite value can be had only when without a body.

To do that ‘360 degree’ turn with the previous argument into the theme of the second meditation, it is Descartes paramount view that God deceives and tricks him, therefore he thinks that the only thing that can be known to exist is the oneself because I think, and I am. It is my understanding that Descartes is lead to think that he is tricked by God because of the normal perceptions he has. He states that a perception cannot be had without a body because ‘I think therefore I am” would not work without that aforesaid statement. The sense organs are the way God deceives him, and those sense organs are within the body, so by this he justifies the statement stated in the previous paragraph. Descartes uses these justifications to lead to stating only the self can be known to exist, and without these his argument would fall apart (for example with my tearing apart his argument).  Finally, before going on to discussing the main argument of ‘I think therefore I am’, Descartes creates uncertainty of all other things besides the self because of how he believes he is being tricked by God and other things that mislead him. The ruling out of certainty of most things lead him to the oneself.  Wittgenstein and the solipsists did the same thing without the presence of a deceiving God.  Setting aside now all of the things that lead up to Descartes stating the justification for self existence, lets go on to the main argument.

The main theme of the second meditation that I have been talking about all throughout Descartes’ justification for this theme, is when he states that because he thinks, he has evidence enough that he exists, and this goes for all people: “I think, therefore I am.”  It is my opinion, but not what I ultimately want to discuss at this point, that stating that ‘I think’ is a great way to link yourself to sure existence. We are thinking things, and because of how we carry out the somewhat advanced process for anything, we can be sure to exist. If we have no other evidence for our own existence, the process of constant thinking is a great one to rest your case upon. How can there possibly be something that thinks but does not exist?  Just contemplate that opposing question a bit. After my own contemplation on the matter, I cannot come up with an answer. If there is any thought that goes on in any of the cosmos, it is directly linked to some conscious being. There is no way around it. “I think, therefore I am” is a ground breaking statement and is true in all cases. It is however not what we should finally come to when searching for evidence of our own existence. Things rested in God and His processes should come first in our search for evidence for our own existence before finally coming to “I think therefore I am.”

Descartes’ process he came through to get to “I think, therefore I am” is not a good or truthful one, and he postulated a lot of false things before coming to it. Regardless, however, of how false Descartes’ precedences for this statement are, the final proposition is entirely true.

This writing was somewhat disorganized in that I went from one remote part of Descartes argument and finally funneled into the main one, but hopefully it is understandable enough to understand why Descartes’ precedences to the main theme are wrong, and why “I think therefore I am’ is correct.

Thanks for the support.

The Non Being and therefore Un-Sayable

31 Aug

After reading passages from Parmenides and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, along with the opposite views of Heraclitus and Spinoza, I understand that for a long time a large argument is about what what the nonbeing is and what can be said about it. Parmenides responds to Heraclitus when Heraclitus said that “the road up and the road down are one and the same” and relative to the being/nonbeing argument it means that anything can be said or thought about the road towards being or non being. Parmenides comes back by saying that the nonbeing cannot be thought or said upon (he does so in a variety of ways other than just one quote stating his stance like Heraclitus’ roads, but he does say that “thinking and being are one and the same” stating his ultimate stance about why nonbeing cannot be thought or said).  My aim is not to discuss the arguments that both Heraclitus and Parmenides had in Greece, but it is to discuss Parmenidesian and Wittgensteinian opinion that what doesn’t exist cannot be thought or said. I take up the matter because it is evident and has been evident in all of time that people think and say about things that are in fact non existent. I involve Parmenides and Heraclitus in the matter because they are one of the first philosophies to come about, and both had good arguments upon the same matter Wittgenstein and other philosophers discussed. Finally, I choose to bring Wittgenstein into this same matter because in Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Wittgenstein says: “I cannot think what I cannot think. What I cannot think I cannot say either”.  When discussing what he cannot think is referring to those things that do not exist within the human perception. This was one of the propositions that led to his solipsism and neutral monism ( numerous writings about Wittgenstein’s neutral monism and solipsism on this webiste, look in the category Ludwig Wittgenstein and/or the archives to find them, theres like 6 I think) that I refute totally, but have respect for the propositions leading up to them. These arguments between Wittgenstein and Spinoza’s monism, and the other numerous arguments between Heraclitus and Parmenides along with other Presocratics are not the subject for discussion, the only subject for discussion is that the non being can be thought and said, so much so that the non being can be made into being by planning through discussion.

Nonbeing can consistently be thought of and reflected upon. When thought of as a being, nonbeing cannot be thought of leading to the notion that nonbeing cannot be thought of or said about. When contemplating upon any contradiction at all, no results will come forth because little can come of such thought (the being in nonbeing is what is thought here).  I say so because when people think about nonbeing, it is a common misconception to think of it as a being, which is totally fallacious and contradictory, therefore nonbeing cannot be thought or said at the outset.  But getting further in nonbeing, we have to get specific of what does not exist to think and say things about nonbeing itself.  For example, eons ago before the genesis, the only thing that existed was God and his angels in a spiritual world. The physical creatum was not in existence before God created it (note that God, angels and the heavens are not part of the general creatum), and yet He conceived the idea of this world, and he made it so. Because God can conceive the nonbeing, so can we to a lesser extent.  Like said before, nonbeing thought of in terms of its being in the world cannot be thought of and the notion is preposterous, but down to nonbeing’s specificities in terms of how it would be if it was can be conceived.

Hopefully I am getting to the point of how nonbeing can be thought of and said. Again, nonbeing can be both thought and said if it is thought of down to its specificities. If nonbeing is thought of in a broad perception little can be obtained from the notion, and yes it is lacking in thought and speech. But if we think of nonbeing specifically down to what certain thing does not exist, thought and speech can be made upon it, possibly even allowing us to turn this specific nonbeing into being.

If nonbeing is thought down to its specificities (examples), we can think and say things about it, and the best part of it (as evident in society) is that we can possibly make the nonbeing into being. If this were not true, then there would be no inventors of the products and services we use daily. Take Alexander Graham Bell for instance. In Bell’s time, there was no device that could enable 2 people 100 miles apart to talk to each other by voice (there was a telegraph, but it was not by voice). The telephone was a nonbeing object. Bell and his assistant worked together with this notion of this telephone device and turned nonbeing into being by inventing their notion into being. They invented the telephone.  Here, nonbeing was thought, and even said. This mere example of Bell’s achievements falsifies Parmenides’ and Wittgenstein’s opinion that the nonbeing cannot be thought or said.

Another example of nonbeing transitioning into being because of our thoughts and speech about the nonbeing, is the fairly recent idea of a liger.  A liger being a cross between a tiger and a lion. This was on the movie Napoleon Dynamite where Napoleon draws the liger, calls it his favorite animal and shows it amongst the people around him. If what Parmenides and Wittgenstein say is true (that what doesn’t exist cannot be thought or said), Napoleon would have no notion of a liger, and anyone thinking or talking about a liger would not be possible because of the fact that ligers are of the nonbeing. Even more recently, biologists tried to make a liger by breeding a tiger and a lion, and they were successful in producing it so the nonbeing notion of a liger did well because it led to an actual being state of the liger. It was born a very weak animal and may not do very well and could regress back into nonbeing.  If what Parmenides and Wittgenstein say is true, the telephone, many other inventions and the breeding production of the liger would never have been possible because we would never have the ability to think about the nonbeing.

My ending inference from my unorganized thought process is this: there is nothing we cannot think, and therefore there is nothing we cannot say. Nonbeing presents one of the many obstacles in thought and speech, but it can be easily hurdled. Wittgenstein’s statement that we cant think what we cant think and what we cant think we cant say is just a resolution to many philosophical problems of dualisms and what some may call ‘philosophical hell’, and the proposition is a great thought, but after searching philosophically, the proposition I refute rejects a lot of areas of thinking that are unexplored and deserve consideration and thought. Wittgenstein’s solipsist and neutrally monist principles when taken for truth would rule out about 1/2 of philosophical exploration that needs to be done in the future. I, personally, look forward to exploring these unexplored areas, and refute any proposition that make exploration of those areas redundant.  In philosophy, there cannot possibly be unthinkable or unsayable  just because there is some nonbeing within metaphysics. If there was, philosophy would not have come as far as it has because more than half of it would be redundant.

If you want more thinking in the nonbeing being said and thought read into Lawrence Sklar and his geometries relating to philosophy and epistemology because of how Euclidean geometry long passed into geometrical law are falsified immediately (i.e. making a triangle with 3 90 degree angles within a whole triangle, which is nonbeing until discussed specifically).

This was just an unorganized thought process coming from reading some ancient writings of Parmenides and Heraclitus and reflecting back on my studies of Wittgenstein.

Thanks for the support.

Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit: Defining Dasein

24 Jun

There are further and more involved discussions about dasein that I want to discuss in full form. But now, I want to define the not widely known term dasein used by Martin Heidegger in his book Sein und Zeit (Being and Time). Before I even want to get into arguments about dasein and other things about it, I want to document a general yet full definition of the philosophical term. Dasein has certain characteristics that make it what it is and it allows Heidegger to come to a few points in Being and Time (Sein und Zeit).

First, dasein translates from German literally to ‘being there’. It is the word that is assigned to the being of humans. Heidegger focused on just the beings of humans in this particular terminology. He allotted certain characteristics to dasein allowing him to come to a certain conclusion. First, dasein is defined as being in the world. Being is the big topic of dasein. The being of people on this world is what is characterized to dasein. If a being is being in the world, Heidegger defines it as “water in a glass” just like a human is existent in the world. We live here and are also being in ourselves because of who we are. Heidegger states that this being in ourselves conflicts with being in the world because we are being in two different things. Dasein does not refer to a certain human or even a large group of humans but it refers to the existential possibility of a human/humans with certain qualities.

A few different things characterize this possible existent of dasein. One thing, is that Heidegger refers to Kant when he says that dasein always has an a priori knowledge. A priori knowledge is defined by Kant and others to be knowledge that is prior to worldly experience. Like if we have not experienced the world around us. If we are just floating around in nonexistent space, and we are the only existent thing, a priori knowledge is the knowledge we would have at this stage. If we have not been in this world or experienced really anything, Heidegger and Kant still feel that we would still have a general amount of knowledge about their being and the existence/non existence of the space around them. Heidegger states that dasein and its possible beings that mirror it have a priori knowledge. I say this because it will be important to know in arguments I bring to the table from Heidegger and dasein. I do not plan to argue whether or not beings have a priori right now.

Heidegger also defines the existents of dasein to reflect certain modes. Two modes Heidegger says that dasein reflects is everydayness and averageness. This is often put together and described as average everydayness. Heidegger blurs the difference between beings of dasein with this average everydayness. Starting with averageness, Heidegger means that dasein and the beings within it are not particular or specific to any one characteristic. All of them generally conform to a certain commonality. There are some beings within dasein that may be specific or particular, but averaging all of those yields a general commonality. Everydayness is characterized by Heidegger as the beings of dasein being generally similar per amount of time. Dasein’s beings become general enough that a lot of the same characteristics of each being make an everydayness in dasein. Average everydayness put together successfully blurs the distinction between individual beings of dasein because of how similar Heidegger says them to be.

So why did Heidegger characterize the being of humans (dasein) to be so similar and regular to every other human being. Heidegger characterized this of dasein because it was his philosophy that one human being conforming to the rest of beings just like him or her leads to the idea that the world is a large, regular, and representing of human beings as a large whole. If this is true, Heidegger states that dasein beings are lost, alone, and on their own in the world and on the actions they perform.

When I use the word regular, I mean regularity in the actions and characteristics of human beings. If dasein is so regular like Heidegger says, perception of individual human beings is lost because of how dasein is replaced to represent the being as a whole. The distinction between humans is easily lost with average everydayness of dasein. Heidegger uses this conception of average everydayness to show how we cannot distinguish human beings from each other because of how they do the same things basically.

Heidegger characterizes human being in dasein in such a way because he wants to make the reader of Sein und Zeit understand that each individual human is cast out into a chaotic, difficult and confusing world without help of supreme deities. The large and loaded definition of dasein is characterized by Heidegger because he wants to create the image of a world where no one really has a chance to become an individual and persevere over the chaos and difficulties of the world.

If you think that I have misconstrued the definition of dasein, please tell me in the comments below. If I didn’t define dasein right, please correct me as much as you can in the comments. If you know that there is something to be added to this definition , also tell me in the comments.

I am defining dasein in this post because I want to fully understand dasein with my efforts and maybe the efforts of even yourself. I want to have this definition of this loaded word fully understood before venturing into other arguments in the Sein und Zeit of Heidegger.

Thanks for your support. and do not forget to comment.