Tag Archives: Wittgenstein

Ayer’s Function of Philosophy in Language, Truth, and Logic ( A Metaphilosophy #2)

2 Dec

I am writing a few things here on my free of obligations thursday so that I can get some posts in before I won’t be able to write anything for about a month (I think). This is simply because I have a ton of school things to do for the next 2 weeks and then I will have Christmas break and will have little time.  I will for sure come back to writing by the week of January 10.

I want to talk about an aspect of another section in A.J. Ayer’s Language Truth and Logic. The second section of the book is the Function of Philosophy. I find this interesting because metaphilosophy and finding out what the goal of philosophy is should be held dear by any philosopher. Again showing his rejection for metaphysics Ayer states that the function for philosophy is not to find insight on metaphysical things. Ayer says that the search for a first philosophy is not really the goal. First philosophy is the kind of philosophizing Descartes did in his meditations.

Ayer proclaims philosophy to be a critic. This is for one thing towards scientific propositions where philosophy is used to critique the sciences and make it better. Mostly, he states philosophy to be a critic in that it tells one whether their beliefs are  ‘self consistent’ or not, and that it shows the things we use to find the truth ( or lack thereof) in our propositions. This function of philosophy contributes to science and critiques things one scientifically proposes. Ayer seems to be defending against the idea that science cannot do without philosophy because of induction. He goes on to say that induction cannot be solved, and we should deal with it in science and philosophy is not really needed for this purpose.

Others in the logical positivist era and before it have maintained the idea that science can do without philosophy and simply that philosophy assists philosophy by critiquing it and making it the best it possibly can be. In the beginning of logical positivism, the Vienna Circle (influenced by Mach and Wittgenstein, and including Carnap, Hempel, Schlick and others) wrote the Scientific Conception of the World. “The goal ahead is a unified science. the endeavor is to link and harmonize  the achievements of individual investigators in their various fields of science. From this aim follows the emphasis on collective efforts, and also the emphasis on what can be grasped intersubjectively; from this springs the search for a neutral system of formulae, for a symbolism freed from the slag of historical languages; and also the search for a total system of concepts.” This I quoted from the Scientific Conception of the World. The aim these scientists show to have is to give philosophy a goal to contribute in this unified science with physics, chemistry and all other sciences contributing in any specific theory. Philosophy just seems here to be one of many parts of a collective effort. Philosophy plays a huge part in this collective effort in that its theories can contribute to any kind of discipline or science. Did I mention the members of the Vienna Circle rejected metaphysics too? Its what all the positivists were doing. If your friends jumped off a bridge would you do it too? I am simply joking because of how many people in the logical positivist era who advocated a verification, an a priori epistemology, and the rejection and elimination of all metaphysics and its pseudo-statements. I can understand why they feel the need to remove metaphysics from philosophy because science does some of metaphysics’ roles in the most logical way possible (I am kind of being facetious). A unified science achieved by collective efforts among many sciences and disciplines is one goal philosophy has. This should not involve the rejection of metaphysics however.

Putting science aside, I feel philosophy is not simply an additive profession used to critique and assist scientific experimentation and exploration. In mostly non-metaphysical aspects of philosophy, there are roles in philosophy made specifically for the critique and use in science, but an underlying goal or purpose exists under all specialized goals and roles the specific kinds of philosophy has (such as I feel the Vienna Circle refers to the philosophy of science and not really to the rest of philosophy as they may have thought). The huge purpose philosophy seems to me to have is the role in doing what science and experimentation cannot.  Science cannot prove the existence of noumenal beings or transcendent realities but philosophy actually has a chance at doing just that. If one uses the intersection of metaphysics and epistemology along with some ethics (and of course logic as the foundation of understandings) to postulate upon our empirical and un-empirical observations, things can be discovered that science cannot measure up to. This is why I think the unified science by the collective efforts of all disciplines including philosophy is the best combination because science being paired with philosophy can yield great results. Philosophical propositions can be experimented sometimes scientifically and proved out.

I totally advocate the unified science proposed by the Vienna Circle, but instead of eliminating half of the entire body of philosophy, it should be revitalized and used toward science’s benefit. Metaphysics can be beneficial to scientists as can some religion.  Philosophy should be used whenever possible in all disciplines of science.

I have interest in metaphilosophy to help philosophers define and redefine the purpose being driven toward. I want to keep addressing themes in metaphilosophy here every once in awhile to keep thoughts on track. Each philosopher regardless of situation has his or her own course of action to take to complete a philosophical project or work. I have my own so I feel it necessary to keep metaphilosophically addressing philosophy right now, and the philosophy I currently pursue.

What function or goal do you think philosophy should have?

Let me know your answer if you would like to (on Twitter, commenting below, or by email).

I appreciate the support as always.

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G.E. Moore’s Proof of an External World: If we cannot prove it, can we know it?

3 Nov

I have previously discussed Wittgenstein’s book On Certainty that he wrote towards the end of his life, where he gets his frustration out mostly by correcting Moore’s essay Proof of an External World (and A Defense of Common Sense).  I am looking at Moore’s essay and looking at beginning propositions of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and thinking about their arguments.  What Moore’s essay ultimately boils down to is him saying that he can know things without proving them. He bases that upon his idea of rigorously proving things along with other things.

Moore begins by saying that he can prove the entire external world by saying “I have one hand here, and another here.” He says this and then says that what he said conforms to a rigorous proof. “I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, “Here is one hand”, and adding, as I make certain gesture with the left, “and here is another”. And if, by doing this, I have proved ipso facto  the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there  is no need to multiply examples” (Moore).  He then states that what he just said was a “rigorous proof” for the external existence of 2 hands. He proceeds even further to state what qualifications for a rigorous proof are: “Of, course it would not have been a proof unless three conditions were satisfied; namely (1) unless the premiss which I adduced as proof of the conclusion was different from the conclusion I adduced it to prove”, so in short, the conclusion is different from the discussed premise,”….; (2) unless the premiss with I adduced was something which I knew to be the case, and not merely something which I believed but which was by no means certain, or something which, though in fact true, I did not know to be so;” in short  you are certain about the premise, which certainty and knowing is the ultimate discussion about Moore’s paper, and I shall further discuss here later, “…and (3) unless the conclusion did really follow from the premiss” (Moore). So, to Moore, for a rigorous proof, the conclusion and premise must be different,  you are certain of the premise, and the conclusion follows from the premise. If, in ones argument, you can satisfy these three requirements, to Moore, you have proven what you have been trying to prove.

Going on in the essay Moore talks about why his proof is good, and how proving that something existed in the past external world helps him with his present proof. All of this leads up to the final paragraph of the essay where Wittgenstein and others get most of their food for argument. I will simply cite it and discuss it thereafter:

“But another reason why some people would feel dissatisfied with my proofs is, I think, not merely that they want a proof of something which I haven’t proved, but that they think that, if I cannot give such extra proofs, then the proofs that I have given are not conclusive proofs at all. And this, I think, is a definite mistake. They would say: ” If you cannot prove your premiss that here is one hand and here is another, then you do not know it. But you yourself have admitted that, if you did not know it, then your proof was not conclusive. Therefore, your proof was not, as you say it was, a conclusive proof.” This view that, if I cannot prove such things as these, I do not know them, is, I think, the view that Kant was expressing in the sentence which I quoted at the beginning of this lecture, when he implies that so long as we have no proof of the existence of external things, their existence must be accepted merely on faith. He means to say, I think, that if I cannot prove that there is a hand here, I must accept it merely as a matter of faith – I cannot know it. Such a view, thought it has been very common among philosophers, can, I think, be shown to be wrong – though shown only by the use of premisses which are not known to be true, unless we do know of the existence of external things. I can know things, which I cannot prove; and among things which I certainly did know, even if (as I think) I could not prove them, were the premises of my two proofs. I should say, therefore, that those, if any, who are dissatisfied with these proofs merely on the ground that I did not know their premisses, have no good reason for their dissatisfaction” (Moore).

The entirety of this ending section of the paper refers to what one says when saying “I know.” His opposition says that one only knows when it is proven, and when premises cannot be proven, the whole conclusion is proven. Responding to all of these oppositions to his proving qualifications and to how he gauges how he knows something, he ends up referring to Kant’s statement that when one cannot prove something, one does not know it, and must resort to having mere faith. Thinking back to Kant’s discussion of noumena, we cannot know of their existence and we must understand that there are ways of understanding things beyond empirical observation. Kant talks about faith when introducing noumena in that noumena cannot be really known. Moore talks about Kant when defending his argument (not necessarily the part in Kant’s work about noumena) by saying that if he has faith in his right hand being there, he can still know it.

Using again the phrase “what this boils down to”, what this boils down to is that what can be proven (proven rigorously beyond what Moore defines as rigorously proving in that the premises are proven in different ways to help prove even more the ending conclusion) is known, and what cannot be proven can be known in a way less strict sense (not with all the logical proofs) where we have faith in it, yet it is not really strictly Wittgensteinian defined ‘known’, yet Moore thinks with faith, one can ‘know’ in all forms of the word what cannot be rigorously logically proven.

Kant thought that faith did not lead to proving or knowing an external thing, Moore thought that faith led still to knowing external things, and Wittgenstein overwhelmingly trampled on Moore’s opinion here with his book On Certainty. I think that when looking at these few arguments about what it means to ‘know’ anything, the word ‘know’ should be thought of and use in the strictest sense especially when trying to understand the arguments and formulate individual opinions on them. Moore thinks of ‘knowing’ something as not having consistent proof (in my opinion) but having faith in things such as that there is a right hand here. Kant believes in faith being there for minimal understanding, but it doesn’t denote ‘knowing’. Finally, in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty he makes the word know, knowing, knowledge and any other words like it to be as strict as possible.

Here are only a few propositions in the book’s entire discussion about knowledge and certainty that stomps on Moore’s argument:

”  14.  That he does know takes some shewing.

15. It needs to be shewn that no mistake was possible. Giving the assurance “I know” doesn’t suffice. For it is after all only an assurance that I can’t be making a mistake, and it needs to be objectively established that I am not making a mistake about that.”

Wittgenstein goes on to cite Moore and say more things about his argument. One thing I want to make known about Wittgenstein’s argument is that he thinks that Moore’s use of know, knowing, and knowledge is redundant, repetitive, and does not help his overall argument. If you have a library near you, like a college library, it probably has a philosophy section and may have On Certainty by Wittgenstein, or if you have the means pick it up. To get Moore’s essay Proof of an External World go here:  http://faculty.uml.edu/enelson/g%20e%20moore,%20external%20world.pdf I say that because there are many arguments that Wittgenstein specifically picks on from Moore’s essay, and there are many other things to think about and discuss besides the single point I am going to make from here on out, so if you want a more wholly picture of Moore’s opinion and Wittgenstein’s opinion, read the essay and read some of the book (since I do not think reading all of On Certainty is necessary and if you want to read a whole book of Wittgenstein read Tractatus Logic0-Philosophicus).

First of all, my opinion is that Moore’s proof of an external world and his qualifications for a proof that he used are faulty in actually making knowledge of external things. It all comes down to that Moore does not feel the need to prove his premises, and then he says that having faith is proof of external things, and it is knowing external things. I am a large holder of faith in things I have not empirically observed and proven, the only reason being that I have not found a way to prove their external existences beyond faith. Faith is similar but not equal to knowledge, and I think that when one says that faith equals knowledge, it is merely a cop out in that that person will not take further efforts to come up with logical proofs for what one has faith in.

Its hard to say how much proof there is in faith, and how much knowledge there can be had in any faith at its face value. This is because faith varies from what faith is had in, how the faith is had, and a plethora of other factors that go into faith in one thing. If I have faith in God, which I do, I feel like I have total knowledge about Him yet I do not have logical rigorous proofs for it. I feel like I have full knowledge because of my intimate and loving faith in Him, but I want to create a logical process for further proof of things others might not see but I still have faith in. Moore just says that faith equals knowing things external, but that leads to ridicule from logically sensible philosophers and people like Wittgenstein. This tells me that faith feels sufficient for knowledge to those who have faith in something external, but if we want to show others about this thing and prove it to others for the entire benefit for everyone and ourselves, we need a logical process to create a rigorous proof for things’ existences like God.

In the end,  I hate to say this, but faith is not sufficient for true knowledge in its strictest sense. Moore is copping out philosophically when he says that faith is equal to knowledge.  Wittgenstein isn’t really getting there either when he tramples on Moore’s argument rather than just removing a few things, polishing it, and building upon it.

I do not know what that logical process towards a rigorous proof of external things not empirically observed would be, but I think it should be something philosophers and logicians should progress toward. It would be nice to have logically rigorous proofs for noumena and God, or even monads and forms. Then metaphysics would be generally more accepted rather than rejected. This is a difficult thing to just say should happen, but I think it should have efforts put toward it rather than just saying that faith is knowledge.

To actually figure out how  to prove external things that are phenomena or noumena, it is my opinion that our sensations should be analyzed more than they ever have been. I say this to mean that we should analyze sensations beyond just the six senses. I like to think of it in the way that we should look at our impressions  (using Hume’s term in the Origin of Our Ideas). Impressions being things entering our perception with most violence and force. Impressions are what I take to be emotions, passions, feelings, and sensations. For example, I find an impression to be the event that one has a direct or indirect conversation with God. I have not had a direct one, but others I know have. An indirect one I have had is where I ask Him for something in particular to really help my horrible situation out. After not getting it for awhile and asking Him again, soon after, it immediately occurs and I immediately realize why He waited until now and why he put me in the problem initially. Along with this understanding, I would have amazing emotional feeling because  I can feel the things that have happened before me, and I know from who they come. This is one example of an impression that I think should be examined further to get from faith in noumenal external things to actual knowledge in the Wittgensteinian sense.

I just think that faith does not denote knowledge even if it gives us real pure understanding.

Thanks for the support, and my apologies if this was too long.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: The Specialized ‘I Know’

1 Sep

Wittgenstein’s proposition filled book On Certainty is a late work of his discussing many things, mostly discussing the many things about and against G.E. Moore’s Introduction of Sense Data/Proof of an External World. Moore discusses sense data among other things about the world ( I have 2 writings about Moore’s writings, in the G.E. Moore category to your right), and at the beginning of the book, as well as being the theme of the rest, Wittgenstein questions the claim to know something.

When Moore continuously began his statements with I know, Wittgenstein refutes not the exact propositions Moore has, but that he uses ‘I know’ with too much liberty. ” We just do not see how very specialized the use of ‘I know’ is” and “That [Moore] does know takes some [showing]” (Wittgenstein).  After reading this it is known that saying that one knows is quite a statement in that knowing something is a large feat to accomplish.

The feat of accomplishing the knowledge of any proposition is large and amazing because of how much doubt that one must go through to signify the knowledge of something. According to Descartes, one must take into consideration all possible doubts there are about something before declaring knowledge of truth or falsity about it. To go through the processes of coherence or correspondence about something to declare truth or falsity would be one thing that would eventually allow a person to use the specialized phrase I know. I think it must be established that if we claim to know something, and are asked to show how and why, that we should be able to produce evidence about why it is true. Wittgenstein states that if we know something, we should be able to maintain all evidence to show that it is evident. It is not my opinion, but according to Wittgenstein (and Descartes for that matter) and his solipsist values, one can know only one thing: that oneself exists.  With these solipsist values, Wittgenstein can easily be understood in the reason why he states that ‘i know’ should be reserved. With these solipsist values, the only thing he claims to know is that he exists and Moore throwing around I know for other propositions can only be leading to falsities unless it is for sure that something is true or false.

Wittgenstein in On Certainty goes further into further testing before saying ‘I know’ by stating that a hand outside him may or not be there based on sensory sight.  He goes on with the hand to discuss his feelings on the matter.For me, to know that my hand exists is to test how solid it is, find all its functions,  decide where it originates from, and where in the spatiotemporal continuum it exists.

So, it is my goal here to arrive at a conclusion as to whether this hand I have is true or false in its existence. I want to give evidence as to its existence, and then form a reductio to further prove the point. First, I want to note that this hand is a part of and not separate from me. Regardless as to whether the body, mind, self, and soul are existent in parts within me, the hand is something that is my own, and it is a part of me. One of the things that can be known in the universe to exist is oneself. I KNOW I exist (Wittgenstein and Descartes thought so too).  And if it is known that I exist, all parts of me exist too. My hand is a part of me, so given that I exist, and parts of me exist with I, including my hand, my hand has this evidence to exist. Secondly,  my hand performs functions that have little to some impact on the world around it. Right now, it types simultaneously with the other hand in a writing about philosophy that will be posted on a website for anyone to read at their leisure. Also, my hand does other functions like washing, eating, and performing a plethora of other functions. Regardless of the function that the hand performs, it puts an impact around the world around it and something changes to a degree. As I am about to say further down the road in this writing, things that do change and impact have hard evidence for existence. I could go further in looking for further evidence but these 2 things are enough for me to say I KNOW that my hand exists. Wittgenstein would not endorse my thought process and he would still think that my use of ‘i know’ would not be specialized enough and that it is to loose in use.

Another example of proving something to knowledgeable certainty is the proof of my friend Scott (he is imaginary, and may not even be a person if you humor me).  Scott is a part of the creatum, and was created by God (I have further things to know to exist later, including the creatum), and if this is so, he can be assured to exist almost to the point of I know. Also, Scott is a terrorist and  places bombs in buildings. Lets say Scott put a bomb in building Z in town X, and building Z explodes killing a quarter of the population of town X including those in large proximity to the exploding building. Scott affected the world with this bomb and killed a lot of people, and had an effect on the world. Between these two things, we can know that Scott exists.

The knowledge of existence of a thing is not what Wittgenstein limits full knowledge to. The justified and evident use of the specialized ‘I know’ can be applied to anything in question in progression to knowing it. I choose however to turn toward the somewhat knowledge and full knowledge of the existence of things because of how delicate the argument is.

After reading Wittgenstein’s thoughts on using ‘I know’ so limitlessly, I was sent into a storm of thought into the justification and evidence of the existence of the below 5 things. I apologize that this writing has gone from the proving with evidence on anything to just the existence of things. But this website is for unbounded thought about the cosmos regardless the setting.

1) Oneself We can know that oneself exists because we think, and we know we exist. We also can be aware of this because we are a thinking thing that are contemplating the issue in the first place. Second of all, oneself has an effect/affect on the world around it, and each person that defines oneself makes a difference. Third, God recognizes and embraces our existence.

2) God We can be sure that He exists because he causes 99.999% of the effects in the cosmos, and he has more impact than is conceivable. He created the cosmos, and each individual person. Because of His effects and creations, we can be sure that He exists.

3) Creatum God created the creatum with all of the living things and earth within it. All of the things inside the creatum cause things within the cosmos, and we can know it to exist. We are within it, so it exists.

4) Spiritual World God and His angels, nor Satan and his demons are here in full creatum form, therefore since we know of Satan’s deception and God’s love, they must exist somewhere.  These worlds have revealed themselves to us in other ways therefore these worlds can be known to exist.

5 Causing Things If something causes an effect, and creates a small to large domino effect, the causer can be known to exist. This overlaps upon all the other 4 things known to exist, and this is one of the justifications just as well as it is a fifth category.

Thanks for the support. The above 5 things were quickly justified and were not done in detail. My main aim was to discuss that saying that we know something is a bigger action than we think and we should not throw the phrase  around so much unless they overlap and reside within the 5 things known to exist, or unless you can come up with other justifications for existence.

The Non Being and therefore Un-Sayable

31 Aug

After reading passages from Parmenides and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, along with the opposite views of Heraclitus and Spinoza, I understand that for a long time a large argument is about what what the nonbeing is and what can be said about it. Parmenides responds to Heraclitus when Heraclitus said that “the road up and the road down are one and the same” and relative to the being/nonbeing argument it means that anything can be said or thought about the road towards being or non being. Parmenides comes back by saying that the nonbeing cannot be thought or said upon (he does so in a variety of ways other than just one quote stating his stance like Heraclitus’ roads, but he does say that “thinking and being are one and the same” stating his ultimate stance about why nonbeing cannot be thought or said).  My aim is not to discuss the arguments that both Heraclitus and Parmenides had in Greece, but it is to discuss Parmenidesian and Wittgensteinian opinion that what doesn’t exist cannot be thought or said. I take up the matter because it is evident and has been evident in all of time that people think and say about things that are in fact non existent. I involve Parmenides and Heraclitus in the matter because they are one of the first philosophies to come about, and both had good arguments upon the same matter Wittgenstein and other philosophers discussed. Finally, I choose to bring Wittgenstein into this same matter because in Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Wittgenstein says: “I cannot think what I cannot think. What I cannot think I cannot say either”.  When discussing what he cannot think is referring to those things that do not exist within the human perception. This was one of the propositions that led to his solipsism and neutral monism ( numerous writings about Wittgenstein’s neutral monism and solipsism on this webiste, look in the category Ludwig Wittgenstein and/or the archives to find them, theres like 6 I think) that I refute totally, but have respect for the propositions leading up to them. These arguments between Wittgenstein and Spinoza’s monism, and the other numerous arguments between Heraclitus and Parmenides along with other Presocratics are not the subject for discussion, the only subject for discussion is that the non being can be thought and said, so much so that the non being can be made into being by planning through discussion.

Nonbeing can consistently be thought of and reflected upon. When thought of as a being, nonbeing cannot be thought of leading to the notion that nonbeing cannot be thought of or said about. When contemplating upon any contradiction at all, no results will come forth because little can come of such thought (the being in nonbeing is what is thought here).  I say so because when people think about nonbeing, it is a common misconception to think of it as a being, which is totally fallacious and contradictory, therefore nonbeing cannot be thought or said at the outset.  But getting further in nonbeing, we have to get specific of what does not exist to think and say things about nonbeing itself.  For example, eons ago before the genesis, the only thing that existed was God and his angels in a spiritual world. The physical creatum was not in existence before God created it (note that God, angels and the heavens are not part of the general creatum), and yet He conceived the idea of this world, and he made it so. Because God can conceive the nonbeing, so can we to a lesser extent.  Like said before, nonbeing thought of in terms of its being in the world cannot be thought of and the notion is preposterous, but down to nonbeing’s specificities in terms of how it would be if it was can be conceived.

Hopefully I am getting to the point of how nonbeing can be thought of and said. Again, nonbeing can be both thought and said if it is thought of down to its specificities. If nonbeing is thought of in a broad perception little can be obtained from the notion, and yes it is lacking in thought and speech. But if we think of nonbeing specifically down to what certain thing does not exist, thought and speech can be made upon it, possibly even allowing us to turn this specific nonbeing into being.

If nonbeing is thought down to its specificities (examples), we can think and say things about it, and the best part of it (as evident in society) is that we can possibly make the nonbeing into being. If this were not true, then there would be no inventors of the products and services we use daily. Take Alexander Graham Bell for instance. In Bell’s time, there was no device that could enable 2 people 100 miles apart to talk to each other by voice (there was a telegraph, but it was not by voice). The telephone was a nonbeing object. Bell and his assistant worked together with this notion of this telephone device and turned nonbeing into being by inventing their notion into being. They invented the telephone.  Here, nonbeing was thought, and even said. This mere example of Bell’s achievements falsifies Parmenides’ and Wittgenstein’s opinion that the nonbeing cannot be thought or said.

Another example of nonbeing transitioning into being because of our thoughts and speech about the nonbeing, is the fairly recent idea of a liger.  A liger being a cross between a tiger and a lion. This was on the movie Napoleon Dynamite where Napoleon draws the liger, calls it his favorite animal and shows it amongst the people around him. If what Parmenides and Wittgenstein say is true (that what doesn’t exist cannot be thought or said), Napoleon would have no notion of a liger, and anyone thinking or talking about a liger would not be possible because of the fact that ligers are of the nonbeing. Even more recently, biologists tried to make a liger by breeding a tiger and a lion, and they were successful in producing it so the nonbeing notion of a liger did well because it led to an actual being state of the liger. It was born a very weak animal and may not do very well and could regress back into nonbeing.  If what Parmenides and Wittgenstein say is true, the telephone, many other inventions and the breeding production of the liger would never have been possible because we would never have the ability to think about the nonbeing.

My ending inference from my unorganized thought process is this: there is nothing we cannot think, and therefore there is nothing we cannot say. Nonbeing presents one of the many obstacles in thought and speech, but it can be easily hurdled. Wittgenstein’s statement that we cant think what we cant think and what we cant think we cant say is just a resolution to many philosophical problems of dualisms and what some may call ‘philosophical hell’, and the proposition is a great thought, but after searching philosophically, the proposition I refute rejects a lot of areas of thinking that are unexplored and deserve consideration and thought. Wittgenstein’s solipsist and neutrally monist principles when taken for truth would rule out about 1/2 of philosophical exploration that needs to be done in the future. I, personally, look forward to exploring these unexplored areas, and refute any proposition that make exploration of those areas redundant.  In philosophy, there cannot possibly be unthinkable or unsayable  just because there is some nonbeing within metaphysics. If there was, philosophy would not have come as far as it has because more than half of it would be redundant.

If you want more thinking in the nonbeing being said and thought read into Lawrence Sklar and his geometries relating to philosophy and epistemology because of how Euclidean geometry long passed into geometrical law are falsified immediately (i.e. making a triangle with 3 90 degree angles within a whole triangle, which is nonbeing until discussed specifically).

This was just an unorganized thought process coming from reading some ancient writings of Parmenides and Heraclitus and reflecting back on my studies of Wittgenstein.

Thanks for the support.