Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics XXVI – XXIX

In Leibniz’s Discourse, between X and XXV, I see little I am dying to argue. I may really want to argue them later, but for now they spark little interest. XX sparks interest, but it rests upon Plato’s dialogue Phaedrus, which I have not read, and must read to fully comprehend Leibniz’s point. XXVI through XXX are interesting to me, and are all things I want to argue about. Also, the schedule for posts has again changed. Now posts will be new at 6pm Central time and/or 12am central time. Sometimes I have 2 to publish, and sometimes I have none, so it varies.

XXVI

‘Ideas are all stored up within us.’

This is Plato’s doctrine of reminiscence that Leibniz  endorses and explains in the discourse. The way ‘ideas’ is used is done so that it can be differentiated from knowledge. In dialectic, knowledge is experienced and had before any ideas are created. Ideas are our invented and thought up opinions and justifications for things that exist. For example, certain ideas for philosophies or inventive things do not come out until the person has had enough knowledge and experience to think well enough and eventually produce the idea. The idea is however, stored within the person at its infant stages. The idea is still there, but it needs key supplemental material from the knowledge needed for the idea to actually matter. For a real applicative example, Alexander Graham Bell wanted to create something that allows us to talk to each other by voice while both people are very far apart. He had this idea, and knew about the telegraph and other advances. He did not know how to use his idea to invent the telephone until he had supplemental knowledge and understanding about electronics until later, then he invented the telephone. The idea was in him the whole time, but he just needed more knowledge to do something with it.Some ideas are in fact innate, some are not and are a posteriori, but all become stored within us by the time our brain develops enough for us to talk. Most of this paragraph was my opinion, not Leibniz’s and not Plato’s.

XXVII

In this part of the discourse, Leibniz compares to Aristotle in how he compared souls to blank tablets. Also, he states how conceptions are derived from the senses.

The part of this propositions about how souls are like blank tablets sends me into deep thought and argument with myself. In argumentation and debate, a student is told to try to forget some knowledge and opinions for the purpose fo the debate at hand (tableau rase).  A soul when first entering the world is a tableau rase (spelling it right?) in all aspects of opinion because the soul has not been acculturated and educated enough to have a stance on things in the world. But in some aspects of knowledge, the soul is not a tableau rase because of a priori knowledge (or innate ideas). I endorse the idea that we have a priori knowledge. We have some knowledge before we experience things on this earth. The soul for the most part is a blank tablet because most important knowledge comes with experience and education.

Second, conceptions do come from the senses. Conceptions and perceptions come from the senses allowing us to have opinions from experience. Without senses no conception or perception would be had, and no progress would occur, and only a priori knowledge would exist in our brains. Without senses, no a posteriori knowledge would be possible.

XXVIII

“The only immediate object of our perceptions which is outside of us is God, and in him alone is our light.”

And some say that God cannot be seen in perceptions. I totally agree with XXVIII. God is always immediately outside of us yet the light of our perceptions. I believe that God changes our perceptions for the better so that we can accept things and understand things for the way they should be understood. God uses our perceptions and his light to be the best thing in our world. God uses His light to direct us in the righteous way in our actions. Whether or not we recognize the things that are there to tell us the best thing to do with His light, we sometimes may or may not obey them. The main point of this is that whether we see it or not God’s light and direction is within our perceptions in one way or another. This may be my favorite proposition in the Discourse.

XXIX

“Yet we think directly by means of our own ideas and not through God’s”

In this proposition is the key to the meaning of life. We are put on this earth because we are being ‘tested’ by God because he wants to see who finds the His light and becomes saved in Him. Whoever finds His light and becomes saved, goes to heaven with Him for eternity. God knows what each of us will end up doing as to whether or not each person will find His light or not, but we all think directly with our own ideas because we all yet have free choice to make our own choices as to what we do, think and believe. We think by our own means because God wants to see who finds Him amids the darkness. If we thought by means directly through God, there would be no purpose for our existence on earth. I totally agree with this proposition. I would have loved to meet Leibniz because he knew the meaning of life way way before all these people who relentlessly ask on a daily basis in today’s times.

Thanks for the support. I hopefully will begin posting regularly like last month.

Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics: VI – X

Happy Monday!

In the Discourse’s propositions VI through X, Leibniz continues discussions about God and goes into discussions about the substantial universe. He connects God to substance, along with talking about how substance is involved with actions and beings in the world.

VI

In the sixth proposition of the discourse, Leibniz talks about the regularity of events and the things God does. He bases all events off of God, along with stating that n o irregularity from God is possible (all events are from God so no irregularity is possible. He says it is not possible to conceive something that is not orderly. What I understand from Leibniz’s proposition is that anything that happens is always coherent to regularity. Whether it is conceived to humans as regular or irregular, it is regular because of how God did it. God is perfect and cannot have done any events that are irregular. God is too perfect for a being made in His image to be able to conceive of an event occurring not within regularity. What we may think to be irregular, is still regular. I also agree, because God does everything for a reason. Hurricane Katrina and the terrorist attacks on September 11 happened for a reason. These reasons are not possible for us to understand, but that does not matter to the sixth proposition. The point is is that whatever we conceive in an event, it is regular because of how God executed it.

VII

In the seventh proposition Leibniz states that miracles are too regular. He says that miracles are however not regular in subordinate regulations. Subordinate regulations are defined by Leibniz as regulations that are lower in significance. Miracles are all still regular in the regulations God always inputs. In subordinate regulations, miracles are unexpected and catch people off guard. These subordinate regulations are those that beings in the creatum hold true because of how we cannot understand God’s regularities. A miracle is defined miracle because it is unexpected and thought not possible. In subordinate regulations, nothing should really be taken for entire truth. The only truth there is, is in God’s pure regulations. Miracles are regular in God’s regularities (the ones that matter) and miracles are irregular in the subordinate regularities (to me they do not matter).

I agree with Leibniz because still, everything is regular under God. I believe, however, that understanding of the subordinate regularities is not necessary. These subordinate regulations are only speculations and guesses that do not even matter. To me, they cannot even be regularities because the people who establish them (are people) and do not know if a periodic event is regular or not. To me, the only regularities are established by God. All other possible subordinate ‘regularities’ are not regularities at all.

VIII

In the eighth proposition in the Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz explains that the activities of God and created beings are only distinguished between each other when the worldly individual substance is understood. He brings this up because people argue about whether all actions are directly from God versus  all activities are being from the created beings, but enforced by potentiality of God. Understanding the individual substance is necessary for this argument because the God and the created beings are both in the same substance.

My opinion on this is a bit different from Leibniz’s eighth argument. I think that all actions are directly from God regardless of how they appear. I think that because the substance that makes up and exists in the universe and in humans is all made from and of and by god, there is no difference between actions by the created and actions directly by God. Regardless of how the action occurred, it happened because of God. Leibniz states that in order to distinguish between actions by God and actions by the created, we have to know what the substance is. Now that I am aware of the substance, I hopefully well understand that distinguishing actions by God from actions by the created is not necessary by any means: 1) because they all are under the will of God, 2) they all play a part in the reason God does anything. Therefore, this argument is not necessary to further prove because actions by God and actions by the created are equal in all forms.

IX

Leibniz states in the 9th proposition, first, that the individual substances express the world and the universe in its own way. Second, he states that the substance includes all its experiences, circumstances and sequences of exterior events.

First, I disagree with Leibniz’s first part of the 9th proposition, because by saying this, he concludes that more than one substance exists. And according to Spinoza and therefore to me, only one substance exists. Also, God is the substance. God does not express the world as substance; God is the world as substance. Second, I disagree with his second part of the 9th proposition because God, the only substance, does not need experiences to be and even express the world (if it did). God and substance is a priori, and the attributum and modus that succeeds substance has also a priori knowledge of God as substance. None of the experience, circumstances, or sequences are necessary because of God/substance’s a priori knowledge.

X

The 10th proposition in Leibniz’s Discourse talks about how substance and its forms have basis in fact, but we should not rely on substance and its forms to explain the phenomenon and experiences.

First, I condone fully the existence of one substance (God) in Spinoza’s definition of it. There is a lot of foundation and basis in fact in substance. Because of this, substance has forms inside it and below it in a hierarchical style. Leibniz says that these substantial forms have no effect on the change or actions of the things that happen. This I disagree with. Substance and all its lower forms describes the universe as a whole. Changes that occur can be expressed in terms of what happened between substance, attribute, and mode. Any thing that happens in the universe can also be explained in terms of substance, attribute and mode.

For example,  on September 11, many people died because of terrorism. People being modes, each person when dying, changes into a different kind of representation of the substance. A person that was Christian that died in 9/11 goes from being a high hierarchy mode to being a high hierarchy attribute ( modes are inferior forms representing the substance, while attributes show the essence of the substance). By this I mean that the Christian person dying goes from being a Christian person to becoming an angel in heaven. While, the terrorist that kills himself in the attempt at killing others goes from a low hierarchy mode to being a low hierarchy attribute. By this I mean that the Islamic terrorist goes from being a useless to God/the world mode, to being in hell with Satan in a low hierarchy attribute (hell and Satan are attributes because they too represent God, because God created them for a reason).

In propositions 6 through 10, there were actually some arguments I disagreed with that I had to oppose.

Thanks for your support. See you tomorrow.

Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics: I – IV (God’s Perfection)

Sorry for my week and a half long absence from posting thoughts and philosophies. I really enjoy writing and publishing amateurishly like this because I can basically do whatever I want.  Also, starting today, on my new site CosmosZ2 (replacing modusz, modusz wasn’t working), posts every Monday-Thursday just like on here, but the posts there will be non philosophical opinionated thoughts on current events and politics. Go check out http://cosmosz2.wordpress.com. I took the week and a half long break to finish and revise my English composition paper, and to build up on some research on Leibniz, Spinoza, Heidegger, and Deleuze. Works are coming on all of these philosophers, but for now the focus is on the beginning of Leibniz’s book Discourse on Metaphysics. The first four propositions are concerning God and his creations and love. Leibniz obviously favors God’s creation and love, and state that people should accept what God gives them (in essence of one through four). I want to state each one and talk about them, along with summing them up together as a whole at the end. I strongly agree with Leibniz’s propositions here and feel that people should read Discourse on Metaphysics (especially atheists and agnostics).

I. “Concerning the divine perfection and that God does everything in the most desirable way…..”

Leibniz goes on after this statement to explain the perfection and supreme characteristics God really has. He states that God has all forms of perfection in every thing on earth. Also, because of God’s perfection, he does everything in the best way anything can possibly be done. Leibniz goes against those who think God is not perfect and that things are not desirable. He goes on to perfect his thought about this in propositions II through IV.

In reality, God is perfect. God is holy in all possibilities. People are not holy, but when on the right track, people look to God for further direction towards perfection even though we will never achieve perfection while here on earth. By saying that God does everything in the most desirable way, he says that regardless of how we feel things are done, those things are done in the most desirable way in God’s eyes. God’s actions are also expounded up on on II through IV.

II. “Against those who hold that there is in the works of God no goodness, or that the principles of goodness and beauty are arbitrary….”

Leibniz again goes on to explain this proposition. In life, people have trials and hardships that break them down into pessimism and make them lose faith in God and other good things in life. Leibniz correlates the vision that God has no goodness and the arbitration of goodness and beauty because people think this way when life gets to them. People say/said this because of life. Leibniz uses this proposition to shoot those arguments down.

In truth, the works of God are always good, and the principles of goodness and beauty are never arbitrary. People think that God’s work do not contain goodness because the things that happen may tear that person down at the time, but God does everything for a reason. Even if the reason will not be understood for years, if God did not do that instantaneous thing, that person may be forever screwed up in some way. God does everything corresponding and cohering with goodness. Once we understand this, we see the beauty and goodness in the things he does. For people who ask God for things on a daily basis, and their prayer never gets answered, there is a reason for that. This is a corny thing to compare this to (especially because I hate country music) but Garth Brooks said in his song “Unanswered Prayers” that  “Some of God’s greatest gifts are unanswered prayers.” He says this because something he desperately wanted, would have screwed everything up now that he understands the reality of a certain thing. I really do not like using this comparison, but the lyrics of that song are insightful and philosophically understanding (not to mention understanding of God’s doings).  Brooks thanks God for unanswered prayers, because there is not a thing that God does that does not have goodness of all forms in it. Leibniz argues this in II. I strongly agree with Leibniz.

III. “Against those who think that God might have made things better than he has.”

Leibniz goes further on this proposition by saying that one acts imperfectly if he does not do things to the best of his ability, and if God ever acts imperfectly, he would not be doing his full ability, and this is impossible because of God’s holiness and love for people. God would not do injustice or mediocre things for us because of his amazing love. People also say this because of the horrible tragedies and disasters that go on today, and how much better things could be.

It should be understood the purpose for our existence her on earth. If we are God’s children why is it that we are supposed to be here for a short amount of time before going to heaven with Him? Our purpose here is to show our love, obeyance, and servitude to God. We are born here to make our own choices (even if we have a variation of predestination, I will explain this in a different argument), and if we make the right ones by giving ourselves to God, we then get our place in heaven.  So, our existence here is sort of like a test to see if we can sort through all the nonsense and find God. The tragedies and bad things that go on that cause trials and hardships for people are only a part of the test we are supposed to take here before being present with Him in heaven. So, Leibniz says this because people say that the world could be so much better without all the tragedies and hardships that go on here. This leads people to believe the God should and could make things so much better here for us. Leibniz rejects this belief because he knew that God does everything for a purpose and Leibniz knew the exact purpose that I explained earlier in this paragraph. God will only make things better for you when you find Him and submit yourself to Him forever and declare Him your savior. The thought that if there was a god, He could do things way better than things are on earth, is the grounds that atheists state to be the reason that they believe against th existence of a God. These atheists are simply too far away from God to understand His reasons and purposes. Leibniz correctly goes against this idea.

IV. “That love for God demands on our part complete satisfaction with and acquiescence in that which He has done.”

Leibniz states that love for God is what causes this whole necessity. If one does not have love for God, there is little purpose anyway. In the case that one loves God, one should be satisfied and acquiesced to God’s doings. Even if something that God has done does not feel good for a person at the time, God has a reason for having done that, so satisfaction and acquiescence is necessary because of your faith and love in God.

I strongly agree with this also, because if we have faith and love in God, and recognition for what God has done in our lives, we should have faith in whatever he does. If we have faith in his actions, we must be satisfied and acquiesced at the time in the things He has done. We must first acquiesce at the time in what he has done even if it does not feel like your prayers are answered. If we have achieved acquiescence, then hopefully we can get to satisfaction because of maturity in our faith in Him. I would hope that no devout Christian and child of God would not feel that anything that God has done be less that perfect, because this person must understand God’s characteristics even if that person does not understand His intentions. If we are true Christians and if we truly love God, we can be happy with what God has done, even if at the time it is not what we want. We definitely feel better in the future if we accept things for the way they are at the time and continue to pray.

Overall, God’s perfection and holiness should not allow us or lead us to questioning God’s actions. We should have enough maturity in faith to accept that what he does is right for us. We do not know what is right for us more than He does. Given that we know that God is perfect, we should have enough faith and love to trust Him. I think that Leibniz’s beginning four propositions in the Discourse on Metaphysics leads to the fact that we should have enough faith and love of God to trust him regardless of the situation. I agree with Leibniz totally and wholly. There are no holes in his argument. The only holes are in the arguments of the atheists and non believers: their arguments have the holes. Leibniz’s argument pokes holes in their arguments.

Again, thanks for the support, and again, sorry for the week and a half long break from the philosophical works. More coming tomorrow on this site Cosmos Z and my other current event/political site for opinions Cosmos Z2.

G.W. Leibniz: Philosophy Leading up to Monads

Leibniz’s Law of Contradiction consists of propositions and predicates and what kinds of propositions do not follow suit with which. Kinds of propositions are things like analytic to synthetic propositions and the phenomena of necessity and contingency.

Propositions

Analytic Propositions

Propositions that say something about logic, arithmetic or geometry are analytic. Logic, arithmetic and geometry involve analyzing some sort of mathematic phrase or term that is analyzed. Therefore it is analytic.

Synthetic Propositions

Propositions that concern existential or metaphysical ideas of philosophy are synthetic mostly because those ideas are mostly of opinion so they are deemed synthetic unless otherwise observed. God is not considered by Leibniz to be a synthetic proposition. God is the only existential metaphysical idea that is not synthetic.

God is only considered synthetic if it is also considered analytic. God is either considered synthetically analytic or God falls in neither category of propositions.

Law of Contradiction

Because of the contradiction that may occur in a premise and proposition, this law states that no conclusion will follow suit in a contradictory statement.
This law can only have one possible conclusion. The conclusion from a contradictory statement, the conclusion is either that there is truth   or that the proposition is false.

Finally, under this if there is a contradiction in an analytic proposition, no possible conclusion will follow suit.

Necessity

Leibniz never really explains it fully as an entity but in a way that there are 3 kinds of necessity: metaphysical necessity, hypothetical necessity and moral necessity. Analytic proposition must always have metaphysical necessity. Metaphysical and moral propositions apply to the law of contradictions where contradictions take place in the premises and propositions. Analytic propositions in themselves are necessary. Necessity in propositions are ultimate and undefinable.

Contingency

Synthetic propositions are usually ones that state existential or metaphysical properties. Synthetic propositions are always contingent. Contingent in this case normally means dependent on other things for existence. Synthetic propositions are different from necessary propositions in that necessary propositions are independent in their existence and other things depend on the necessary things. Synthetic propositions are contingent because of how opinions about existence and other metaphysics are usually dependent on other things. While things that are analytic in things like mathematics are necessary because they are independent and other things usually depend on them.

Considering judgments (a different form of opinions), they are necessary in that they have moral necessity and they are synthetic in that they involve existentialism or other metaphysics.

Contingency is relating more to the Law of Sufficient Reason just as necessity relates more to the Law of Contradiction.

Contingency

Contingency basically is talking about anything with severe generality. If your argument of reason is very vague, it is within the use of contingency. Generality relates to being contingent because if you are general in something, it is dependent upon other ideas to fully explain something. Contingency also involves time or smaller parts of time. The use of time is contingent because it is dependent on other things to explain why the time of something matters to the overall argument of reason. Necessity would never involve any sense of time. God and simply the idea of a higher superior deity is not contingent according to Leibniz. Necessity would involve God and all ideas concerning superior deities. God being an eternal truth involves no idea of time because of the fact that no eternal truth has a sense of time. God falls in the eternal truth category so necessity keeps the idea of God while contingency does not because of how an eternal truth is independent in itself.

On another subject concerning contingency, a  notion of species involves a whole certain group of beings that is usually very large. Notions of species either are or can be an eternal truth. If the notion of species is an eternal truth, they are necessary and contingency has no part in it. Notion of species also involves no time.

Another notion called the notion of an individual or sub ratione possibilitatus refers to only 1 existence and involves much time. This notion also involves fact about that individual that cannot be solid because of the many individuals there are. Because of the vaguness that is a part of sub ratione possibilitatus, the notion of the individual is itself contingent.

Contingency has dependence on other ideas and things and has ambiguity and vagueness in it. Because of the dependence and vagueness of contingency, existence itself cannot be a part of it. Existence of 1 or many is a part of necessity only. One might ask what part existence has in contingency if existence in its pure form belongs to necessity. The essence or main idea of existence (kind of like the form of existence by Plato) does not need to be referred to by a tangible form. The essence or main idea of existence is dependent on tangible things to actually verify a concept of existence, therefore the essence/main idea of existence belongs to contingency. The essence of existence here is described as assertion. Essence discussed in another manner of the word can be discussed as essence of existence belonging to necessity.

Law of Sufficient Reason

There are 2 kinds of existents that are bounded within this law.

1. Possible Existents- An existent (cause) that is itself possible in any way are only desires and appetites (sometimes of the flesh).
2. Actual Existents- An existent (cause) that is itself actual in any way are only desires for good. The idea of good here can be rooted all the way back to Plato’s form of the good.

There is reason that people try to use to carry out daily tasks. In the things that people do every day, there are two existents and by existents I mean causes that drive the choices of people. Starting with the Actual Existents, the desire for good does drive people to decide certain things. You see this fact in many philosopher’s ideas. For example, Plato’s line at the top just under dialectic, shows the Form of the Good. The good includes assisting others, having greater knowledge and serving the higher deity. The actual existents enforce the decisions of the better people of the society. The actual existents shows necessity

Possible existents is something different because it reflects items of contingency. Desires and appetites lead people to do something that may feel better to them than doing things toward good (actual existents). Doing things to advocate your desires and appetites lead nowhere towards a God within necessity. The actions in the possible existent lead to synthetic propositions and contingency. Because of the causes the possible existents have shown to cause, Leibniz directs the best option in reason to be sufficient reason in the actual existent.

Leibniz’s biggest known philosophy was Monadism. The concept of substance and activity are concepts of his that lead up to monads.

Substance

Lets first understand what a subject and predicate is in logic and reason. A subject is pretty much a premise of an argument. It is the main thing discussed in a sentence of logic. A predicate is the denial or confirmation in a sentence of logic of the subject
Lets define substance:

1) Recognizes of only the subject of logic and not the predicate(s).
2) Consists of many predicates.
3) Goes through constant change

To shortly sum this up, it is the changing form of a subject. In substance alone, time is a contradiction.

Activity

This is the metaphysical necessity of substance. This is how substance exists metaphysically in things discussed. This is a phenomenon that is the biggest quality of substance. This is where substance shows itself. Without this, substance would be contingent. Leibniz introduces this idea and does not thoroughly explain it until a whole new phenomena is introduced. Activity is necessary. It is especially necessary for substance to be necessary.

Force

This is an essence that constitutes substance. Force in this case creates activity in substance. This is the biggest principle of activity. This must change and pass in and out in activity. Virtue comes in and out of substance through force

Activity with force is not causation. However, activity with force is an attribute corresponding to the relation of causality. Force is causal to activity. Activity is causal to the appearance of substance.

This is the introduction of Leibniz’s ideas posted because they directly play into monadism.
Leibniz’s Monadism will be explained later. The  concepts of substance, activity and force are the elements of Monadism.

Laws of Continuity

There are 3 laws and the 1st law has 2 laws inside it. Continuity means simply that what is discussed never ceases to continue.

1) Spatio- Temporal Continuity
This breaks down into 2 continuities
– Continuity of Space
– Continuity of Time

2) Continuity of Cases
This applies mainly for laws of nature and reason/logic. If the difference between 2 cases continue to decrease without limit, the result itself will also decrease in difference without limit. For example. if a marsupial mouse and a normal mammal mouse are very different, evolution becomes divergent and the 2 cases without limit become more and more the same, the result will be the same mouse even though they are of different genus.

3) Continuity of Actual Existents/Forms
If 2 substances differ finitely, there is a continuous series of intermediate substances, each differing infinitesimally from the next one in the series (Russel, 1900). The substances that differ and create the intermediate series are actual existents. By Leibniz, ever spot in a series is filled with all certainty. Each spot in a series is not filled twice either.
Continuity is never always equal to actual existents.

Possibility versus Compossibility

If there is a series of existents, the series is possible if none of the existents in the series contradict each other.

Compossibility

If there is a series of existents and 2 of the existents belong to the same possible world, the existents are compossible. Another way to explain this is that if 2 existents coexist in the same possible world, they are compossible.

Being compossible can be confused with when 2 existents fall into the same possible world/category. If this occurs, the 2 existents are contradictory  not compossible. Things cannot coexist if they contradict each other.
There are an infinite number of possible worlds whether or not compossibility exists within them. All worlds respond to each other in one way or another with the existents within them.

Necessity

There are 3 types of necessity concerning the possible worlds and the compossibility within them.

1) Metaphysical or Geometrical Necessity
-This basically covers the parts of necessity that have been proven past hypotheses. Metaphysics and mathematics that are known to be true are in this category of necessity. The opposite of this necessity is self contradictory.

2) Hypothetical Necessity
– In some ways, hypotheses can have contingency, but some have necessity and those that do are what this discusses. Those existents that are valid concepts that have not been accepted to be metaphysical or mathematical are hypothetically necessary.

3) Moral Necessity
– There is only necessity in morals because morals are only from the good. The good existents are chosen by God and His angels according to Leibniz.

Leibniz’s philosophy of matter/monads should be the next post on Leibniz.
If you did not understand some terminology like the word existents or contingency there are 3 previous posts on Leibniz. Go there to understand all the interwoven concepts within these higher understood concepts.

This is still leading up to the theory of monads as these concepts lay foundation for it. This is one of 2 parts of Leibniz’s Philosophy of Matter.

before the Theory of Dynamics and other concepts can be explained, there are 5 different definitions of matter and body.
1) Materia Prima- this is matter that is known to exist because of extension. Extension is then known as repetition. The translation is primary matter. It is purely passive as defined by Leibniz.
2) Materia Secundus- this is matter given by force. It translates to secondary matter.
3) Primary matter as an element of every monad.
4) Secondary matter described as an aggregate of monads. When secondary matter is described as so, it can also be described as mass. Mass as defined by chemistry is what has matter and takes up space.
5) The organic body of a monad.

Secondary matter and secondary matter as an aggregate of monads is what makes up mass and body. Body is something that is a part of explanations throughout the philosophy of matter.
Corporeal substance is created with the organic body of a monad and a dominant monad.

The aforementioned material may not mean much now, but they are only defined to assist in explanation of later principles.

The Law of Dynamics

As explained by Leibniz, dynamics shows that the essence of matter is not extension (remember that extention is repetition). Also, the total quantity of matter in the universe is not constant, but the quantity of matter in a given direction is constant.

Force

As explained in previous posts, force is a key phenomenon in activity itself and activity is the main principle of substance. In relation to dynamics, force is an ultimate entity that is and remains constant. Force is proportional to the quantity of another phenomenon in energy. Different kinds of force will be explained later.

Where is Dynamics derived?

2) Dynamics is derived from the nature of the extended. Materia prima is the matter that is extended under dynamics.
3) Dynamics is derived from the fact that materia prima is supplemented by force.

Materia Prima

As stated above, dynamics is derived by the fact that force is its supplement. Force is primary matter’s supplement through resistance.
There are 2 types of resistance that materia prima acts upon through force.
1) Impenetrability- other forces or beings cannot penetrate it if the materia prima has sufficient resistance.
2) Inertia- The materia prima resists motion that it endures.

Materia prima has 2 properties:
1) The property of bodies, matter and mass in virtue of which they are in places.
2)  The property of virtue in which they resist any effort to make them change places.

The above 2 properties relate to the 2 kinds of resistance. The first property relates to impenetrability because  of how the bodies, matter and mass attempt to remain in the same places. The second property relates to inertia because of how the materia prima bodies attempt to resist motion in between places.

The materia prima also shows in dynamics to have 2 kinds of power.
Power- according to dynamics, power involves force and energy all inside activity
1) Passive power- power that constitutes matter/mass therefore contains resistance.
2) Active power- power that constitutes form.

The idea of power in dynamics contains passive force. In all power, force is involved so passive force is also involved.

Passive Force

there are 2 kinds of passive force in dynamics.

1) Primitive Passive Force- this kind of passive force always involves ressitance. Primitive force itself resists materia prima.
2) Derivative Passive Force- this kind of passive force resists materia secundis.

to clarify inertia.

Law of Inertia


The fact that a body will not engage in motion when a force acts upon it. The body or mass will remain stationary when the force acts on it and is one of the resistances involved in force.

There are 3 theories of dynamics that surfaced in Leibniz’s time that Leibniz refuted because these 3 principles  contradict his idea of the law of dynamics and through this, he explains what dynamics really is. Leibniz is kind of difficult in how he explains his ideas.

The Doctrine of Hard Extended Atoms


By Leibniz, all atoms are extended/repeated and elastic. This doctrine of these atoms state that even though the atoms are elastic and extended/repeated, they are also hard. Leibniz refutes this because it is not possible for the atoms to be hard while at the same time being elastic and extended/repeated.

The Doctrine of the Plenum


This is a doctrine basically explaining about the possible existence of a vacuum in Leibniz’s dynamics of atoms.
This is getting a little bit into physics and that is not what my aim really is but I think that the doctrine of the plenum does well to explain the philosophy of matter by Leibniz. If you do not know what a vacuum is, it is not the device that sucks up dirt to clean your house. A vacuum in physics is a spot in space/time where there are no atoms or particles of any kind. If a person was in a vacuum, you would suffocate because there is no air in vacuums.
The argument is whether or not a vacuum in space is possible under dynamics of atoms. Leibniz refuted the possible existence of any vacuum because he says that when God made the universe, he took every opportunity there was to create atoms and life to occupy every area within the universe. Leibniz is basically saying that there is no real reason to determine the proportion of filled space to vacuums in the universe so he concludes in this doctrine that an existence of a vacuum anywhere in the universe of atoms is not possible.
Plenum has a clear definition by Leibniz. Plenum is where all matter is connected together. Everything that has atoms is a plenum.

The Doctrine of Unextended Centers of Force


The topic of this doctrine that Leibniz refutes is force actions of atoms upon other atoms. The presupposition is that whether or not atoms act upon each other far away from us. Leibniz concludes that because atoms never act upon each other through force near us, they cannot possibly do so far away. The issue here is merely if or not atoms can act upon each other anyway. It is first determined whether or not they can do so and then it is determined to what lengths they do those force implied actions. Leibniz’s verdict on this is that atoms cannot act forcibly upon each other anyway so the lengths that they do so does not matter in this case.

There are 2 kinds of force that act upon the atoms in this universe.

1) Primitive Force- First of all, this force corresponds to the soul and the substance of atoms. This force consists in every body always. At the beginning of this post when I laid out the 5 definitions of matter, I also included that corporeal substance is the organic body of matter and a dominant monad. This kind of force exists primarily in corporeal substances.

2) Derivative Force- This kind of force is more simple. This force is the result only of conflict between bodies with each other.
Derivative force is also defined as (called impetus) a tendency (called conatus) to some determinate motion by which the primitive force is modified. This shows that both kinds of force are always connected to each other in some way.

This next category is not really a force in its own but it is something that is important to force itself in activity of
atoms. Vis Viva is the sum of the derivative forces throughout the universe’s constance. Vis Viva being a sum of forces is really important to the substance and activity of the atoms in dynamics because this sum is always equal to kinetic energy.

Before the idea of a point can be explained, 2 kinds of beings must be introduced:
1)Simple- Entities consisting of one part and consists of no other parts.
2)Compound- Entities consisting of many parts. Each part of this is a simple entity.

Extension- Regardless of the changes something may go through inside time and space, the extension/repetition of the thing never changes. The time and space the entity extends itself in does not belong to the entity but the extension that is created will always exist and belong to the entity that was extended.
Extension is a plurality because of the ownerships and properties that are involved in the act of extension.

There are 3 points in space and time that Leibniz categorizes things in space and time.

1)Metaphysical Point- first characterized as atoms of matter, Leibniz re-explained metaphysical points as atoms of substance because substance gets more basic than matter. Monads are defined within these points.

2) Physical Point- this is clearly defined as the compressed corporeal substance. If you do not know what corporeal substance is, go to the beginning of this post.

3) Mathematical Point- these points coincide with mathematical relations of space and time and matter.

Monad-an existing substance that is a member of the actual and is of the best possible world. It is of the actual best possible world.

Monads have a few properties that explain nature of monads and how they unite.

Perception- at any moment, each monad/substance perceives all other monad/substance in different degrees of clarity. Every monad is omniscient but confused because of the varying degrees of clarity that monads perceive other substances. Monads perceive other monads on a basis of similarity to themselves.

Representation- or showing. This is the inverse of perception. B perceives A as A is represented in B.
In monads, sometimes a monad represents what they are perceiving.

How do monads differ

Appetition- this causes changes in perceptions of monads (or representation) leading towards appetites of good or evil. This causes more differences and diffusion between similar monads.

Monadic Phenomenon- phenomenon occurs in a monad when something appears to a monad so that it is represented in its perceptions.

• Well Founded Monadic Phenomenon- a well founded phenomenon is when the thing that appears to the monad has well rooted perception.
• Mere Phenomenon- if something appears to a monad and has little root in its perception showing  little to no adequate monadic basis, it is mere phenomenon.

Phenomena are just perceptions are just like any other perception that could appear to a monad. Phenomena are just more complex and are able to be distinguished between those that are mere and well founded.

In previous posts where materia secundis was explained, aggregates are those that correlate with that kind of matter. An aggregate is a unity of 2 monads there are 2 unproven possible kinds of aggregation but a for sure kind of aggregation will be explained later.

Monadic Aggregation

Monads do not usually easily unite. The below are 2 possible forms of aggregation.

1) Mere Aggregate- not being a real aggregate, it is confused for a simple collection of similar monads. The monads have similar perceptions of one another showing that it may be a real aggregate. It is classified as a mere aggregate because all the monads within the ‘aggregate’ have similar perceptions, representations and appetitions.

2) Real Unities- Unity of the monads is questioned in the first place because of the lack of similarity in form, perception, representation etc. between the monads. It is classified as a real unity because it is possible that the monads could be an aggregate because similarity is sometimes seen internally and sometimes externally.

*None of the above aggregates are real mutual possible aggregates. These are merely possible aggregates without having another component explained later.

Well Founded Phenomena Aspects

Excluding mere phenomena, well founded phenomena have 2 aspects that correlate them to monads.

• Subjective- perceiving the monad as a phenomenon unit
• Objective- seeing similarity of monads in phenomena

Phenomena are aspects that are used to help unite monadic aggregates. That is the big reason why phenomena matters to aggregation.

Ways for Monadic/Aggregate Unity

• Externally (Merely)- This is not really unity in an aggregate, but monads try to unite as an aggregate through perception. When a monad tries to unite with an external monad, you only have fake unity because you see similarities in perception, representation and appetition, but that is not the way that aggregates are made so unity externally creates only mere aggregates.
• Internally (Real)- Monads are united by general similarity of mutual perceptions of different monads, so outright similarity is not seen here, but in this case there is a larger chance for a bond between monads.

Monadic Perceptions

1)Simple Delusion- for example, a hallucination

2) Disjointed Aggregate- like a herd of livestock or a mere or a real unity/aggregate

3) Unified Aggregate- like a stone or a real unity without a dominant monad

4) Structural Aggregate- like a plant or animal or a real unity with a dominant monad

Substantial Link between Monads and the Dominant Monad

A Dominant Monad is a monad amongst many other monads that has the best perception with the highest degree of clarity above all the other monads. This high monad has the highest good and has the highest amount of  strength and knowledge. A Substantial Link is created when the dominant monad observes all other monads within an aggregate below it.

This diagram does not put one point above others but the dominant monad would be B towards the furthest right because of how all other axioms are leading toward it. The substantial link is made because B perceives all the other monads.

Vinculum Substantiale

As explained in one of the previous posts about Leibniz, a simple substance is one that has no parts. And a compound substance is one that has many parts and each part is of a simple substance. In the beginning of this post I explained why the mere aggregate and the real unity aggregate are not REALLY  true aggregates, because a real aggregate is one that unites well enough that after it is united in the aggregate, it is no longer perceived as 2 monads/substances, but it is perceived as 1. Vinculum Substantiale is where an aggregate is that much of a true aggregate that it is perceived as a quasi-individual. Correlating this to monadic perceptions, aggregates without V.S. are disjunctive aggregates because of how they are not united into quasi individuals. The V.S. aggregate is the monadic perception of unified aggregate or even a structured aggregate because of how they are unified to the utmost extent.

How do monadic aggregates get from disjointed aggregates to unified aggregates with V.S.?

You get unified aggregates with V.S. with dominant monads and substantial links between the D.M and the other monads. Because of the high degree of clarity that the D.M. perceives the other monads, the monads and the D.M. are able to have a unified or even a structured aggregate with vinculum substantiale.