Tag Archives: logic

Ayer’s Function of Philosophy in Language, Truth, and Logic ( A Metaphilosophy #2)

2 Dec

I am writing a few things here on my free of obligations thursday so that I can get some posts in before I won’t be able to write anything for about a month (I think). This is simply because I have a ton of school things to do for the next 2 weeks and then I will have Christmas break and will have little time.  I will for sure come back to writing by the week of January 10.

I want to talk about an aspect of another section in A.J. Ayer’s Language Truth and Logic. The second section of the book is the Function of Philosophy. I find this interesting because metaphilosophy and finding out what the goal of philosophy is should be held dear by any philosopher. Again showing his rejection for metaphysics Ayer states that the function for philosophy is not to find insight on metaphysical things. Ayer says that the search for a first philosophy is not really the goal. First philosophy is the kind of philosophizing Descartes did in his meditations.

Ayer proclaims philosophy to be a critic. This is for one thing towards scientific propositions where philosophy is used to critique the sciences and make it better. Mostly, he states philosophy to be a critic in that it tells one whether their beliefs are  ‘self consistent’ or not, and that it shows the things we use to find the truth ( or lack thereof) in our propositions. This function of philosophy contributes to science and critiques things one scientifically proposes. Ayer seems to be defending against the idea that science cannot do without philosophy because of induction. He goes on to say that induction cannot be solved, and we should deal with it in science and philosophy is not really needed for this purpose.

Others in the logical positivist era and before it have maintained the idea that science can do without philosophy and simply that philosophy assists philosophy by critiquing it and making it the best it possibly can be. In the beginning of logical positivism, the Vienna Circle (influenced by Mach and Wittgenstein, and including Carnap, Hempel, Schlick and others) wrote the Scientific Conception of the World. “The goal ahead is a unified science. the endeavor is to link and harmonize  the achievements of individual investigators in their various fields of science. From this aim follows the emphasis on collective efforts, and also the emphasis on what can be grasped intersubjectively; from this springs the search for a neutral system of formulae, for a symbolism freed from the slag of historical languages; and also the search for a total system of concepts.” This I quoted from the Scientific Conception of the World. The aim these scientists show to have is to give philosophy a goal to contribute in this unified science with physics, chemistry and all other sciences contributing in any specific theory. Philosophy just seems here to be one of many parts of a collective effort. Philosophy plays a huge part in this collective effort in that its theories can contribute to any kind of discipline or science. Did I mention the members of the Vienna Circle rejected metaphysics too? Its what all the positivists were doing. If your friends jumped off a bridge would you do it too? I am simply joking because of how many people in the logical positivist era who advocated a verification, an a priori epistemology, and the rejection and elimination of all metaphysics and its pseudo-statements. I can understand why they feel the need to remove metaphysics from philosophy because science does some of metaphysics’ roles in the most logical way possible (I am kind of being facetious). A unified science achieved by collective efforts among many sciences and disciplines is one goal philosophy has. This should not involve the rejection of metaphysics however.

Putting science aside, I feel philosophy is not simply an additive profession used to critique and assist scientific experimentation and exploration. In mostly non-metaphysical aspects of philosophy, there are roles in philosophy made specifically for the critique and use in science, but an underlying goal or purpose exists under all specialized goals and roles the specific kinds of philosophy has (such as I feel the Vienna Circle refers to the philosophy of science and not really to the rest of philosophy as they may have thought). The huge purpose philosophy seems to me to have is the role in doing what science and experimentation cannot.  Science cannot prove the existence of noumenal beings or transcendent realities but philosophy actually has a chance at doing just that. If one uses the intersection of metaphysics and epistemology along with some ethics (and of course logic as the foundation of understandings) to postulate upon our empirical and un-empirical observations, things can be discovered that science cannot measure up to. This is why I think the unified science by the collective efforts of all disciplines including philosophy is the best combination because science being paired with philosophy can yield great results. Philosophical propositions can be experimented sometimes scientifically and proved out.

I totally advocate the unified science proposed by the Vienna Circle, but instead of eliminating half of the entire body of philosophy, it should be revitalized and used toward science’s benefit. Metaphysics can be beneficial to scientists as can some religion.  Philosophy should be used whenever possible in all disciplines of science.

I have interest in metaphilosophy to help philosophers define and redefine the purpose being driven toward. I want to keep addressing themes in metaphilosophy here every once in awhile to keep thoughts on track. Each philosopher regardless of situation has his or her own course of action to take to complete a philosophical project or work. I have my own so I feel it necessary to keep metaphilosophically addressing philosophy right now, and the philosophy I currently pursue.

What function or goal do you think philosophy should have?

Let me know your answer if you would like to (on Twitter, commenting below, or by email).

I appreciate the support as always.

A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic: Elimination of Metaphysics

30 Nov

I return, once again, yes again, to Mr. Alfred Jules Ayer. I am now interested in his book he wrote in his twenties Language Truth and Logic. Reading it, the first section addresses metaphysics and why it sucks.

What a positivist.

I have two bones to pick with the first section of Ayer’s book, but he goes over more things than I am particularly concerned with. He begins to discredit the metaphysician  by stating that they attempt to get into the transcendent reality (unseen unempirical reality) when we create our propositions by our senses. When we feel we are limited to our 5 senses, postulating about anything other than empirical matters can be something hard to muster. Ayer claims that if one cannot really or worthily postulate about anything unempirical, most metaphysics conducts philosophies of pseudo-statement where nothing is really proclaimed and nothing can be argued for or against because again nothing is really proclaimed. From this discussion of most metaphysics as crappy pseudo-statements Ayer goes on to saying that statements and propositions made in metaphysics and epistemology must have a process of verification. He then goes into aspects of verification ( like application and other things).

Like I said, what a positivist (trying to kill metaphysics and trying to verify statements).

I have said before, I have 2 opinions differing from Ayer. 1) must all propositions be derived from sensory perception?

2)Verification is a lost cause.

In the beginning of the section Elimination of Metaphysics, Ayer stated that if most propositions are derived from sensory perception, transcendent realities cannot be understood or postulated about. Not to say that we have a 6th sense, but there are senses and feelings beyond the 5 senses we all know (sight, sound, smell, touch, sound). The main five tell us things about phenomenal reality, but there are things we have that can lead us to postulations about noumenal reality. When I say noumenal reality, I mean reality we cannot empirically perceive. I hate to exemplify this because I will be called dumb, but one might be a conversation indirectly or directly between a God and man. This is not of th 5 senses. This can note an existence of a God, and a heaven. Another example is God talking to a man and sending him to a very dark place (i.e. Hell) and then bringing him back. These observations are not empirical. This would lead me to question does one have the 5 senses beyond the body and when the soul is relocated? I think not, and it is just that everything is made known to the soul of what is around it. This is all hard to explain because empirically understood people will not understand. A connection between a God and a man, or a relocation to another space, is personally experienced only with the soul present, and cannot be understood to a man who has not experienced it himself.

I have only experienced an indirect conversation with God. In a hard time of problems in my life, and constantly praying to God for answers, my prayers were answered as I immediately understood wholly my situation and what I needed to do from there on out. It is almost as if I had a close experience with God to the point that I cannot explain it to any other than myself. These experiences are examples of what can lead us into inferring a noumenal space not empirically observed by people.

My point is that not all propositions have to be derived from empirical observations. It isn’t like we can chose to observe unempirically a noumenal place or being, but it happens at the will of God and other beings there. I do not mean to reject Ayer’s argument solely on religious inferences, but I mean to reject it by saying that if people have conceived of beings and places unempirical and not phenomenal before, it  can happen again even if its not at our will.

This leads me to verification, the Holy Grail of the logical positivists. Quine and other philosophers have shown the with meaning and other things in verification, it is just not a feasible project for metaphysical and epistemological propositions.  Verification can be done, but only on a personal basis, or a local basis between a few people who have experienced the same things. If verification of statements can only be done on such local or personal bases, there is little point to continuing on the quest for verification. Meaning has been solved, as has justification and criterion of application, and how these are applied has also been solved, but using all of these things in verification is what I understand as a pointless endeavor.

Going back to the noumenal perceptions that I believe people (including myself) to have, if these noumena unempirical perceptions are there mixed with the phenomenal ones, propositions become personal. Once these propositions about the world phenomenal or noumenal become personal, verification is a pointless endeavor.  It cannot be done, and one would be continuously be searching for that last part to verify a proposition.

Where does this leave a person who wants to know things about the world?

Still with a bright future I think (I haven’t even addressed the current foundationalism vs. coherentism, and internalism vs. externalism yet but nonetheless this is a totally different course of action in postulating things about the world). The fact that propositions cannot be verified only means that single propositions cannot be verified because of personal aspects with noumenal facts. Various propositions grouped together are what actually can tell one something about the world. Plethoras of propositions put together that while aren’t verified alone, can overlap and tell people something about the phenomenal or noumenal world. Or at least this is what I think, not taking into account any other philosophies.

Let me guess what you’re thinking, “Bullshit”. Did I hit the nail on the head?

Noumenal metaphysics is something totally feasible, just not entirely by empirical observation. Empirical observation is the short cut in all epistemology crossing with metaphysics, and it is also seen as the only way, when really it is one among many.

Thanks for the support. I have not a clue when I shall write again as my college papers are coming closer to their due dates and I will have less time.

 

Classification of Beings

20 Sep

A long necessary thing to be done is to classify the beings of the world. Some choose to set metaphysics aside, but I choose to classify the beings to make this my guide to today’s metaphysics and my further studies in it.  Benedict de Spinoza did NOT  state this classification of beings, and this work is purely of mine. The reason I categorize this with Spinoza is because of how within this classification I use his word ‘creatum’ a lot. Creatum is the world that was created by God, and I take only the word and its meaning from Spinoza. It is an important term because within the classification, the world only He created is necessary to classify apart from the rest.

Beginning this classification, I break all of it down into 3 categories and ways to classify the beings in the world.  Those 3 would include Sort classification, temporal classification, and spatial classification. I feel no need to classify the beings beyond these three things because it would be arbitrary. It could be argued that the sort classification is not necessary, but I feel it is.

Temporal Classification

The temporal part of all this is what I split into 2 things:  the infinite, and the finite. Temporal means time, in case you were not aware of it. Most things in the world are infinite temporally. Lets first discuss what could be finite, since infinite is basically everything else. When I talk about the creatum I split that up into  spiritual, and material. Everything material is infinite (which I’ll discuss later), while spiritual things are either infinite or finite. I talk about finite right now because in the temporally finite category includes non-nous souls. Nous is an ancient term meaning intelligence and being aware of one’s existence. Humans have most nous, while animals have less than half of what a human has. Nous also includes a being not being aware of what happens to them in the future. The notion that all dogs go to heaven is only a story and a myth because all animals (excluding humans), plants, fungi, protista, and monista are all non-nous souls enough to the point that they are called into question as to the finiteness of their souls.  I categorize non/some-nous souls to be finite. When a plant comes into life, and dies, the soul of it goes nowhere, and it vanishes from existence. When a dog or other animal dies, its soul dies and vanishes from existence with it. Therefore, in the temporal classification I include lesser-nous souls. This is the only temporally finite thing.

Temporally infinite includes everything else. This means God, un-ensouled beings ( soulless matter),  the void, and the rest of the creatum and its beings. Beyond this, infinite is divided by whether a being is infinite towards the past, and infinite towards the future. God is infinite both ways, meaning he never came into being, and has always existed (this is a concept no human can understand and that we must accept and wait until Heaven to conceive). The non-ensouled, the void, and the creatum all came into being at some point and will never cease to exist (it will just be relocated). The void is infinite because God created it when he created the world. The creatum includes all ensouled beings, and non-ensouled beings. By ensouled beings I mean humans, and all other non-nous souls (plantae, fungi, monista, protista).  The creatum also includes the non-ensouled beings like the earth, all other planets, and planetary extra matter (asteroids, comets, meteors scattered among the void).  The soul of the nous en-souled beings is infinite temporally because it comes into being, and once the body dies, the soul is relocated to another level spatially. When the body dies it mixes with the rest of the earth. I gave a scenario in a previous writing where a man comes into being, dies at 99 years old, and his soul goes to a higher spatial level (will talk spatial levels next), but his body gets put in a wooden casket. After many years, the body decomposes along with the casket and becomes humus with the earth. Many years after that, carrots are grown in the same humus, and feeds newer life. In this process nothing leaves existence, it is all relocated and still exists in some way or another.

I say that the only thing finite in the universe is non- nous souls/some nous souls because everything else is relocated and does not perish in any form. The only being in the universe that does perish is the soul that lives in a certain body at a certain time (the body is still again relocated and conserved). I have a few rules for the beings in the world that I shall present after talking about beings spatially and by sort.

Spatial Classification

The spatial classification of beings is where I choose to classify everything as to where they exist into high, middle, and lower space. Here I classify this to link the levels of space to what beings exist there, therefore creating the spatio-temporal metaphysical field, that is discussed yet not formally clarified. In the higher spatial includes heaven, the upper void, and the upper planetaries.  By the heavens I mean where God exists, and that must be far away from the middle space (and from evil), even if the heavens is a spiritual space field. By the void, I mean the space without any beings other than some air particles not forseeable by anyone.  By upper planetary (and by planetary I mean all bodies of the universe), I mean the stars that exist above the middle spatial. All things in the high space are infinite in every way possible. Second, is the middle space, which includes the solar system as a part of the middle planetary. Around the middle planetary is the middle void, also being the space without beings around the middle planetary. All beings in the middle space are not all infinite, because the non-nous beings live in the middle space, and the non-nous souls are finite.  Third, and finally, the lower space is where the lower void, and lower planetary (excess matter, and stars) exist. Not only this, there exists Hell, where Satan and those cast away live.  Here I encounter a problem in that it could be understood that 2 lower spaces exist, or my old definition of space of hell must be redone. It is a biblical statement that hell exists within the depths of the earth where it is extremely hot. This makes ambiguous the lower space definition.  The lower space could include the lower void, and other planetary. So, because of the biblical statement of the spatial location of hell, I find I must include within the lower space the hell, and the lower void and planetary. So, my definition of lower space is the lower void, and planetary, along with the inner cores of bodies of solar systems. This seems to qualify as all low enough to work well with the definition. Dividing space up makes it necessary to further sort the actual beings to understand where each beings exist.

Sorting Classification

By sorting classification, I mean dividing the beings up by nous ensouled, and the non-nous ensouled. As I described before, nous is the intelligence and awareness of the soul of its own state and existence. Man has nous, plant has none, animal has some.  I divide beings by this nous because beings with complete nous, are beings that their spirit is infinite, while some to non-nous beings’ spirits are finite in nature. The nous ensouled beings of course include God and man. The non nous and even ensouled beings include animals besides man, plantae, fungi, protista and monista, along with all unensouled beings like earth, and planet matter.

The sort, spatial, and temporal classifications I have set forth compel me to state some postulates about the beings and spaces in the world, hence the below:

*

__________________

Another way to sort out the beings is by how they came about: God, who did not come about, and will never perish, and the creatum which was created by God, some of which is infinite and some finite.

The creatum can be further divided into spiritual and material. Spiritual includes the man’s soul which is infinite, and the some animal, plant, fungi, monista, protista beings which are finite. Material includes all planetary bodies, planetary stars, planetary excess and material a part of each body. All of the material is infinite, because it is merely relocated when it seems it ceases to exist (water in a cup disappears, it does not cease to exist, it evaporates and relocates itself to the higher atmosphere).

The term infinite can be defined either by spatially or temporally. Temporally, as I said before, all things are infinite except for the spirits of some animals besides man, plants, fungi, monista and protista. Spatially, the void is infinite, God, and His Heaven is infinite, while all other things are spatially finite.

The lower space can be characterized as space below the planetary systems, but when it is said to include hell, the definition is said to include the inner parts of the larger planetary (not stars or excesses) bodies because of the place Satan’s lair is located.

Without Him having created the creatum, there would be nothing, not even the void, except for Him. He created the void, all spaces, and all beings, including therefore the creation of temporal sense.

God Himself is said to be an unmoved mover by Descartes and Aristotle, and I too endorse this statement. He is infinite spatially and temporally (whether or not the notion of time is noted). He exists at all times in all spaces in one way or another, and is in all places at once.

Spiritual matter of the man is generated in the middle space, and is later relocated to the higher or lower space, and with man’s spirit, no spiritual matter is ever discarded. (* note that any other spiritual matter beside God’s and man’s is discarded on a daily basis because of lack of presence of nous).

Material matter is never discarded, again, only relocated to other spaces. Like the chemists say, no matter is created or destroyed, but I revise their standpoint to say that beyond the Genesis when the creatum was first made no matter is created (creation of new beings by sexual or asexual reproduction is not creating new material matter, only spiritual matter. When a sperm fertilizes an egg in sexual reproduction, the fertilized egg in its spot has only to grow into another human being, therefore material matter is conserved). This leads to further laws and theories.

Conservation Law: (An extension of the chemist’s law of conservation of mass)  After the creatum was created by God during the Genesis, no material matter is created or destroyed, only relocated (or changed to different beings, like also the chemists say that during a reaction two elements change totally by composition and physical qualities, and are completely different from what they were after the reaction. This shows that not only can matter be relocated, but it can be changed without the creation or destruction of matter).

Conservation Law: After the creatum where all things besides God were created by God, only non-nous souls are destroyed. All nous souls are never destroyed, only relocated from the middle space to the lower or the higher space based on certain commitments while within the middle space. God’s soul is never destroyed or created. His supreme soul never came into being, but has always existed, and will never cease to exist. The fact that a being within the universe has the ability to always exist for all eternity but never actually come into being is an impossible concept for us to understand, but something we must still accept as truth (This is something we are able to understand if our soul is relocated to the higher space).

The beings of the world are classified by three main categories, and therefore many sub-categories because we must understand where we are, who we are, and what we discuss and look at, before we declare metaphysical and theological statements to be truths. The logical positivists and the empiricists (and the empirical positivists) did not assess the beings of the universe in a correct way, leading to their rash decision to discard metaphysics and theology.  My statement for them is that there are solutions coming to their problems by metaphysicians and theologians. They have not yet become mature theories to be introduced among all branches of philosophy for understanding and application.

The above is a precedent to further defenses of metaphysics and theologies.

Bertrand Russell’s Role in Progressing Epistemology

16 Sep

I previously did not think it was necessary to talk about the blue spectacles and the hard/soft data here, but now I am aware it is needed. I now before this one have 2 writings about Bertrand Russell, and with search engines asking for Russell’s role in epistemology, my 2 writings came up but I am sure that those are not what the person asking that question is looking for. This writing is. The notice of that search bringing my site up is the reason for this writing, when really I should have talked about these things in the first place given that the blue spectacles are totally awesome.

I also have 2 writings on G.E. Moore where he talks about sense data and patches of it. I discussed how, because of this sense data, I like to view everything I see as a big portrait. I said this not only because of what Moore said but because of Russell’s blue spectacles he discussed in Our Knowledge of the External World.  Not only does he discuss the blue spectacles, but he discusses shutting an eye, walking around a table and other things, just to discuss sense data.  Why all of these things? Because  along with Moore, Russell wants to state that sense data is the only way of making understanding of our perceptions.  If I see a red tulip, normally I would think, ‘oh its just a tulip’, but it is necessary to break common sense ordinary observation statements down to sense data statements. If I see a red tulip, I say, a few red patches there, adjacent to each other, and an elongated green patch below.

I used an object to state my argument. Moore used an envelope. Russell used the blue spectacles. I like Russell’s object the best because it supports the way we should all view and understand our perceptions. If you stand still and view the table, you see a few brown and black patches. If you walk around the table, you see a different set of sense data to be interpreted. You do not think about what you saw before you moved, you only analyze what you see now. Russell’s blue spectacles are put on, and you see everything with a blue hue, so if you are looking at a sea shell, you do not think oh, a white and pink sea shell sits beyond these blue spectacles, you think ‘ oh, a blue sea shell.’ Or at least, that is how an epistemologist would think. If you put the blue spectacles over a large white marker board, you would not think about what lies behind the blue spectacles, you would only think,’oh a huge white patch with 2 blue patches within it.’

Put these on, and then observe!!!  I think we should view the world as a portrait because if I am observing my yellow envelope somewhat through a green Mountain Dew bottle and some not, I see 2 yellow patches and a greenish dull yellow patch. I do not inquire what lies behind the green bottle.

The other part of Russell’s epistemology that led to his great role in it, was his hard and soft data.  I need to explain some things before going right into hard and soft data. Russell said that thoughts are either logical, or psychological, and they are primitive or derivative. So if something is logically derivative it is something that takes logical process and inference to understand it. If an idea is logically primitive it is something logical that one knows without having to go through an actual process of understanding and inference.  If an idea is psychologically primitive it is an idea caused by a fact from the sense that is asserted by a belief and that we need no process to understand and that we immediately understand. If, finally, an idea is psychologically derivative it is caused by 1 or more beliefs or an idea  not asserted by the fact of sense and often takes a process to understand because of how it is not asserted by the fact. These 4 definitions can be intersected with each other to have meanings of certain things

First, logically primitive, and psychologically primitive data cannot possibly be put together.

Second,  logically derivative, and psychologically derivative data can be put together. This is called nondata. For example, nondata is like electrons like to be next to protons. Nondata is not important and is arrived at by a lot of psychological and logical inference.

Third,  logically primitive, and psychologically derivative ideas can be put together to get soft  data Soft data is immediately inferred by logic, but takes more than just immediate observation to infer its existence. Soft data would be like when Russell walked around the table, and when more than one observation occurred (making psychologically derivative intuitions), yet he knew the table was still there with the many observations.

Fourth and finally,  logically and psychologically primitive data can be put together to get hard data. This is what is discussed most in epistemology. It takes one immediate logical inference, and one immediate psychological belief to get it. When Russell used the blue spectacles, he saw 2 blue patches. It is hard data because it takes no more than 1 logical and 1 psychological intuitions to understand that there are 2 blue patches.

To discuss some of this, soft and hard data are the only important ones to epistemology. This is so because it is often discussed if certain hard data can be proven wrong. Hard data can be said to be so hard because it involves immediate logic and immediate sense data. Russell discusses in ‘Our Knowledge of the External World’ that the hardest data is made up of 2 things: logic, and sense data. If the two can be inferred, you have hard data. Hard data for the most part cannot be disproved to be there. If there is a blue patch here, and we are immediately observing it, there is little one can do to disprove it, even if he declares your hallucination. Soft data can often be disproved because when Russell walked around the table, it can be postulated that the table no longer exists after that first sense data after he moves, and that new sense data of another item is present.

The above is Russell’s big role in epistemology. If you need more clarification of his philosophy read ‘Our Knowledge of the External World’ by Bertrand Russell.

Russell’s Logic as the Essence of Philosophy

14 Sep

Logic as Essence  of Philosophy is a lecture/essay by Bertrand Russell  that breaks all of the principles down to their bare minimums.  Russell does a lot for epistemology when he brings everything down to philosophy only mattering to logic and sense data. In this lecture he makes logic the bare essence of philosophy.

Logic is our rules for making judgments and thoughts and without it, we would not be able to get anything out of what we philosophize. We have observations, and we have a desire to make something out of them. Logicians like Frege establish formally these rules for philosophizing and the boundaries to maintain. Things we do not know about, we aim to define (I will get to what defining is later).

Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that aims to help us understand the being around us, and what all this actually is. As I have said,  epistemologists and skeptic philosophers discredit and often eliminate metaphysics from existence. This is so for many reasons like we cannot perceive what metaphysics says, or we cannot test for what metaphysics says, or like here, reducing metaphysics to its logical components reduces the logical sentence to mere gibberish.

Russell calls logic the essence of philosophy, because whether it is metaphysics or not, any philosophical relation can be reduced to pure logical sentences. Metaphysics is just discredited among them because before it is reduced, it means even less than the other philosophies.  If I said ‘Socrates is a sycophant’  , I would be saying the same thing logically if I said  ‘ rooter is a beezer’. This is basically what Russell talks about in this essay of his, because anything can mean the same thing logically when it is stripped of all its meaning.

I bring Russell’s essay up for discussion just to lay some foundation in what metaphysics and epistemology do in fact have in common. My aim in my progressing writings is  to shoot down empiricism and positivism in their elimination of metaphysics, and defend metaphysics to its stronghold. Metaphysics and epistemology have this quality in common. A rooter could be either metaphysical or epistemological, but regardless of what a rooter or a beezer means, the logical sentence works. I feel little further need to explain this relation, in that I feel that my readers have a strong understanding and feel for logic without my need to explain it.  I just wanted to state that in regardless of what the sentence talks about,  if it confirms logically, both are the same regardless of what the words’ meanings are.

If theres pink shoes , then theres  fogoters. There are pink shoes, so there must be fogoters. This is a perfectly logical statement, yet we cannot know for sure if this true because we cannot know what fogoters are.  I push this concept so hard because I want to clarify that empiricists and positivists do not discredit metaphysics because of its logic, but because of its definitions. If the definitions known or not work well in the relation with one or more other things, it works great, but a metaphysician could assign a property with the name fogoter and have just created a frivolous philosphy, according to empiricists, Noumena is one thing that works well with logic, but the empiricists and positivists thought noumena was the worst metaphysical concept and means nothing even though it works well when related to other things with logic. I used Russell’s lecture to base my discussion off of, and to lay some foundation for some writings that will be here in the future.

This thought brings me to address the actual defining of  A, B, C, D, fogoters, rooters, and beezers.  It is not until here where metaphysics begins to be discredited and eliminated by the positivists and empiricists.  We can assign a letter like A to the first spot to mean anything, but when we define it, metaphysicians use relations with these undefineds and make properties out of them. For example, Kant defined a principle  X as noumena giving it its proper definition (which if you do not know it, it doesn’t matter for the moment) and noumena defines other things, and the things defined refer to other things as well. Heidegger uses Dasein to define his undefined, with the same thing happening too X as soon as it is defined.  It all works out agreeably until the variables are assigned definitions, and at that point, disputes are had and philosophy divides itself.

One of the bigger problems of metaphysics is that a newly defined term is often needed to be set forth to say what a metaphysician means. Empiricists and positivists dislike this action. After stating what i have said before this point, I want to portray metaphysics as a plethora of definitions that are scattered about, and then I want to further organize that beyond this writing to arrange all of the conflicting metaphysics together like Carnap began to organize the analytic and synthetic definitions.  I want to arrange metaphysics this way because of what a definition of any term causes.

The taking upon the action of defining a term is something that puts you in an infinite  regress of referrals. Lets define the word ‘braggadocio’ to help understand how defining something puts us in an infinite regression. Braggadocio:  empty boasting; bragging. If someone does not know what  bragging means we must define bragging. Bragging: to use boastful language. Now that we know that boasting and bragging are somewhat the same, what is language? Language: a body of words and the systems for their use common to apeople who are of the same community or nation, the same  geographical area, or the same cultural tradition. Okay, so what if we don’t know what words or common means. Then we would define those, and so on, and so forth.

I state that defining things puts us in an infinite regression because this sets the stage for a metaphysical buildup to have a stronghold instead of speculative things based on faith. I want to create a metaphysical buildup just like Carnap did so in an epistemological way. Faith is a great thing to have, but when people ask you your reasoning and you tell them faith, you will be laughed at. I want to find another way of reasoning metaphysical properties. Just like Kant said concerning noumena: “….for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition….”

This was only a preconcerning discussion about my intentions and thoughts. I did however want to root some things in this essay by Russell (even if most of this writing goes beyond what the his lecture actually adresses).

Thanks for the support, and do not get mad if more than half of this lecture was not actually about Bertrand Russell’s philosophy.

Immanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason: The Transcendental Logic I (Logic in General)

10 Aug

Kant’s book Critique of Pure Reason contains in it the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements which has the landmark concepts of time, space, transcendental logic, among other things including the concept of a priori intuitions. In the first part On logic in general, Kant talks about certain intuitions along with the sensibility all pointing towards the qualifications for an intuition to be a priori. This Transcendental Doctrine is one of the things making Critique of Pure Reason one of Kant’s amazingly thought provoking and amazing books.

First in this part on logic, Kant talks about reception of representations and faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations.  Reception of representations is our nature of being given representations of the world. We are given these things without much thought being necessary to achieve them. The faculty for cognizing an object comes to us through our thought and contemplation upon the representations we receive. This faculty for cognizing comes to us only through our thought of things, and are not given to us as the representations are. Kant states these fact to lead up to his distinction of intuitions between those that are empirical and pure. Empirical cognitions are those that have sensation contained in them. Pure cognitions are those without any sensational involvement. Kant goes on to say that only pure cognitions are a priori, and empirical cognitions are a posteriori.  From this he goes on to talk about understanding and what it is made up of: “If we call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way sensibility, then on the contrary the faculty for bringing forth representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding” (Kant). Receptivity being the ability of our mind to receive representations that are affected by sensibility is not that complex of a process, but understanding involves more thought and is therefore more complex. The faculty for “thinking of objects of sensible intuition on the contrary, is the understanding. The logic used towards the understanding is then divided into general and particular logic in use of the understanding. General logic is logic used for understanding that is the basic absolutely necessary rules of thinking. The particular logic for the use of understanding is the rules for thinking about a certain kind of objects or thoughts. General logic is further divided between pure and applied logic. Pure logic being logic of understanding dealing with particularly a priori principles. Applied logic being understanding for the sensible and psychological purpose because of the sensibility involved. The empirical, pure, general and applied can be crossed with each other to have different logic and understanding. Kant’s main proposition of this part of the book: “A general but pure logic therefore has to do with strictly a priori principles,  and is a canon of understanding…” (Kant).

I explain the above because it is my opinion that sensibility clouds propositions and judgement creating the need and therefore existence of some a priori logic and understanding. Empirical applied logic and understanding  is in my opinion corrupted by sensibility. The senses we have govern too much our logic and understanding, when we should not rely very  much upon them. I believe Kant felt the same about senses and sensibility because of the fact that he made sure that a priori logic only included that which had no sensibility. I do not choose to discredit  sensibility totally, but it clouds judgement away from the real and the truthful because of how our brains are complex enough to make things appear different from what they really are.  If there were no  a priori principles we would be lost in this world and all of us would resort to  foolish philosophies (like solipsism, and atheism if I may say so). If there were no canon of understanding we would be so lost that we would not be able to come back from it. There are reasons we cannot have all a priori knowledge, but we cannot succeed in the world without some of this a priori knowledge. I think that Kant called a priori principles general and pure because of how the sensibility corrupts logic and gives it impurities. This canon of understanding is what helps us have the ability to sort through the corrupt and false principles and understand what is true and real. I appreciate Kant for making the distinction between these logical distinctions. This philosophy endorses what the Christians believe about the knowledge God means for us to have while on this earth. We are given just enough knowledge to find our way, but there is enough possibly corrupted sensible empirical knowledge to lead us astray.

Thanks for the support. @Reply on Twitter, comment below, or email at cosmosuniversez@yahoo.com to talk about your opinions, and if you think I am wrong in believing this.

Gilles Deleuze The Logic of Sense: The Paradox of Regress

5 Aug

Sense being one of the main discussions in Deleuze’s book Logic of Sense, the fifth series talks about sense and why it is more than the presuppositions it leads to on a daily basis. This series in Deleuze’s book has a few paradoxes of sense in it. One being the paradox of regress. This series has difficulty in coming to understand it because of how Deleuze believes the sense to regress.

But I am all about paradoxes and understanding them.


“…I never state the sense of what I am saying. But on the other hand, I can always take the sense of what I say as the object of another proposition whose sense, in turn, I cannot state. I thus enter into the infinite regress of that which is presupposed” (Deleuze).  Deleuze state the sense to be not which is discussed out in front, but it is what is presupposed in any discussion on any issue. The sense that is used in any proposition/statement is not needed to be brought into discussion even if it is dominant in everything. Because the sense is so widespread, the sense of one proposition reaches the boundaries of other propositions, although the sense of this proposition is different and cannot be stated because of the fact that it is a different sphere of knowledge and propositions. Because of how the sense is presupposed in all propositions, it becomes ambiguous (?) creating the inability to actually state the sense of the other propositions that the sense for the discussed proposition had also.  “This regress testifies both to the great impotence of the speaker and to the highest power of language…” (Deleuze).  I state this quote because the high power of language contributes to this infinite regress of the sense, and the infinite regress of the sense causes a lot of the impotence of the speaker. “In short, given a proposition which denotes a state of affairs, one may always take its sense as that which another proposition denotes.” (Deleuze).  I quote Deleuze so much in this writing because no one can put this infinite regress better than he did. Deleuze states this paradox to be Frege’s paradox (other writings on Frege on this website, not on language but on logic in the ~F Logic page found in the above right). Deleuze again refers to Alice to exemplify in a real example this infinite regression.  Alice speaks with the Knight about a song he intends to sing. He states the name of the song to be Haddock’s Eyes,  where the Knight responds by saying that that is what the name of the song is called. With more discussion, the name of the song is called The Aged Aged Man. The song is then said to be ‘called’  The Ways and Means. With more discussion, the song ‘is’ A sitting on a Gate. The names (Aged Aged Man, Ways and Means, A sitting on a Gate, and Haddock’s Eyes) vary about the same song because of sense and how it reaches from statement to statement while ambiguously varying. One name is ‘what the song is called’, another is ‘what the name of the song is called’, another is what the song ‘is’. The same song being discussed is presupposed to have one name, but it has many different names when it is concerned what of the song is discussed. The talking between Alice and the Knight is stated by Deleuze to not be the infinite regression discussed, but it is finite in the fact that they get to understanding what the song is. Infinite regression (could even happen with the song, Alice and the Knight’s discussion could go on forever if they keep bringing up propositions about the same song varying because of the same sense that occurs in all of them) occurs when you do not come to a finite conclusion because different aspects of the same thing bring up different propositions because of the ambiguous outsretching sense that occurs in everything in existence. Sense cannot be defined and stated outright in a single proposition because it is not a state of affairs or an object, it is a quality and a feature that occurs in all states of affairs and objects because of the sense humans have. I explain this detailedly because I think (Deleuze also thought) that this infinite regression of sense being from our perception is a part of the power of language and contributes to the fact that language is not advanced enough to represent and state wholly our thoughts and ideas. This infinite regression is the clear reason for the faults language has when comparing it to our thoughts, and is the reason for the (unfortunate) enormous power language has over all. If sense was more simple and fathomable philosophy and linguistics would not be necessary (much science wouldn’t be necessary either) because we would easily be able to understand the world around us. I believe that God intentionally made sense this way so that we would seek him out and trust him with our lives, and so that we would know that we have to wait to get to Heaven to understand God’s works and everything else. Sense not having this infinite regression would defeat the purpose of our lives because of the fact that our purpose of life is to find the Lord and to seek salvation in him. If we knew everything we would all be  followers of the Lord which would be against what God wants for this world and His followers. We are all here together to sort through the nonsense of this world and find Him. There are reasons we are not able to know some of the things around us. God made it that way so that we would seek something to trust in. People respond to this worldly ambiguity by seeking God, atheism/agnosticism, solipsism/neutral monism, and other things. Solipsism and neutral monism (by Wittgenstein) are obviously (as stated in previous writings on this website), not the way to seek truth in the world. We can seek truth in the world, but we must know that we cannot know everything, and we must turn to faith for the rest.

If you feel anything I said above is wrong/fallacious, @reply on Twitter, email at cosmosuniversez@yahoo.com, or comment below.

Thanks for the support.